He was arrested, but mysteriously escaped seventy-two hours later to Malaysia, from where, with Hambali, he would assist the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group in spreading its tentacles across South-East Asia and into Australia.
Chapter Three
Australia – Canberra
Office of National Assessments (ONA)
“The Intelligence and security agencies are subject to the operation of Australian law unless specifically exempted because of the nature of their work.” Australian Government Legislation.
Peter Rigby waved the shared-intelligence report. ‘How do they expect us to believe that so many nukes simply went missing?’ he challenged rhetorically. The United States National Security Agency’s document revealed that some thirty suitcase sized nuclear weapons remained unaccounted for within Russia and Chechnya. The analyst crossed his arms and frowned at the damning report listing the former Soviet Union’s nuclear armory that included 25,000 nuclear weapons, of which 12,000 were strategic warheads on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers – and an inventory of a further 13,000 warheads for tactical nuclear weapons.
With deteriorating economic conditions and organized crime activities continuing to expand across the former Soviet states, Peter Rigby was convinced that it was inevitable for nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists. An ONA (Office of National Assessments) Sr. Analyst, Rigby was also convinced that separatist groups in S.E. Asia were in the market for highly mobile nuclear weapons, and had therefore placed the topic at the top of the weekly briefing agenda.
‘Just how mobile are these weapons?’ the Assistant Director for the S.E. Asian Branch of the ONA asked. The ONA was the government body charged with analyzing international political, strategic and economic developments for the Prime Minister, Cabinet and government departments. ONA was one of the key agencies that directed the activities of the spy agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Service (ASIS).
‘ADMs,’ Rigby commenced, then hesitated, his intelligence world pebbled with acronyms. Acknowledging the attendance of a Cabinet member, Rigby accepted he would have to be more expansive in his delivery. ‘That is, Atomic Demolition Munitions are significantly dangerous due to their mobility. An ADM can be transported and detonated by a single individual. The result of a one-kiloton detonation could claim anything from 50,000 to 100,000 lives. Physically, the weapon is about the same size as a suitcase, doesn’t require launch codes and can be prepared in less than half an hour.’ He looked directly at the ASIS Deputy Director, Andrew Grey. ‘The Chechen rebels could place one under Boris Yeltsin’s bed and none would be the wiser.’
He knew that, without exception, Western intelligence agencies attributed the disappearance of the nuclear stockpiles to the inept guardianship of the hard-drinking Russian president. He also knew that ASIS’ Moscow bureau had reported the local American agents’ deep concern about the thriving black market — especially in transportable ADMs — and that, with the Chechen war entering its second year, Russia’s mountainous borders offered a near-fail-safe exit for these ADMs to arms dealers and fanatical fringe groups. But he doubted that S.E. Asia should be a major concern.
‘The question is whether any of the separatists operating in the Philippines and Indonesia have access or the financial backing and infrastructure to successfully initiate such an attack?’ said Grey. He paused, cast his eyes around casually, then added, ‘and our own analysts concur that those specific groups just don’t have those resources.’
As the ASIS deputy director droned on, Peter Rigby remembered another report which had passed through his domain days before, the information contained in the US-shared information brief providing credence to intelligence claiming Osama bin Laden had recently visited Chechnya. An informant in Grozny had suggested that the purpose of bin Laden’s visit was to consolidate his relationship with a prominent fundamentalist Muslim leader known as ‘Hattab’, a one-eyed Jordanian who had fought alongside bin Laden in Afghanistan before moving on to Chechnya.
‘We might wish to consider Afghanistan as a potential depot?’ Rigby suggested when Grey fell quiet. ‘There’s tracking evidence of movement from Malaysia that confirms a growing number of Islamic dissidents from Indonesia and the Philippines are attending military training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.’
‘There is no intelligence to support that these are not more than simple dissidents escaping local regimes,’ Andrew Grey waved a hand in the air, unaware of the fallout from the Doña Josefa Apartments’ fire. The ASIS head of station in Manila had read the newspaper reports of the fire and, not privy to the report filed by the Philippine authorities with the Americans, summarily dismissed the incident. ‘There has been no significant growth in militant Islamic movements in S.E. Asia that should be of concern to Australia.’ The deputy director’s face stretched into a knowing smile. He supported the pro-Jakarta lobby within the Defence Intelligence Organization. The DIO and ONA both came under considerable pressure from the Defence Department to produce pro-Indonesian assessments and tone down criticism of the Republic. ‘Suharto and the other Asian heads of state have seen to that.’
With the exception of Peter Rigby, concurring heads nodded in assent as the first briefing for the New Year came to a close.
Malaysia – Kuala Lumpur
Hambali’s face remained crumpled with concern. The Indonesian cleric ceased pacing and turned to the al-Qaeda envoy. ‘In view of these developments we must consider closing the company down.’
Wali Khan Amin Shah cast fiery eyes over The Manila Times’ ominous headlines that signaled disaster for their cause. ‘Operation Bojinka’s’ potential to wreak havoc on the United States and its allies had been eclipsed by a Philippine crackdown bringing swift retribution to those involved.
Hambali could not contain his anger and disappointment, moving around the sparsely furnished surroundings, shaking his head in exasperation. ‘We were so close…’ He left the words hanging, flopped into a cushioned rattan chair and looked questioningly at his associate, seeking his concurrence to close down the umbrel a company, Konsojaya Sdn Bhd which they had established only the year before.
Collectively, Konsojaya and its counterpart conspirators had developed the plan codenamed ‘Operation Bojinka’. Now, with the operation revealed and the Manila cells disrupted, Hambali knew that it would be only a matter of time before the international intelligent agencies would come after him, threatening disclosure of the newly created Jemaah Islamiyah cells in the region.
* * * *
The events of the past twenty-four hours had all but destroyed what would have been Hambali, Ramli Yousef and Osama’s finest hour – the Bojinka plan.
Hambali considered the consequences of abandoning the corporate structure Konsojaya Sdn Bhd and whether existing linkages might lead the authorities to their door. He frowned. It was crucial that the trail end there, in Kuala Lumpur, and that no connection be established between the front organization and their covert activities elsewhere.
Although the Bojinka disaster in Manila represented a major setback in their timetable, Hambali remained determined that, one way or another, his network would be restored and expanded until it had delivered the nearly half a billion ASEAN population to the Jemaah Islamiyah, at whatever the cost. He turned to Wali Khan Amin Shah. ‘We must close the company down – then wait. It would not be wise for you to come here again. Until we know the extent of the investigation we should not communicate. I will wait for when you send word from the ‘Sheikh’. Do not lose heart – time will repair what has been done. The Americans and their allies will pay – that, I promise as surely as Allah is the one and only true God.’
Jakarta –The Thousand Islands
Andrew