However, the fact that humans inherently perceive causality (or space and time or perspective) is not itself evidence for the independent truth or accuracy of such perceptions. Arguably, such hard-wiring in the human brain results in the detection of such relationships even where none exists in fact, exhibiting a kind of irrationality. See, e.g., House MD, “Small Sacrifices,” Season 7, Episode 8, November 2010 (in a typically exasperated reaction to religious belief, when he is treating a man who believes that his promise to reenact the crucifixion explains his daughter’s miraculous recovery from cancer, House mutters: “Causal determinism: hard-wired to need to find answers,” a legacy of the caveman for whom the belief in causal relationships was a survival benefit, but which House clearly considers to be irrational where religion is concerned, despite his own obsessive drive to find causation in sources that he considers legitimate).
Undoubtedly, the presence of such hard-wiring would be attributed by many to evolution: for example, the ability to appreciate and perceive causation, spatial relationships and the passage of time all improve the rates survival and reproduction. But, if it is concluded that evolution is the source of such mental constructs, would that be evidence that the constructs reflect reality? As we shall see below, twentieth century developments in physics certainly pose challenges to our preconceptions and perceptions of reality, suggesting that the truths about the Universe (especially at very small and very large scales) may be quite different from what our common sense (and senses) tell us about the world on a human scale.
Perhaps the simplest expression of the main point here is reflected in the statement: “We see with our brains, not with our eyes,” a quotation attributed to Paul Bach-y-Rita, a scientist and rehabilitation physician who developed a “tactile-vision device” that would enable a blind person to “see” by providing electrical stimulation to the brain from the device rather than from the impaired eye. Norman Doidge, MD, The Brain that Changes Itself (2007), p.15. See Paul Bach-y-Rita, et al., “Vision Substitution by Tactile Image Projection,” Nature, 221 (8 March 1969), pp.963–4. In other words, our perceptions of the world are the result of how our brains interpret the inputs received from our senses. See also, Joseph Mazur, The Motion Paradox, p.27 (“the mind, not the eye, is the seeing organ”).
Comprehensibility
To return to the subject of comprehensibility or understanding, an important component of comprehension to modern man is the existence of some theory or model that generates an explanation of the causal relationship, i.e., why it is that “if A, then B.” A theory will postulate what things are causally related and why (or how). An attractive theory will generally accomplish two things: it will be consistent with a body of observations or data and it will provide the person contemplating it with a sense of explanation, a feeling of insight or understanding, not held before the theory was propounded. This second achievement can be described as an experience akin to putting on a pair of properly prescribed spectacles—one can see things more clearly or, even, see things that one previously could not.5
As we shall see, the role of the concept of understanding (or explanation) in science is subject to some dispute. Various philosophers of science and many working scientists have argued that the accuracy of the predictions that can be made is the real scientific test of a theory. Nonetheless, there has been a persistent feeling among many others that the essence or heart of science involves something more.
Michael Polanyi, in an influential paper from 1966, stressed the central importance of what he called “vision,” both in the process of discovery and in the subsequent acceptance of new theories. “The vision which guided the scientist to success lives on in his discovery and is shared by those who recognize it. It is reflected in the confidence they place in the reality of that which has been discovered and in the way in which they sense the depth and fruitfulness of a discovery. Any student of science will understand—must understand—what I mean by these words. But their teachers in philosophy are likely to raise their eyebrows at such a vague emotional description of scientific discovery.” “The Creative Imagination,” in Michael Kransz (ed.), The Idea of Creativity (2009), pp.147–8 (reprinted from Chemical Engineering News 44 (1966) p.85).
Polanyi explained that Copernicus had a vision, subsequently shared by Kepler and Galileo and others, that persisted despite the practical problems of connecting the new theory to the substantial data that had been compiled, problems that required Kepler, Galileo and then Newton to resolve. He asserts that they did not believe in the new theory because the theory solved the problems necessary to predict accurately the planetary movements. Instead, the scientists managed to solve the problems because they already believed the theory. Polanyi also asserts that this vision is the scientists’ glimpse of reality: they “believe that it refers to no chance configuration of things, but to a persistent connection of certain features, a connection which, being real, will yet manifest itself in numberless ways, inexhaustibly. It is to believe that it is there, existing independently of us, and that for that reason its consequences can never be fully predicted.” Id., p.149.
In short, one could manage the external world based upon theories or models that accurately predicted the consequences of particular actions or events. But, many of us would not necessarily say that that person really comprehended or understood the world. We want more than accurate predictions; we want understanding.
In all events, the source of man’s creative actions lies in the construction of theories, which start initially with speculation and the formulation of hypotheticals that are then “tested” against observations of phenomena in the external world. The remarkable history of the development of human culture and learning reflects the power of the theory-building mind to test, improve, reject and then create ever-more extensive theories to explain the human situation and the external world.
The Role of Theories and Models
Perhaps the most important point to be made about theories is their ubiquitousness. Theories shape the questions we ask and the observations we make, as well as the conclusions we draw. Indeed, it is the creation and then communication of theories that enable humans to attempt to make sense of and adapt to the world around them. The use of theories would appear to be a significant distinguishing feature of man, setting us apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. All other animals have reactions to stimuli that are apparently genetically determined (and transmitted) and many animals have some ability to “learn” about relationships (regularities or patterns) between various sensory perceptions and likely benefits or detriments to the organism associated with those perceptions (learned either through direct experience or observations of the experiences of other individuals).
Relatively recent studies have suggested that some animals are even able to recognize the implications of certain observed phenomena and engage in some form of reasoning. This work is discussed in the chapter on Consciousness. With these caveats, it seems fair to conclude that humans have a unique capability of “deducing” broader conclusions or chains of implications from particular sensory perceptions. And, humans do so through the power of explanatory theories or models.
The pervasiveness of theories or models can easily be underestimated. All of our observations about the world are based upon theories; we do not receive any meaningful information directly from our senses. All knowledge is a result of interpretation. “[W]e perceive nothing as what it really is. It is all theoretical interpretation: conjecture.” Barrow, Theories of Everything, p.10. Theories shape the questions we ask; theories enable the observations and measurements we make; theories structure the explanations we derive to make sense of those observations. As recently expressed by physicist David Deutsch: “Observations are theory-laden. Given an experimental oddity, we have no way of predicting whether it will eventually be explained merely by correcting a minor parochial assumption or by revolutionizing entire sciences. We can know that only after we have seen it in the light of a new explanation. In the meantime we have no option but to see the world through our best existing explanations—which include our existing misconceptions.