But the resistance at Saint-Valery at least permitted the evacuation of Le Havre, with no interference except by the Luftwaffe. The Navy was able to tow away a few sub-chasers under construction at Fécamp and in the shipyards of the lower Seine, and also the submarine Créole, which had been launched at Le Havre on June 8. But the Luftwaffe’s bombs sank half a dozen transports, including the Niobé. This ship, although loaded with ammunition which had been intended for Dunkirk, was evacuating refugees from Le Havre. The ammunition was set off by the bombs, causing the death of 800 soldiers, sailors, workmen, women, and children. Only 11 out of all those aboard were saved.
On June 13, Le Havre and the whole north shore of the Seine estuary were in German hands. On the south bank a few guns sent over from Cherbourg were still manned by survivors from Dunkirk, but upstream from Rouen the river had already been crossed in half a dozen places. The front was nothing more now than a thin line of troops, outnumbered three to one, and with no reserves behind them. Several million refugees were crowding all roads to the south. In order to prevent useless destruction, General Weygand had ordered a general withdrawal and had proclaimed Paris an open city.
Italy now had declared war on France.
Generalissimo Weygand informed the Government that he saw no other solution to the situation than to ask an armistice from the Germans. Churchill heard the news, with tears in his eyes, at Tours on June 13, and admitted the probability involved, yet he interposed no conditions.
Even in the hour of decision the Government ordered the organization of a bridgehead in Brittany which France possibly could hold through the assistance of England and with supplies brought in by sea. General Charles de Gaulle, who since June 9 had been Assistant Secretary of the Army, went to Rennes to study the organization of this “Breton Redoubt,” whose front was to follow the courses of the Couesnon and Vilaine rivers. The defense forces were to consist of a few regiments assembled from within the area, plus a Canadian division which was even then disembarking at Brest, and General Béthouart’s troops just back from Norway. But the project was entirely visionary for several reasons: lack of planes, lack of antiaircraft guns to defend the ports, and, above all, lack of time. To organize a worthwhile defense would take a month—some of De Gaulle’s generals and engineers said three months. And the Germans would be there in less than a week.
Admiral Darlan, in Admiralty headquarters now at Montbazon, near Tours, knew the bitter truth. Every evening since the beginning of the German offensive, liaison officers from the Supreme General Headquarters of the Army had brought the latest information on the situation. This Admiral Darlan had promptly passed along to his subordinates, so that while many authorities in France and overseas were poorly informed, the Navy’s principal commanders usually were fully and accurately informed. This sense of sharing in the problem would be a tremendous psychological factor in maintaining the Navy’s cohesion in times to come.
“In case we should be surprised by the rapidity of events” the Commander in Chief of the Naval Forces, acting on his own initiative on June 14, drafted a set of directives to take effect “in the case of an unfortunate armistice.” These directives, which called for the Fleet to sail for Great Britain or for French colonial ports, were coded in advance in order that they could be sent out immediately upon receipt of orders from the Government.
Those orders from the Government never came. But the frame of mind of the Admiralty can be clearly deduced from the two important messages it sent to the western naval bases on June 15. The first suspended further drydocking of any ships; it ordered a speedup in repairs to the Fleet, and the loading of spare parts and ammunition reserves on requisitioned cargo ships; and it directed all men-of-war to be ready to get under way at a moment’s notice. The second message concerned the two powerful battleships still under construction: the Richelieu, which was undergoing trials at Brest, and the Jean Bart, which was still on the building ways at Saint-Nazaire. In case of being threatened by the German advance, these two ships were to be sent to England in accordance with arrangements which had been concluded by Admiral Odend’hal with the British Admiralty. The outline for these arrangements had been taken to Admiral Odend’hal at Dover by Captain Auphan just three weeks earlier.
The next day, June 16, the French Admiralty received definite information that two German armored divisions had just gotten under way in a drive toward the Cotentin Peninsula and Brittany. In that direction lay both Cherbourg and Brest.
Cherbourg, the headquarters of a naval district, was where Admiral Abrial had set up his command post after the evacuation of Dunkirk. It, like most other such ports, had sent the majority of its small guns to Paris or to the banks of the Seine for antitank defense. The result was that it had little left now in the way of mobile artillery. As for defenders, there were a few second-rate battalions. Other than these there were only noncombatant specialists—mechanics, yeomen, stewards, air technicians, and the like—men more used to handling a typewriter or a kit of tools than a machinegun or a rifle.
On the evening of June 17 the German tanks arrived at the Carentan lines. These are natural defense lines which, as far back as the Hundred Years’ War, have been relied upon to defend the approaches to the Cotentin Peninsula. Here Vice Admiral Jules Le Bigot, Commandant of the District and a veteran of the famous Marine Brigade of 1914, had attempted to establish defense lines. But on account of the many other tasks assigned to Cherbourg, he was never able to do so.
On June 17 the radio announced that a new Government, now headed by Marshal Philippe Pétain, had asked the Germans for an armistice. But Admiral Darlan directed that the fight must continue with fierce energy as long as the negotiations were not concluded. Consequently the sailors opened fire on Rommel’s advance guard and held them the whole night. The next morning the drive on Cherbourg continued, but under fierce harassing fire from men-of-war which Admiral Abrial had positioned on each side of the Cotentin Peninsula.22 A few defensive positions in the outskirts of the city also held up the enemy advance so that it was not until the afternoon of the 19th that Cherbourg finally was taken.
The firing ships on the east coast were the old battleship Courbet, escorted by two 600-ton torpedo boats and one antiaircraft sloop; on the west coast, the Léopard, Savorgnan de Brazza, and two torpedo boats. The effectiveness of their fire was attested by French prisoners whom Rommel had placed at the head of his column.
The forty hours thus gained, however, had insured the evacuation of the last British troops there as well as all the French ships in the harbor. A submarine, not quite ready for launching, was dynamited on the ways. All of the coastal batteries were blown up, as were the forts on the main breakwater, which did not surrender until the 20th. Nothing of any use whatsoever was left for the Germans.
Determined to share the fate of his men, Admiral Abrial refused all opportunities of escape and let himself be taken prisoner, along with Admiral Le Bigot and the Cherbourg garrison.
Brest, situated at the very tip of Finistère—“the end of the earth”—could not believe that it was threatened. Despite numerous attacks in its long history it had never been overrun since Brittany had become a part of France in the Middle Ages. Powerful forts defended the roadstead and its approaches. Unfortunately none of these forts faced inland. Worse still, a telegram from the French Admiralty, warning against parachutists landing on the beaches, had resulted in wide dispersion of all the light guns which had not already been sent off to defend Paris.
Brest was the headquarters of a naval district and the command post of Admiral de Laborde, Commander in Chief of the Naval Forces of the West. The Admiral, a vigorous, quick-tempered officer, was very popular in the Navy, especially among those not in a position to encounter his formidable wrath. Up to now the duties of Admiral, West, had been concerned purely with nautical affairs—escort and convoy duty, antisubmarine