Commander St John Aldrich Micklethwait of Eskimo. (Author’s collection)
There were also two convoys directly from Narvik to Scotland, one on 26 October (NV-1) and one on 18 December (NV-2). The gathering of the ore ships into convoys created serious delays though, and on 24 December, the Admiralty decided that fast ore ships to and from Narvik should sail independently and not join the North Sea convoys. This stemmed partly from questions as to who was to pay for the Norwegian pilots, which were compulsory inside the Leads, partly from the belief that the time saved on each round-trip was worth the risk, partly from the problem of providing escort for yet another convoy, and partly from ships sailing towards Narvik in ballast finding conditions inside the Leads challenging and wishing to stay offshore.16
The convoys were spread over a number of routes, sometimes by natural causes. Commander St John Micklethwait of Eskimo wrote in his characteristic brief style on convoy ON-3 departing on 26 November 1939:
26th Nov. 15:20: Weighed and proceeded [from Rosyth] to Methil to pick up Bergen convoy, Matabele, Icarus and Ilex in company. 17:00: Convoy ON-3 moved off, weather squally and dark.
27th Nov. Wind North West – fresh
28th Nov. 04:00: West North Westerly gale in full swing, convoy and escort being scattered.
29th Nov. Wind shifted to Southerly and eased
30th Nov. 03:00: Sighted Utvaer Light broad on the Starboard Bow distant 4 miles in bad visibility. Altered course to South West, switched on lights, blew ‘U’ on the siren and signalled to convoy ‘Steer South West’. All ships turned except one, the guide of convoy who struck a reef, but damage was not serious. 07:30: Convoy proceeded into harbour 21 hours late. It is understood that another ship ran aground whilst trying to go into harbour. 07:45: Commenced A/S sweep across the entrance to the harbour outside the three mile limit under the surveillance of Norwegian aircraft. 08:30: Four funnelled Norwegian destroyer appeared and made in English ‘Do you want them now?’ I replied ‘Yes, please’ and she bustled back into harbour returning shortly with the homeward bound convoy. 10:45: Took station ahead of convoy HN-3.
1st Dec. The night of 1st–2nd December was very dark and misty and convoy and escort became scattered but was rounded up with the exception of SS Eskdene, by the time landfall was made off Ratray Head at 11:00. 18:00 (approx.): Detached Icarus and Ilex to close Eskdene who had been mined or torpedoed.
3rd Dec. 02:30: Pilots boarded convoy inside May Island. 08:30 Secured to South Arm Rosyth Dockyard.17
Another Tribal-class destroyer, Afridi, was part of the local escort for convoy ON-23 departing Scotland in the end of March 1940. Stoker (Second Class) John Gritten recounted:
Sometimes as many as fifty vessels, many of them neutrals, would gather off Methil in the Firth and Afridi and other Fleet units, including Cairo and another anti-aircraft cruiser, Calcutta, would escort them across the North Sea to the offshore limits of Norwegian territorial waters where we would pick up a returning convoy. When one morning there was dense mist off the Norwegian coast and the convoy was not at the rendezvous, ignoring scruples about Norwegian neutrality, [Captain Vian in] Afridi not only crossed the invisible seaward frontier, but nosed his way up Bergen Fjord until we found our flock and led it out of the fjord into the open, but still shrouded, sea. Even on the stoker’s mess-deck we knew that this was a breach of a non-belligerent’s sovereignty, though no one doubted, from a strictly naval point of view that it was the right action in the circumstances.18
Entering Norwegian territorial waters was not according to regulations. Quite the contrary: if there was time to spare, the escort was instructed to sweep northwards, away from the rendezvous point, looking for German U-boats or merchant ships. The Cairo and Ceres-class light cruisers were rebuilt to A/A service from 1935. Torpedo tubes and original guns had been replaced by 4-inch high-angle guns and eight-barrel 2-pounder pom-poms with appropriate fire-control equipment to provide warships and convoys with protection against aircraft. The ships, assigned to the 20th Cruiser Squadron, were largely manned by reserve officers and drafted men, but deployed in some of the most exposed areas of the early war.19 Their deployment with the North Sea convoys was found necessary due to the risk of German air attack, and several A/A cruisers were transferred to the Home Fleet, earmarked for convoy duty. This was not trouble-free; on 24 November, Captain Brooke of Curlew reported to C-in-C Home Fleet that:
experience gained in patrol work with the Norwegian convoys has shown that a ship fitted without any weather protection to the guns, deep in the water and without trawler bows is entirely unfit for the work. [. . .] Since the ship was built, the mean draft has increased from 14 feet 1 inch to 17 feet 1.5 inches due to re-arming, fitting of type 79Z [radar set] and counter weight. The freeboard amidships has been reduced to only nine feet. On these patrols where moderate weather was experienced, the upper deck guns were constantly under water and the pom-pom under heavy spray. [. . .]. The only guns which could be fought were the super-structure guns, a total of five providing a broadside of only three guns. The ready use lockers were damaged and became saturated with water [and] it would have been impossible to open the ammunition supply hatches on the upper deck in the event of an action. The ship laboured most when steaming ten knots, about the speed of the convoy, with a quarterly sea. During this time the lee rail was almost constantly under water [. . .]. The maximum roll observed was 33°. The continual flooding of the sumps of the guns is leading to stiffness of training [and] heavy leakage.20
Admiral Forbes concluded that Curlew and Coventry, which both had open 4-inch mountings, should as far as possible only be deployed in sheltered waters.
The Scandinavian convoys quickly caught the attention of the SKL, which declared that ships joining the convoys did so at their peril. Still, not a single merchantman was sunk while under escort in one of the Scandinavian convoys.21 Why the SKL did not send surface forces to attack the Scandinavian convoys is slightly puzzling. A surface attack supported by U-boats and aircraft would have lured British cruisers and capital ships within reach, and proper coordination could well have given excellent results. One can only assume that the covering forces were considered too strong and the risk of losses too high. Instead, U-boat attacks were attempted at times.
A/A cruiser Curlew, May 1937. (W&L)
In the early morning of 18 February, while on the surface some 40 miles east of Pentland Firth, Kapitänleutnant Otto Kretschmer in U23 ran into convoy HN-12, of about thirty ships, from Bergen to Methil.22 At the time, the local escort consisted of the destroyers Daring and Ilex on the port and starboard quarters, respectively, while Delight and Inglefield were on the port and starboard bow. The A/A cruiser Calcutta and the submarine Thistle were also in company, while the cruisers Edinburgh and Arethusa with destroyers covered at a distance. Submarines were often added to the convoy escort at this time, when available, the concept being that they could attack heavy surface ships attempting to harass the convoy, obviating the need to deploy capital ships. Kretschmer noted in his KTB:
Convoy came into sight at bearing 0°. I steer ahead of it to eastward in order to get away from the moon and have the dark horizon in my back. The convoy, consisting of some twenty ships, is sailing in three columns with a destroyer at each corner. Those ahead are zigzagging. The rear destroyers are maintaining a steady course. Astern and between the two destroyers is an L-class submarine. While attempting to penetrate the convoy from the east and fire a shot at one of the large steamers sailing in the middle, I get caught between the two portside destroyers, so I decide to attack the one in the rear of the convoy. Torpedo fired from 800 m at 03:54.23
The destroyer emerging on the starboard bow of the U-boat, less than a mile away,