That left ships with two tubes in a forward torpedo room. The perceived value of torpedoes increased in the 1930s as the Royal Navy learned to fight a major fleet action at night. However, so did the cost of the space surrendered for that purpose. When twin 4in high-angle guns replaced the earlier single mountings in the late 1930s, the necessary magazines were provided out of the surviving torpedo rooms.
Early in 1934 removal of all submerged tubes in the older battleships and Renown was proposed, above-water tubes being installed. C-in-C Home Fleet wanted only Renown to retain tubes, in above-water form. C-in-C wanted all the ships to have above-water tubes. At this time plans for DTM’s proposed 22.5in torpedo were dropped. Plans for above-water tubes in capital ships were generally rejected on space and weight grounds.35
Should the new battleship then being planned carry torpedoes? At an October 1934 Sea Lords conference Controller argued if the gun were the primary means of attack, torpedoes could rarely be used. The 250 tons involved could better be spent on anti-aircraft armament or main-battery ammunition (thirty rounds per gun) or both. Eliminating above-water tubes would simplify training, relieve congestion on the bridges (no torpedo controls) and save personnel, making a better fighting ship. ACNS pointed to the new night action capability: four 21in tubes would add only 75 tons. First Sea Lord agreed: now that the fleet had been highly trained (and equipped) for night action, it should be and would be embraced. Even in a day action an enemy might find it much more difficult to counter torpedo salvoes fired by battleships than by destroyers. The weapons would be fired intermittently, unseen, so evasive action would be impossible. Exercises sometimes showed as much. In a night encounter in the Mediterranean in June 1932, HMS Ramillies had hit HMS Revenge three times. C-in-C Mediterranean wrote that in the large-scale strategic exercise ZH conducted in March 1934 by the Home and Mediterranean Fleets, ‘the firing of torpedoes by the battleships of both sides during the final close-range encounter might have had very important results’. According to C-in-C Home Fleet, a 18 October 1936 torpedo exercise by Nelson in low visibility demonstrated the value of torpedo armament under such conditions. Similarly C-in-C Mediterranean considered that a 15 October 1937 firing by Barham (also in low visibility) ‘indicate[s] the value of the torpedo armament to a capital ship in short range encounters’.
Although torpedoes were removed from all the rebuilt ships and also from the plans for a new battleship, when she was rebuilt HMS Royal Oak received four above-water tubes. Similar above-water tubes were approved for Revenge and Resolution at their next large refit, but they were not installed.36 The new tubes were made and placed in storage, but when the ships came in for refit no preparations had been made to install them and installation would considerably delay completion. ACNS wanted the tubes installed in Revenge, particularly since it was now unlikely that the Royal Sovereign class would be scrapped on completion of the King George V class. Controller vetoed the idea (for Resolution) on the grounds of the extensive work involved, including gutting one complete mess deck. He was prepared to reconsider Revenge, but doubted that he would approve her. The dockyards were just too congested and the torpedo tubes too marginal.
During the action with Bismarck, Rodney fired her torpedoes, albeit apparently without hitting. With this experience in mind, C-in-C Home Fleet wanted the tubes retained. His successor did not. Meanwhile the British had been much impressed by the performance of Japanese torpedoes in the South Pacific, to the point where ACNS(W [Weapons]) wrote on 27 September 1943 that he agreed with DTSD that the torpedo was ‘the most effective weapon we have’. However, it was a small-ship weapon. When the status of capital-ship torpedoes was reviewed in 1943, all concerned agreed that the enriched air plant should be removed from Rodney and C-in-C Mediterranean saw no point in retaining the torpedoes without the plant, given their much-reduced performance.37 DTM wanted the tubes retained in case he was able to improve torpedo performance. DNC wanted to remove the tubes to improve sub-division, but he would not pursue that if the torpedo battery could be made more effective.
To Controller, ‘this is one of those problems which gets different answers from sea and from the Sea Lords periodically. It is doubtful if we ever have a “line of battle” again. Should this happen, a proportion of battleships should have torpedoes. This was Lord Chatfield’s view. Under conditions of single ship actions or night action by small groups, torpedo armament of medium range may well prove invaluable. The torpedo, when it hits, is still our best weapon.’ The Sea Lords agreed. As late as 1945 DTM seriously proposed installing torpedo tubes on board the King George V class in the space vacated by their catapults and torpedoes were discussed in connection with the abortive 1945 battleship. Overall, the Royal Navy seems to have retained an interest in capital ship torpedoes far longer than any other.
British interest in long-range torpedoes led to an assumption, particularly before and during the First World War, that their enemies had similar views. By 1912 the British thought that others had caught up with them in torpedo range, so that in his instructions for tactical exercises that year Admiral Jellicoe wrote that the 10,000-yd 30-knot torpedo was a current reality. That presented a major problem. British gunnery had been developed to keep battleships out of enemy battleships’ torpedo range. However, 10,000 yds was average North Sea visibility range and by 1912 the Royal Navy was finding it difficult to achieve high hitting rates at even that range. In fact the Royal Navy had more, and more sophisticated, torpedoes than the Germans; even though the Germans had more torpedo tubes, they were less interested in using their torpedoes in a major fleet action. On the other hand, it was difficult for the British to use their own torpedoes during such an action because the same officers assigned to control torpedoes were often occupied controlling gunfire. British capital ships did fire torpedoes at Jutland, but the range was slightly too great for them to hit (the Germans saw British torpedoes floating to the surface at the end of their runs).
Before 1910 the British assumed that only capital ships would be firing torpedoes during a day action, perhaps because they operated their own destroyers separately from their battleships. They dismissed reports that German destroyers (torpedo boats) were working with their fleet on the grounds that such operation would be suicidal. That year they finally accepted the reports and conducted their own tactical trials. Even if the destroyers made no hits, ships evading their torpedoes would find their fire-control solutions ruined. The immediate conclusion was that 4in anti-torpedo batteries on battleships should be mounted in ships’ superstructures, preferably behind armour, where they could fire even when a ship’s main battery was in action (4in guns atop turrets could survive blast, but probably would not be effective during a main battery action). The advent of long-range torpedoes in the German navy opened a new possibility, that destroyers could fire ‘browning’ shots from a safe range. They had to be engaged at even greater ranges. Hence the protected 6in secondary guns in the 1911–12 ships Tiger and the Iron Duke class.
Underwater Protection38
The Royal Navy began experimenting to determine the effect of underwater explosions as soon as self-propelled torpedoes appeared. Early experiments were conducted on HMS Resistance (1866–7), Belleisle (1903) and the Ridsdale Tank (1905–6). On the basis of these experiments and of reported foreign practice, HMS Dreadnought (1906) introduced a torpedo bulkhead: a thick bulkhead on the sides of the magazines specifically to protect them against mine and torpedo explosions. Other navies had already adopted similar measures. The British seem to have attributed the survival of the Russian Tsarevitch after a torpedo hit to her torpedo bulkhead, although in fact the torpedo hit an unprotected part of the ship. Ships built after Dreadnought had full torpedo bulkheads, but they were reduced to local protection in Colossus and Hercules. The full-length torpedo bulkhead was not revived until the Queen Elizabeth class. In these latter ships torpedo protection received special attention and improved structural arrangements were worked out.
All of these ships also had torpedo nets, which were