In a second document, undated but apparently written in March or April 1978, it was bluntly stated that the situation in SWA was entering “an unacceptable turn” due to SWAPO’s military activity. The movement was becoming “ever more audacious with well-planned operations”. SWAPO’s political influence was high, and for this to change meaningfully, its “military capability had to be given a knock-out blow”.[7]
In his MA thesis on the battle of Cassinga, Brigadier General McGill Alexander summarised a third, even more important, document of 1 April 1978:
SWAPO was clearly capable of acting in the “traditional terrorist manner”, but also where necessary to act more aggressively and in larger groups with the required firepower and mobility in a reasonably effective way. SWAPO, claimed the document, had established a considerable number of bases in southern Angola from which it conducted military operations across the border as well as doing limited training and delivering logistical support. SWAPO actions north of the border were displaying a tendency to make more use of conventional weapons.
In sharp contrast to this, it was stated in the document, the SADF had concentrated in the past few years on “counter-terrorist” operations and had to a degree fallen into the rut of carrying out specific, elementary actions because it was seldom possible, and was in any case not permitted, to employ the full military potential of the Army and the Air Force against targets. It was further stated that it was militarily unacceptable to allow SWAPO to be trained in safe areas north of the border in order to concentrate for attacks on South Africa in northern Namibia. More than 50% of SWAPO’s activities in Namibia, it was claimed, took place in the immediate border areas. The initiative, it was emphasised, therefore remained in the hands of the “terrorists” whilst the SADF was compelled to merely react.[8]
This alarming view was confirmed when the Chief of the SADF, General Magnus Malan, was briefed in Oshakati on 12 April on the worsening security situation in Ovamboland. Not only was SWAPO freely holding well-attended meetings at various places to politicise the locals, but also the youth were being particularly influenced. Intelligence was reporting “open SWAPO support in the rural areas”. Militarily, the movement was “acting more purposefully. Moves in big groups. Carries out attacks on the Security Forces. Prepares ambushes and lays mines. Invades territory to the Golden Highway.” Some of the attacks were carried out by groups 100 to 150 strong, Malan was told.[9] Several pro-South African headmen were assassinated, land mines exploded, and a bus with 73 passengers (mostly women and children) was hijacked and forced to enter Angola.[10] Something clearly had to be done.
The preparation for this “something” had started some months earlier, on 31 December, when Prime Minister John Vorster met the Minister of Defence, PW Botha, his Foreign Affairs colleague, Pik Botha, the Chief of the SADF, General Magnus Malan, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Brand Fourie, and the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Constand Viljoen, at Vorster’s holiday home at Oubos, on the Garden Route. There, the intrinsically cautious Vorster was moved to concede the principle of a cross-border operation, provided that he personally approved it.[11]
The South African strategic appreciation was that SWAPO was intensifying its military onslaught in order to strengthen its position in any future negotiations. PW Botha in particular was afraid that this could contribute to a SWAPO victory at the ballot box. Operation Reindeer was meant to tarnish the guerrilla movement’s prestige in view of possible internationally supervised elections. Botha felt that SWAPO’s military power “had to be broken before elections are held”.[12]
By April, it was decided to attack two SWAPO bases in Angola: Cassinga, a mining town about 260 km north of the border, and Chetequera, just 22 km from the border. To SWAPO operatives, Cassinga was known as “Moscow” and Chetequera as “Vietnam”. As Cassinga was too far for a conventional mechanised force to reach, destroy and pull back from without an unacceptable confrontation with Angolan and perhaps even Cuban troops, the weapon of choice was a paratroop force. Chetequera, which was seen as a major supply base and a centre for control and planning for operations in western Ovamboland, would be attacked with a mobile conventional ground force. Several other smaller bases just north of the border would be attacked simultaneously.[13]
Unlike Savannah, which was an intervention in the Angolan civil war, Operation Reindeer, and those that followed it (until 1985, at any rate), was aimed primarily at SWAPO. If FAPLA or the Cubans placed themselves in the line of the South African fire, that would be, as it were, collateral damage.
Cassinga: the plan
The parachute assault on Cassinga was preceded by a series of clandestine cross-border operations by 32 Battalion, with the aim of harassing PLAN inside Angola. Patrols were sent out to locate and hit SWAPO concentrations in the “shallow” border areas before they could reach South West Africa.[14] In one of these, elements of 32 Battalion and Reconnaissance commandos paired up to attack Eheke, an operational SWAPO headquarters. It was a bitter fight, in which the SADF soldiers suffered heavy losses, but it resulted in SWAPO’s eviction. One consequence of this battle was that the SADF realised that the highly trained elite Recces should not be used as infantry; henceforth, they were used mainly for clandestine work such as sabotage and reconnaissance.[15] More importantly, PLAN decided to relocate its headquarters to Cassinga, which was judged safe.[16] This was where the SADF decided to hit SWAPO. The assault would be placed under the command of Colonel Jan Breytenbach, one of the ablest tactical officers in the army.[17]
From a military-historical point of view, the Battle of Cassinga was one of the most interesting engagements of the entire Border War.[18] It was the first, and last, use of the concept of “vertical envelopment”, that is, outflanking the enemy by going over his head, instead of around his flanks. The decision was to drop 370 paratroopers, mainly from 2 and 3 Parachute Battalions (both part-time Citizen Force units), as well as an independent platoon from the full-time conscript 1 Parachute Battalion. A company from 3 Para would form the reserve, to be employed only if necessary.
The paratroopers would be dropped by six Lockheed C-130 Hercules and Transall C-160 transport aircraft, with another three C-160s on standby with reserve troops and extra supplies, if needed. The SAAF had the airlift capacity for more troops, but the problem was how to get the men back after the battle. Cassinga had no airstrip, so there was no way to land and extract the troops by fixed-wing transport aircraft. It was a full 260 km inside Angola; therefore walking back was not an option. The plan, therefore, was to send in a force of helicopters to extract them. Breytenbach had originally wanted a force of 450 paratroopers, but the number of troops was restricted on the basis of the available helicopter airlift capacity (19 Super Frelons and Pumas).
The plan was to hit Cassinga hard with a sudden air bombardment by four Canberra and four Buccaneer bombers, immediately followed by a 30-mm cannon strafing attack by two Mirage IIICZ fighters. While the enemy was still reeling from the noise and confusion, the main ground attack force, two companies of paratroopers (Alpha and Bravo) would be dropped west of the target and advance eastwards through the objective. One company (Charlie) would be dropped to the east, the independent platoon to the north and one company (Delta) to the south to act as stopper groups when the PLAN fighters started fleeing. (“We did not really expect them to stand and fight,” Breytenbach comments.[19]) A mortar platoon with 60-mm mortars and steel helmets for base plates (there were 12 mortars in total) would be available to support the attack, while an antitank platoon with RPG-7 rockets and antitank mines would be dropped to the south to counter any attempt by the mixed Cuban/FAPLA force at Techamutete to intervene.
At the same time, a so-called helicopter administrative area (code-named Whisky 3) would be established 22 km east of Cassinga to allow the chopper force to land and refuel prior to extracting the paratroopers. After the fight, the choppers would transport half the