In order to understand the successive SADF cross-border operations during the next few years, it is necessary to say something about PLAN’s deployment in Angola. The headquarters of SWAPO’s armed force was at Lubango (see map on page 6), as was the Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre, where insurgents received their military training. The SWAPO forces were divided into three fronts: Western, Central and Eastern. The Western Front’s headquarters was at Cahama, while the Central Front was controlled from Cuvelai and the Eastern Front from Ngluma/Puturunhanga. PLAN also had a so-called mechanised brigade – a grand name for a poorly trained and equipped unit, which existed mainly for its prestige value and had no real place in an insurgency war. The formation, about 2 500 men strong, mostly operated against UNITA as payment to the MPLA for being allowed to use Angolan territory against the “Boers”. SWAPO also had four “semi-conventional” battalions of between 100 and 350 men, situated in the general vicinity of Cassinga.[11] This meant that PLAN was mostly stationed in Cunene province in southwestern Angola, and so this was where the South African axe would fall repeatedly.
A tactic often used by SWAPO was to let specially trained guerrillas infiltrate right through the operational area into the “white” farmlands around Grootfontein, Tsumeb and Otavi to terrorise the white farmers and politicise their workers. This happened for the first time on 8 May 1979, when 30 insurgents crossed the cutline (the border between Ovamboland and the white farming area). During that night, they attacked two farm homesteads and killed a grandfather, grandmother and two minor children. This led to 61 Mech’s first operational deployment, ironically in a counterinsurgency role rather than in the conventional mobile warfare for which it was created. Armoured cars were deployed in stopper groups on roads in the demarcated area, while infantry carried out follow-up patrols on foot and artillerymen protected the farmhouses. This operation was known as Carrot, as would similar operations be in the following years. In this case, all 30 insurgents were rapidly found and killed or taken prisoner, or managed to escape to Angola.[12]
In February 1980, the insurgents tried again. In a widely publicised case, guerrillas attacked the farmhouse of the Dressel family, 45 km south of Grootfontein, and killed the farmer, Eberhard Dressel. His 15-year-old daughter, Sonja, opened fire on the attackers and shot two dead, after which the others fled.[13] The result was pretty much the same as in 1979: altogether, 31 insurgents died and the rest of the group of 60 were either captured or made their way back to Angola. The SADF suffered two fatalities.[14]
But things were not looking good for the South Africans. In February 1980, the SADF registered 42 land mines – a record number – in Ovamboland.[15] And the SADF learnt that the Soviet Union was pressurising SWAPO to intensify the war. Apparently with this purpose in mind, about 800 PLAN fighters were transferred from Zambia to Cunene province. For the first time, attempts were made to infiltrate Kaokoland (hitherto free of insurgents), while the hydroelectric works at Ruacana (supplying northern SWA with electricity) were also attacked. SWAPO was very far from being beaten. On the contrary, the insurgents were aggressive and spoiling for a fight. Everything pointed to a large-scale guerrilla offensive, although Military Intelligence could not pinpoint exactly what was going to happen.[16]
At the same time, South Africa’s strategic position was weakened by the collapse of white rule in Rhodesia. Following the Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979, elections were held in that country in February 1980. Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo’s Patriotic Front won an overwhelming majority in the new parliament, with the result that a valuable South African ally was gone. With the transition from white-ruled Rhodesia to independent Zimbabwe, the international focus would now clearly fall on South West Africa. The thinking in SADF circles was that the Rhodesian government had waited too long to strike across its borders, which was one reason for its demise.[17] The arguments advanced in the first months of 1978 in favour of a large cross-border operation were – from the SADF point of view – more valid than ever before.
And thus, in May 1980 the decision was reached: SWAPO had to be taken on and beaten in its lair. The date would be 10 June. The SADF was expressly forbidden to tangle with FAPLA troops. The strategic purpose of the attack was to break down SWAPO’s image as a war-winning movement, to show the South West Africans that they should not depend on SWAPO, but that the South African government was dealing the cards, and to pre-empt SWAPO’s offensive even before it could start. Operationally, the attackers had to destroy PLAN’s command post and headquarters, to disrupt its logistics system, to gain maximum intelligence, and to “eliminate SWAPO terrorists”.[18] The base complexes of Chifufua (also known as Smokeshell, or QFL), Ionde, Mulola and Chitumba were to be attacked and destroyed on the first day. Thereafter the force would stay in the vicinity for ten days to follow up and hunt down SWAPO groups that might have escaped. For the operation, known as Operation Sceptic, the invading South African forces were divided into four combat groups:
• The main punch would be provided by 61 Mech (called Combat Group 61 for the duration of the operation), under the command of Commandant Johann Dippenaar. The formation would consist of two mechanised infantry companies, two parachute infantry companies (motorised), an armoured car squadron and support troop, a battery of 140-mm guns, a support company with two antitank platoons as well as a mortar platoon, and a combat engineer troop, together with other support troops.
• The other part of the punch was concentrated in Combat Group 10, under Commandant Chris Serfontein, with two paratroop companies (motorised), one armoured car troop and a support company. His target was Mulola.
• The third element was Combat Group 53 (three motorised infantry companies, two armoured car troops and a support company), under Commandant Jorrie Jordaan.
• Lastly there was Combat Group 54, with five light counterinsurgency infantry companies (including two from 32 Battalion and one from the parabats) and a mortar platoon, all under Commandant Anton van Graan. This group would not be part of the main operation. Van Graan’s light battalion would kick off the operation by securing the area just across the border up to Mulemba for the others to pass through safely. At Mulemba, a temporary base area would be set up where troops would sleep overnight on 9/10 June and from where Smokeshell would be attacked the next day.
The intelligence about Smokeshell was rather deficient – Dippenaar describes the information at his disposal as “very vague”.[19] After a while, it became clear that Smokeshell was not so much a base as a complex of 13 positions, spread out over an area of 3 km by 15 km, all of it in dense bush. Each position covered approximately 300 m by 600 m. SWAPO had clearly learnt a lot from Cassinga and Chetequera; Smokeshell was dug in, with the fighters living in foxholes, trenches and covered bunkers, all of which had been excellently camouflaged. This showed a strong Soviet influence. The SADF identified seven anti-aircraft positions, some with the feared 23-mm gun, and the whole complex was manned by an estimated 800 men.[20] (As far as could be ascertained, no women or children were present this time. Had SWAPO learnt its lesson?) The position was, as the crow flies, about 180 km north of the border, but, with winding sandy tracks along which the army would advance, the distance would in fact be about 260 km.[21]
The idea was that Combat Group 61 would lead the way across the border towards Chifufua, with Combat Group 10 in its wake. By noon on 10 June, the attackers were meant to be in place. After an aerial bombardment by the SAAF and a follow-up by 61 Mech’s artillery, the South Africans would move in from the east and advance through the complex. It was expected that the enemy would not stand and fight, but would immediately flee westwards. The two parachute companies from Combat Group 61 would be choppered in on the western side to act as stopper groups. Afterwards, the focus of the attack would shift eastwards to the Ionde complex, with four positions and 700 men.[22] And while the assault on Smokeshell took place, Combat Group 10 would take on Mulola, to the south.[23]
Of course, General Constand Viljoen again insisted on being part of