When war broke out in 1939, the Home Fleet withdrew to Scapa Flow. It was as far from Germany as the fleet could easily go, hence safe from a knock-out attack – in this case probably from the air. Scapa was also considered safe from submarines, but that turned out not to be the case (blockships had not been positioned effectively), as demonstrated when HMS Royal Oak was torpedoed and sunk. Apparent safety from air attack had also been overstated: the training/experimental ship Iron Duke (an ex-battleship) was bombed and sunk. However, the scale of air attack on Scapa was never as serious as that further south. When Italy entered the war in 1940, the main pre-war Mediterranean base at Malta became largely untenable. The Mediterranean Fleet had already withdrawn to Alexandria (out of range, it was hoped, of Italian air attacks). An element moved west to Gibraltar as Force H, a ‘swing’ force which could reinforce either the Home Fleet or the Mediterranean Fleet. The battlecruisers had already been deployed in 1939 against German commerce raiders in the Atlantic, including the ‘pocket battleship’ Graf Spee. In 1940 Force H consisted of the battle-cruisers and the carrier Ark Royal. It contributed to the attacks on the Bismarck (supporting the Home Fleet), but it also escorted convoys to Malta (supporting the Mediterranean Fleet). The Home Fleet absorbed the new King George V class battleships, although some later fought in the Mediterranean.
The war in European waters left no surplus force to fight Japan. After HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk, the Royal Navy assembled an East Indies Fleet around Royal Sovereign class battleships as a barrier against Japanese expansion into the Indian Ocean and later (in enhanced form) to go on the offensive. As the war in European waters wound down, the Royal Navy created a new British Pacific Fleet to operate alongside the US Pacific Fleet. It fought off Okinawa and its experience helped shape the early post-war Royal Navy. It too included battleships – the remaining King George Vs – but its main strength lay in its carriers.
British big-gun capital ships saw far more action during the Second World War than during the First. The Home Fleet battleships were essential insurance against German battleships breaking out into the Atlantic or attacking convoys bound for Russia. In the Mediterranean, British battleships were essential cover against the powerful Italian battle fleet. Less capable battleships served as convoy escorts to deal with possible attacks by German surface raiders, which were quite active early in the war. These roles involved British battleships in far more ship-on-ship action than their US counterparts, but far less shore bombardment. The great surprise was that British battleships were never massed in a battle fleet of pre-war proportions.
The Admiralty
In this book I often indicate participants in discussions by their titles rather than by their names. That is deliberate; it is often said in government that ‘you stand where you sit’, meaning that you advocate for your department at least as much as for yourself. The same Winston Churchill pushed forcefully for cuts in the expensive naval programme before he advocated even more expensive programmes as First Lord of the Admiralty. Later he again pressed for severe cuts as First Lord of the Treasury.
Royal Navy policy was set by the Board of Admiralty, which consisted of a First Lord of the Admiralty (corresponding roughly to a US Secretary of the Navy), Sea Lords, a Civil Lord and a Secretary. The First Lord connected the Board to the Cabinet and to Parliament, publicly justifying Board policy, but also enforcing Cabinet decisions. He presented the annual Estimates to Parliament, for a financial year beginning 1 May (thus the 1911–12 Estimates referred to the period between 1 May 1911 and 30 April 1912). To some extent the First Lord always affected policy, but Winston Churchill (First Lord between October 1911 and June 1915) greatly exceeded all of his predecessors and successors in his involvement.
Churchill had no prior naval experience, but had been an active soldier and a war correspondent in South Africa. When offered a Cabinet position in 1910, he asked for the Admiralty, but was given the Home Office (internal security) instead. There is reason to believe that he was moved to the Admiralty more to take him out of the Home Office (due to his excessive activism against, for example, strikers) than to reform the Admiralty. Because the ruling Liberals considered war very unlikely, the Admiralty was probably considered a safer appointment. Churchill was also wanted there to convince Liberals in Parliament to keep paying for increasingly expensive warships. He was fascinated by technical details, but his writings show virtually no grasp of naval technology or tactics. His ideas for modifications to ships often seem wrong-headed. His famous account of the Queen Elizabeth design is badly muddled. His forte, which was far more important, was grand strategy, often with a view to larger political or morale issues.
Before 1904 the Sea Lords were termed Naval Lords, but Admiral Fisher revived the earlier Sea Lord term when he took office. First Sea Lord was first among equals. It may seem that between 1904 and 1909 Fisher set British naval policy, but decisions were always corporate. Fisher lost some of his battles. Second Sea Lord was First Sea Lord’s deputy and was particularly responsible for personnel. Third Sea Lord (sometimes termed Controller) was responsible for materiel, including weaponry. Typically he set out what was wanted in a new ship. Many Controllers later became First Sea Lords and as such sometimes revived initiatives they had started as Controllers. Although the title Controller (for Third Sea Lord) lapsed between 1912 and 1918, I have used it interchangeably with Third Sea Lord to emphasise Controller’s key role in warship design decisions. Later there were also, at various times, Fourth Sea Lord (logistics) and Fifth Sea Lord (fleet aircraft).
At least in theory, the Board formulated requirements and gave them informally to its technical advisor, the Director of Naval Construction (DNC), who was therefore sometimes styled Deputy Controller. Many requirements were understood informally, hence are not obvious from surviving documents. An activist DNC could convince the Board to build a new type of ship, as in the case of the first British armoured cruisers, were sold to the Board by Sir William White. The DNCs of the period covered by this book seem not to have had comparable impact.
Ships were designed by the construction department headed by the DNC. Machinery was the responsibility of Engineer-in-Chief (E-in-C) and ordnance the Director of Naval Ordnance (DNO). Their subordination to DNC seems to have been much more nominal than actual: there is no evidence that DNC or his department had much familiarity with either ordnance or with machinery.
DNC’s assistant supervised design teams, each headed by an experienced constructor. Constructors’ Notebooks give some examples. During the First World War the capital ship team leader was E L Attwood. By 1920 Attwood was DNC’s assistant. The team which designed the post-war battlecruiser was headed by S V Goodall. For the King George V class, Goodall was assistant to DNC A W Johns. The capital ship team was headed by H S Pengelly. Goodall was soon promoted to DNC. Unfortunately there are insufficient surviving pre-1914 Constructors’ Notebooks to indicate how design was organised under Philip Watts, who as DNC was responsible for the pre-war dreadnoughts.
The DNC organisation designed ships up to the point at which bids could be invited, which for the purposes of this book meant to the point of mature designs. E-in-C and DNO laid out specifications and evaluated designs (they also estimated weights and sizes so that DNC’s designers could produce preliminary designs).6 DNO was responsible for developing fire-control systems. During the inter-war period an Anti-Submarine directorate, concerned with Asdic (sonar) was created. Ultimately this DAS took over responsibility for torpedoes as well (as DTASW).
Queen Elizabeth at Trincomalee, 13 April 1944, as photographed from USS Saratoga. She had been heavily modified during a refit at Norfolk Navy Yard in the USA and then refitted again between August and September 1943. Note that unlike Valiant, at this time she did not have Oerlikons