The role of the Democratic Party (DP) in the negotiations was a valuable one. Indeed, it could have been decisive had the NP government and the arch-liberals of Rondebosch been able to put aside their sometimes childish party-political vendettas from a bygone era and participated, instead, in the negotiations with the understanding that they shared many points of agreement. The DP could have contributed experience and insight to the process, something which the NP did not always have. The DP tried to do this, but, without any firm agreement with the government, its influence was limited.
The conservative Afrikaners also had to be kept on board. They were not necessarily against the idea of negotiations, but cherished the dream that the outcome would be a little place of their own under the sun. But they were deeply divided and leaderless. Largely because they had strong support in the security forces, they were handled with kid gloves and a measure of understanding during the negotiations.
Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, no less, spent hours with me negotiating with the right-wingers about a volkstaat, a state set aside exclusively for the Afrikaner people, and the subsequent inclusion of principle 34 in the Transitional (Interim) Constitution. Mbeki was well aware of the Afrikaners’ potential for disrupting the peace process – a perception, strangely enough, not shared by De Klerk and Meyer, who left it largely up to me to negotiate with the right-wingers and who were visibly irritated when informed of my progress, or the lack thereof.
There were also dozens of talks with the multitude of smaller parties. Some were no more than splinter groups, but the country could not afford to deny them inclusion in the process. They ranged from Azapo and the PAC, headed at the time by a fiery and unapproachable Patricia de Lille and the unimpressive Benny Alexander (aka !Khoisan X), to the Afrikaner Volksunie under the leadership of the talented Andries Beyers.
For good measure, we also had to deal with the relics of the previous political dispensation in the form of the homeland leaders. Evidently, they were in general disfavour with their voters, but had something to contribute nonetheless. Needless to say, negotiating with them was less onerous, but, when Meyer found time to speak to them, he was full of the bravado that he lacked when trading blows with ANC heavyweights. (The negotiations with each of these groups are discussed in more detail in Chapter 12.)
1 Cited in Anthony Sampson, Mandela (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1999), p. 364.
Chapter 4
A truly South African plan
It is to the credit of the South African negotiation process that it developed a unique procedure and set of measures that are still unequalled in the modern world. A good example of this was the executive transitional councils that made provision for participatory management by all parties during the last phase of the settlement process.
We developed systems, processes and procedures that were as uniquely South African as biltong, boerewors, putu porridge, chakalaka, snoek and biryani.
Europe’s classic textbooks may have given us something of a guide, but we gradually developed our own, often unique, negotiation philosophy and structures. It was better this way: in South Africa, we could not simply accept as gospel what had developed elsewhere over the centuries.
On the one hand, we had to rule the country and keep it as stable as we could so that peaceful negotiations would be possible. On the other hand, an existing government had to negotiate with parties who were actively engaged in undermining this very stability – and who regarded this capacity as their most important means of putting pressure on the process.
Furthermore, support for some of the big parties had not yet been determined democratically, which meant that it was no easy task to gauge their relative weight – and to handle them accordingly. The negotiations had to be fully representative and transparent, too – in the struggle ranks in particular, American president Woodrow Wilson’s ‘open covenants of peace openly arrived at’1 was followed with almost religious fervour.
Nevertheless, the secrecy in all parties’ inner circles was maintained and became progressively more important. Negotiations without secrecy are futile. No negotiator can afford to place his critical aims – and, particularly, the concessions that must, of necessity, be made – before his sometimes fickle and unyielding supporters for approval.
It stands to reason, then, that the core negotiating group could not only include the doves and soft-hearted peacemakers of the various parties. Unless each group included the hawks and the hardened toughies as well, negotiators could forget about getting their message accepted by their sceptical supporters. When it came to reporting back to their respective parties, the words of the hawks were inevitably more credible to party members than those of the doves.
Throughout, the negotiating processes were conducted in many different forums and were often held simultaneously. The opportunity was afforded to hold confidential talks and arrangements were made for leaders at the highest level to conduct special discussions to iron out any problems and to place their seal of approval on developments. Mass conferences were also held so that politicians could have their say and media coverage could stroke their egos. In addition, there were bilateral and multilateral discussions on mutual problems and, last but not least, highly confidential talks with radical groups who wanted to throw their hat into the ring but did not want it known that they were negotiating with a government that they had openly declared they did not recognise as legitimate.
Some negotiations happened in writing, especially when parties wanted to take out insurance policies so they could show their supporters how astute and persuasive they had been in stating the party’s case.
There was also the opportunity for confidential whispers to test the water. Thereafter, everyone would naturally deny, to the death, that such discussions had ever taken place. Sometimes it was a wish list, or a subtle suggestion of the underlying dilemmas in a party’s own ranks. On other occasions, it was perhaps an indication that taking certain steps or making headway was impossible at the time, but might be considered later.
The fact is that no single blueprint applies to all constitutional negotiations, but they may contain guidelines that, through experience, expertise and initiative, could successfully defuse revolutions.
Talk about Greek! This is more than likely what an outside observer would have thought of the government’s negotiation structures.
The AK11 (Civil Servants’ Committee comprising 11 officials) reported to the Core Group for Negotiation. This core group had replaced the Policy Group for Negotiation and reported to the Policy Group for Reform. The latter in turn referred policy matters to the Extended Cabinet, while off on a side track were the Working Committee for Security and Security-Related Matters and the Security Information Committee, which had their own agendas and gave scant attention to co-ordination. Over this complex web, the Cabinet, in theory at least, kept an eagle eye.
Initially, the Policy Group for Negotiation was responsible for managing the government’s negotiations. Later, after Codesa 1, it was replaced by the Policy Group for Reform. The Core Group was set up to handle day-to-day management and to keep the Policy Group for Reform informed of all developments, because it was in the latter that policy matters and the way forward were decided. These structures all comprised government officials.
The Policy Group for Negotiation was the government’s strategic planning team; it was here that the real process of constitutional negotiations kicked off. Well-known heavyweights served in this group, including Pik Botha, Gerrit Viljoen, Dawie de Villiers, Kobie Coetsee, Barend du Plessis, George Bartlett, Hernus Kriel, Roelf Meyer and Tertius Delport. Later, Leon Wessels, Sam de Beer, Jac Rabie and others were included from time to time if the agenda called for it.
In its turn, the Policy Group for Reform had to report to the Extended Cabinet, chaired by De Klerk. This gave the president the opportunity to confer with politicians and officials alike. Naturally, the Cabinet had the final say.
To