White also argued for greater speed: ‘the great increase being made in the numbers of Armoured Cruisers which may take part in an action with Battleships and the tendency to increase Battleship speeds abroad make it appear desirable to aim at a greater speed than the 18 knots approved for Formidable class’. The Italians had adopted 20 knots for their new ships, but they were expected to sacrifice protection. DNC proposed an increase to 19 knots. Estimated displacement was initially 15,300 tons, but that soon grew to 17,000 tons. This was a massive jump over the 15,000 tons of the previous standard class (Londons) then being built. Although the Admiralty Board initially endorsed the increase in displacement, the Cover for the next (King Edward VII) class shows that it sought reductions to contain ship size, hence cost. The design process was further complicated because it coincided with a decision to change gun propellant (to cordite MD) to reduce bore erosion. Cordite MD was less energetic, so a larger charge was required.5 The shift thus demanded larger magazines and that in turn made for a larger ship.
Another step towards uniform calibre was the adoption of faster-firing main battery guns. HMS Swiftsure, shown, was armed with 10in guns which could fire much faster than contemporary 12in guns, plus a secondary battery (7.5in guns) more powerful than the usual 6in quick-firing weapons. She was conceived not for the Royal Navy but for the Chilean navy, which needed a counter to the large armoured cruisers Argentina was buying in Italy. In this sense Swiftsure and her sister HMS Triumph were conceived as semi-capital ship cruiser-killers, not too different from the first battlecruisers. The ships went on the market after Chile and Argentina agreed to stop their naval building race (there is some suggestion that the Royal Navy was rescuing the builders from severe financial embarrassment). The cylinder on the fore side of the ship’s foretop displayed the range at which she was firing; a similar cylinder appears to have been mounted on the after side. Note the rangefinder atop her compass platform, just forward of the chart table, with the ship’s compass (note the balls to compensate for nearby magnetic masses) forward of it. The ship’s goose-neck cranes proclaim her non-Royal Navy origin. Swiftsure and her near-sister Triumph had 30in searchlights, whereas the 24in type was standard in the Royal Navy. In January 1907 Swiftsure and the battleship Jupiter were used for comparative trials. Various trials, including some with other ships, showed that the 24in searchlight was generally superior. This photograph was taken by Abrahams of Devonport. (Dr David Stevens, RAN Seapower Centre).
HMS Agamemnon (shown in July 1908) and Lord Nelson were radical departures from the long line of battleships designed by Sir William White, which had culminated in the King Edward VIIs. The incoming DNC Philip Watts told the Board of Admiralty that he could provide considerably more firepower on the same tonnage and this was his first opportunity to show what he could do. The ships’ hulls were unpierced by 6in gun ports. The bridges of past designs were eliminated altogether to provide those in the conning tower (behind the light canvas-covered structure visible at the fore end) with a clear view. As officers complained that they could not con a ship in formation from the conning tower, an additional light flying bridge was added. Lord Nelson had a charthouse.
By late 1900, the design had apparently stabilised. In December DNC was asked to produce a sketch design showing eight 7.5in in four turrets plus ten (rather than twelve) 6in, with a trial speed of 18 knots. This was not the end of the story. When he reviewed the sketch design in April 1901, Controller (Wilson) argued that the ships had to be faster ‘in view of the fact that nearly all the recent battleships building or projected by Foreign nations will have higher speeds. We cannot hope to maintain the command of the sea unless our battleships and armoured cruisers are fast enough to bring the corresponding vessels of the enemy to action if they are sighted. The slight inconvenience entailed by the extra length required to give 21,000 IHP and 19 knots speed is not worth consideration in comparison with the advantage of being able to insure bringing the enemy to action.’ The Naval Lords now reviewed the design. On 3 April they decided on a speed of 18.5 knots.
The new King Edward VII design was the first British battleship to be armoured above the main deck, presumably in response to the threat of intermediate-calibre guns. The design initially showed the 9in belt of the previous Formidable class, extending from the bottom of the slope of the armour deck (well below the waterline) up to the flat main deck, which in the previous class was 1in thick. Initially the new design showed 6in armour above the main deck, the flat deck armour being moved up to the upper deck, the top of the enlarged armoured box. When the design was approved, the side armour extending from below the waterline was split into a 9in waterline belt and an 8in upper strake, the weight saved on the upper strake going into a thicker upper belt (7in between main and upper decks). Weight was also saved by reducing the thickness of the middle (protective deck) from 3in (slope)/2in (flat) in the Formidable to 2in slope and 1in flat in the new ships.
The Naval Lords also chose to substitute single 9.2in guns for the twin 7.5in. The 9.2in mounting would be the same as in Cressy class cruisers. The Cover provides no explanation for the change in armament. For the Royal Navy, it was the step to what was later called a semi-dreadnought, a ship with near-battleship intermediate guns in place of all or part of the earlier quick-firing secondary battery. The first ships of this King Edward VII class were built under the 1902–3 programme; repeat ships were ordered under the 1903–4 programme.
The Royal Navy could have gone further, to a 10in gun, which many considered the largest which could fire rapidly. Although that might not seem much more powerful than the 9.2in, it fired a shell about twice as heavy (because shell weight is proportional to the cube of the calibre). Roughly contemporary with King Edward VII was the new Japanese battleship Kashima, laid down at Elswick in February 1904 with four 10in guns and twelve rather than ten 6in.6
The Board was apparently particularly affected by new US designs. In the winter of 1901 it ordered a War College comparison of the tactical value of speed vs guns and armour, inspired by the example of the new US battleship-sized armoured cruisers of the Tennessee class (four 10in guns, 22 knots).7 In presenting this study DNI (in effect the chief of naval staff) suggested that the strategic aspect (sustained speed) be taken into consideration. Later he argued that although speed was probably not very important tactically (Senior Naval Lord agreed) it might be of the greatest moment strategically. This time First Lord called for comments by Controller, Junior and Second Sea Lords and principal flag officers afloat.8
The basis for the War College conclusion that speed had limited tactical value was two assumptions: that both sides were determined to fight and that the commander of the slower ships always carried out the right movements. In that case faster ships could choose their own range and keep their broadside (mainly secondary battery) guns bearing longer. Vice Admiral A K Wilson (Channel Squadron) pointed to ‘a further advantage which cannot be accurately assessed in the rapidity with which mistakes, which are constantly being made on both sides, can be rectified’. A slow fleet could never bring a faster fleet to action, nor could it prevent it from going wherever it wanted. Wilson’s Rear Admiral (A G Curzon-Howe) added that ‘the condition of the men and ship, after being mauled by faster antagonists choosing their own distance and attack,