The invitation from the KGB to visit Russia had not been an impulsive whim to make friends with a few South Africans: the prelude to the visit had stretched over almost a decade.
Fairly soon after I became the head of NI’s predecessor, the Department of National Security, in 1980, I realised how important it was for South Africa to create a secret channel of communication with the Russians – one of the ANC’s greatest benefactors. An opportunity presented itself in the early 1980s when South Africa had arrested a Russian spy, Alexei Kozlov – a chance that NI used to initiate talks with the KGB.
For years, in many European cities, discussions with representatives of the KGB had been held, particularly with an eye to suspending Russian financial and military support to the ANC, or at least scaling it down. Progress had been painfully slow, but at last we were seeing excellent results.1
In March 1991, two generals of the KGB, Artemov and Ivanov (not, apparently, their real names), arrived at Jan Smuts Airport amid sensitive operational arrangements to bring the two of them unhindered into the country under the noses of the security police. Mike Louw, deputy director general of NI, received them there, at the start of what was destined to become one of the most interesting visits that a sister service in the world of espionage ever made to South Africa.
Our well-read guests asked searching questions about the country. These ranged from the rightists in the agricultural sector to the role of ethnicity in black politics (as observed particularly in the actions of the IFP in the negotiation process). They also asked knowledgeable questions about the support and respect accorded to the ANC and fished, professionally, about what leading ANC figures were getting up to. Unemployment and the role of the trade unions were also discussed closely.
About the crumbling Soviet Union our colleagues were surprisingly open and loyally critical. They believed that the changes in the Soviet bloc had happened too quickly, which had led to undue disruption and a disorderly society. In their view, concessions during premature and rapid transformation were often made too readily. Furthermore, they claimed that 90 per cent of the 2 500 members of the Soviet parliament were ignorant about political matters and had very little or no experience of public administration.
Artemov and Ivanov were also personal guests at our beach house, Lewensessens, at Kleinbaai on the southern Cape coast. My wife Engela cooked her typical boerekos, including roast leg of lamb and curried meatballs. Before dinner, the discussion turned to boerewors, among other things; as a result, it was added to the meat dish, although in untraditional – fried – form. Our Russian colleagues particularly enjoyed the wors and, without hesitation, we shared Granny’s ‘secret recipe’ with them.
On 25 March 1991, the two had an important appointment with President De Klerk in Tuynhuys. Artemov was the spokesperson and communicated the messages from his government. The first of these was that the Russian leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, accepted the NI–KGB channel as the official communication conduit for sensitive matters between Russia and South Africa.
As far as Russia was concerned, there need be no impediment to future co-operation. De Klerk agreed, but also made the point that this should neither replace nor stand in the way of normal diplomatic relations.
Gorbachev’s good wishes for De Klerk’s political transformation initiatives were then communicated and the hope was expressed that, in both the Soviet Union, which was busy with similar processes, and South Africa, transformation would be accomplished successfully and peacefully. De Klerk agreed with this, whereupon Artemov declared that a personal meeting between the two heads of state was not out of the question.
Surprisingly enough, Artemov asked for South Africa’s help with providing grain fodder for livestock in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s official message read: ‘We are facing serious difficulties with our national economy in providing the country with feeding stocks and foodstuff.’ Naturally, he did not mention that this, among other factors, was the result of the catastrophic ideological manipulation of Russian agriculture.
De Klerk informed Artemov that, at the time, South Africa was also experiencing a shortage of certain agricultural products, but that we would be happy to send a team of experts to the Soviet Union where practical assistance could be discussed and planned by specialists in the field. Nor was this just talk – the plan later came to fruition when an interdepartmental team headed by Mike Kuhn visited Russia to launch the initiative.
De Klerk took the opportunity to ask Artemov about the situation in the Soviet Union. He also requested that the message be relayed to Gorbachev that it would be of great benefit to South Africa if the Soviet Union stopped supporting sanctions and opposed our isolation from participation in international social and sporting activities. He also asked that pressure be exerted on the SACP and MK to abandon the use of violence for the purpose of attaining political goals. The two KGB colleagues listened attentively, made notes, and promised that the message would be communicated within days to the Russian leader.
The two must have mesmerised us all a little, as PW Botha would have said. We have to admit that we bade them farewell with heavy hearts indeed.
My invitation to visit Russia as a guest of the KGB four months later was a direct outcome of Artemov and Ivanov’s visit to South Africa.
Very early in the morning – at about 4.30, after the spectacular show by the Moscow Circus the previous evening – I was awakened discreetly to take a telephone call from South Africa. It was Mike Louw. He told me the devastating news that my father had passed away the previous day.
It occurred to me that this must have been the same news that Artemov had received the previous night while we were at the circus, but that he had obviously decided to spare me the grief for the time being, also realising that such sad news should come from a close confidant such as Mike instead. From other hosts during my time in Russia I received the same sincere sympathy. I experienced it as a character trait shown by those who, in their history, had lived through immeasurable hardship and suffering. This kept one humble and grateful and made one more aware of supporting one’s fellow man in times of hardship.
I did not have much time to reminisce about my father and his life. The KGB had organised a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity: to have a personal discussion with Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev. It was scheduled for the next day, but, because of the death of my father, I had to return home earlier than planned.
Then another unimaginable thing occurred: Gorbachev undertook to interrupt a sitting of the Politburo and see me that same day in the Kremlin – which is exactly what happened on 10 July 1991 at 10a.m. We met in an enormous boardroom adorned with old-world finery. The Russian leader wore a neat, navy tailored suit and a red tie. Artemov and an interpreter were also present.
From my side, I informed Gorbachev about the political negotiations in South Africa and asked that the Soviet Union not favour any particular political group in this process; and that the Russians use their influence to exert pressure on the ANC–SACP to abandon its protest action, such as mass mobilisation, if it wanted the process to proceed peacefully. I added that the SACP had a radical influence on the ANC and that it was interested less in a political settlement than in a violent takeover of power. I also warned that any military destabilisation of the process would not be tolerated, be it from inside or outside South Africa.
The Russian leader listened attentively and then made a few remarks. First, he sent his best wishes to President De Klerk and admitted that both of them were dealing with challenging and wide-ranging issues of transformation. Of the South African settlement process, he was complimentary and supportive.
On the possibility of political contact on the highest level, he replied: ‘I will give this idea serious consideration.’ He expressed his concern about the political disintegration in Eastern Europe (it was almost two years after the