Historical, Social and Political Context
Ancient China
As Collins (1998) argues, intellectual creativity is rarely if ever a product of an individual genius. Original and influential thinking is regularly created in direct or indirect collective interaction. Scholars develop new conceptual and analytical models in dialogue with others and in many historical instances the rise of influential and competing schools of thought tend to reinforce each other. Confucianism is no exception as its key principles have developed in creative disagreements with Mohism, Legalism and Daoism. Furthermore, the new ideas also often entail the presence of historically turbulent times. In this context the origins of Confucian ideas owe a great deal to the blustery social and historical context of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. In contrast to the previous age of relative stability, rooted in the dominance of the Western Zhou dynasty that was focused on fighting the ‘barbarian tribes’ in the north while maintaining peace among its feudal fiefdoms at home, the Spring and Autumn periods initiated a new era defined by protracted violent conflicts. When the ‘barbarians’ inflicted a decisive blow to the Zhou, the internal geopolitical stability crashed: from 771 bce onwards a series of wars led to the emergence of several relatively powerful states which had managed to subdue their weaker neighbours and were competing between each other for supremacy. These two long periods were defined not only by incessant warfare and political instability, but also by organisational and intellectual creativity as the competing local powers tried to build a sturdy state and powerful military apparatuses. Hence they all attempted to recruit the best scholars, soldiers, scientists and engineers in order to achieve the ultimate military victory. In the Spring and Autumn periods the key states were Jin, Chu, Qin, Qi, Wu and Yue, most of which also controlled smaller, tributary states in the Central Plains. By the end of this period some states such as Jin had collapsed and others emerged from their ruins. Thus during the Warring States period the key players were Qin, Qi, Wei, Zhao, Han, Chu and Yan. This period was characterised by intensive military, technological and organisational developments including the invention and mass use of the crossbow, the shift from chariots to massed infantry and the establishment of efficient bureaucratic institutions (Tinbor-Hui, 2005).
By the end of the Warring States period Chinese states were world leaders in state formation and in the development of military capacity. The seven leading states were able to field massive armies and provide complex logistical systems, and establish effective bureaucratic structures capable of training, supplying and controlling hundreds of thousands of soldiers. In other words this period was defined on the one hand, by intensive warfare with an unprecedented number of human casualties and, on the other, by substantial organisational advancements, economic growth and significant bureaucratic, legislative and military reforms. Some of these developments, such as the Shang Yang reforms, were instrumental in eventually bringing about a unified and centralised authority for the whole of China. Before unification in 221 bce, the rulers of the Qin state tended to avoid major conflicts with other states, using their unique and beneficial geographical position to build alliances, trade and play off other states against each other. It is only in the last decades of the Warring States period as the Qin evolved to become the most powerful polity that war was used as the principal device for expansion and control. From 238 bce onwards the rulers of Qin devised a concrete strategy to conquer the other six states. The key idea behind this plan, devised by Ying Zheng, was to attack and annex each state individually along the principle of ‘allying with distant states and attacking nearby ones’ (Tin-Bor Hui, 2005).
Medieval North Africa
Just as with Confucius, Ibn Khaldun’s intellectual project owes a great deal to the historical, political and ideological turbulence of his times. The fourteenth century was a period of protracted crisis in North Africa, a region which in many respects was unlike the rest of the medieval Muslim world. Since the large-scale rebellion of the 730s, inspired by the egalitarian heretic teachings of Kharijism, the rulers of the Maghreb were politically independent from the caliphs of Baghdad and Damascus. This autonomy was rooted in economic strength, as the region was the epicentre of Middle Eastern and Mediterranean trade for centuries. In addition the rulers of the Maghreb kingdoms controlled the gold trade as they had a monopoly on the routes to the Western Sudan’s gold, destined for European and Middle Eastern merchants (Lacoste, 1984: 16). The direct consequence of this trading monopoly was the substantial growth of towns such as Fez, Tlemcen, Bougie, Constantine, Tahert or Kairouan, the centres of prominent medieval kingdoms. However, unlike the relatively centralised imperial orders of the Mamluk Sultanate in Cairo or the Ottoman Empire, the North African kingdoms were largely decentralised entities where the rulers controlled the towns and the main trading routes, while the local tribal groupings maintained a wide degree of autonomy. More specifically, unlike feudal Europe where warrior lords controlled vast swaths of peasantry and were all in turn immersed in personal vassalage relations, in North Africa the tribe was the locus of power and solidarity.
Hence, it was not individuals but ‘the tribe that was subject to the chieftain who had granted the right to raise taxes’ (Lacoste, 1984: 21). In this context, the power of individual rulers was heavily dependent on their ability to negotiate with the chieftains of different tribes and their power base was firmly rooted in their tribal group. Simply put, the kings were essentially tribal leaders who assumed control of a confederation of several tribes. The rise of the Almohad Empire in the twelfth century temporarily changed the political landscape of North Africa as the Almohad dynasty unified the Maghreb in 1120. The Almohad period was characterised by a degree of cultural renaissance and the establishment of new universities teaching Greek and Roman philosophy, science, geometry, astronomy and the arts, development of novel artistic and architectural forms, and advancements in jurisprudence and Islamic theology. The leading philosophers of the medieval world found their intellectual home in the Almohad Empire including such distinguished neo-Aristotelians as Averroes (Ibn Rusd), and the Jewish philosopher Maimonides. This period was remembered as the golden age of the Maghreb.
Ibn Khadun was coming of age at the time when the well-established stability of the Hafsid dynastic order was dramatically and substantially undermined by the rising Marinid dynasty, and the neighbouring Zayyanid powers, all struggling to establish entire control of North Africa. Furthermore the inter-dynastic claims within the Hafsid royal court triggered internal conflicts which led to the fragmentation of Hafsid territories under different claimants to the throne. This situation triggered a scramble for territories between different political actors including neighbouring kingdoms, distinct dynastic claimants, and nomadic and semi-nomadic tribal groupings inhabiting the Maghreb region. All these radical geopolitical changes created long-term instability with constant shifts in alliances between rival sides. More significantly, the geopolitical volatility brought about new social realities where on the one hand, no single political power could establish its hegemony and, on the other, the rulers were forced to compromise with different social groups and extend some rights and privileges to non-aristocrats. More specifically, various dynastic claimants welcomed to their courts talented individuals, some of which were without patrician credentials.
Arguments and Ideas
Confucian Social Philosophy
Confucius’s ideas have occasionally been described as a predecessor of sociological thought. For example, Cho (1996: 112) argues that ‘Confucianism was, in a sense, Durkheim’s “moral education” and Weber’s “ethic of responsibility” combined into a single