The next day, Ju87 Stukas of StG 2 commenced bombing Westerplatte while Schleswig-Holstein continued the bombardment from a distance, supplemented by T196, the depot ship Von der Groeben and land-based artillery. In spite of the massive onslaught, it was a week before Major Sucharski, in the morning of 7 September, gave the order to surrender. By then, his men were almost out of ammunition, and a growing number of wounded were in dire need of medical attention.10
Sailing for Britain
The primary task of the Polish Navy (Polska Marynarkna Wojenna – PMW) was to create a credible deterrence against Soviet and German aggression. Hence, it was decided to build the navy around a number of fast submarines with mine-laying capacity. French capital loans for naval development came with conditions for use in specific French yards, however, and Polish plans for nine submarines were changed to three plus two destroyers, which had initially not been wanted. The submarines Wilk, Ryś and Żbik and destroyers Wicher and Burza were poorly designed and plagued by operational problems from the start. In the mid-1930s, the large minelayer Gryf was also built in France, while a further two destroyers, Grom and Błyskawica, were purchased from Britain. Trying to restore the original plans for mine-laying submarines, orders for two large sophisticated vessels were eventually placed in Dutch yards. Orzeł and Sęp, both commissioned in the spring of 1939, were indeed fine boats, well armed and capable of 20 knots on the surface and 9 knots submerged. At 1,110 tons, though, they were quite large for the shallow waters of the Baltic, and smaller, coastal boats would arguably have been more suitable.11
Major Henryk Sucharski (right) surrendering to Generalleutnant Friedrich-Georg Eberhardt. (Author’s collection)
Crater from a 250-kg Stuka bomb inside Westerplatte. (Author’s collection)
Destroyer Blyskawica, October 1937. (R Perkins)
The small PMW would be at a significant disadvantage versus the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, should a confrontation occur. Hence, the head of the British military mission in Poland, Lieutenant General Adrian Carton de Wiart, advised that the most modern elements of its fleet should evacuate the Baltic in case of a crisis and be prepared to fight the war from British ports. At first, the C-in-C of the Polish armed forces, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz, resisted the idea, but eventually he decided discretion was the better part of valour. In August 1939, he ordered that plans should be developed for a departure, should the situation become desperate. Hence the Peking Plan was formed, through which the destroyers of the PMW prepared to leave the Baltic, passing through the Belts before the Germans had time to block them.12 Part of Śmigły-Rydz’s reason for accepting the plan was apparently that he believed that Allied troops, munitions and arms could be escorted by Polish ships to Romanian ports, where they would be out of reach of German aircraft, but connected to Poland by railways.
Kontradmiral Jozef Unrug, Fleet Commander of the PMW, issued the instructions for the Peking Plan on 26 August 1939, the day after the signing of the Polish–British Defence Pact. Sealed envelopes were distributed to the ships in question, with instructions to keep them under lock and key, pending further orders. At 12:55 on the 29th, the order ‘Execute Peking’ arrived, and the captains could open the mysterious envelopes. The instructions were short and unambiguous: ‘. . . Błyskawica, Grom and Burza to sail for Britain, reaching position off Bornholm by sunset, passing Malmø at midnight. Departure immediate . . .’ An hour later, the three destroyers cast off. For a while they were stalked by the German destroyers Steinbrinck, Ihn, Eckholdt and Heinemann, but encountered no problems and passed through the Öresund during the night. Next day in the Skagerrak, they were followed by German reconnaissance aircraft, but a change of course towards the Norwegian coast during the ensuing night shook them off. At 09:25 on 1 September, in the North Sea, information of the German invasion of Poland arrived. At 17:37 on the first day of the war, the Polish destroyers docked in Leith.13
The remaining Polish naval surface ships, destroyer Wicher, minelayer Gryf, mine-vessels Jaskółka, Czapla, Żuraw, Czajka, Rybitwa and Mewa, gunboats Komendant Piłsudski and Generał Haller, and some smaller vessels, received orders during 1 September to relocate from Oksywie to the naval base on the Hela Peninsula.14 From there they were to commence Operation Rurka, laying minefields at the entrance to Danzig Bay to disrupt German traffic. Meanwhile, the submarines were deployed in predetermined operational zones in Danzig Bay and the southern Baltic for Operation Worek – sinking as many German ships as possible. A minefield should have been laid outside Gdynia harbour on the 29th, but a neutral Greek ship, hesitating to depart, prevented this.15 At Hela, some 15 miles north of Danzig across Puck Bay, around three thousand soldiers were manning a set of strong defensive lines and formidable amounts of A/A guns, searchlights and coastal batteries with in all four 15.2-cm guns, four 10.5-cm guns and some twenty-five smaller guns.16
Polish 15.2-cm guns at Hela. (Author’s collection)
In the afternoon of 1 September, Gryf and the other mine-vessels cast off from Gdynia for Operation Rurka. Wicher, Piłsudski and Haller joined as cover. En route, they were attacked by Ju87 Stuka dive-bombers of 4.(St)/TrGr 186. There were no direct hits, but a bomb exploded in the water close to Mewa. All twenty-two men on board were either killed or wounded and she had to be taken in tow by Rybitwa. Gryf was also damaged by splinters and strafing. Among the casualties was her captain, and first officer Lieutenant Commander Wiktor Łomidze took command. He decided the 300 mines on board were a liability and, having their triggers removed, he ordered them thrown overboard. Operation Rurka was no longer possible, and the ships headed for Hela under continued air attacks. Lieutenant Commander Stefan de Walden of Wicher did not receive the information that the operation had been called off and continued to the rendezvous area to cover the mine-laying. While he was waiting through the night, German destroyers were sighted on two occasions, but de Walden did not attack, as he feared he might compromise the operation he still believed he was covering. Realising in the morning of the 2nd that something was wrong, de Walden took Wicher to Hela.17
The Kriegsmarine saw the primary threat from the PMW to be against the troop and supply convoys between Germany and East Prussia. Extensive minefields were expected and the coastal batteries on the southern tip of the Hela Peninsula, which covered a large part of western Danzig Bay, would have to be avoided. A large number of destroyers, minesweepers, escort vessels and cruisers were allocated to support the operations. Minesweepers would be sent in to clear the anticipated minefields as fast as possible, prioritising Danzig Bay. Destroyers would stand by, outside the range of the Polish coastal artillery, waiting for the bay to be declared mine-free. Beyond these, a number of U-boats (Type II and Type VII) would make a defensive barrier, while Vizeadmiral Hermann Densch with Köln, Leipzig and Nürnberg would be patrolling further out in the Baltic as back-up, should anything unforeseen develop. The Flottenchef, Admiral Boehm, found this somewhat excessive and sent a letter to Raeder on 21 August, arguing that in the event that Britain and France honoured their obligation towards Poland, a larger part of the Kriegsmarine would be needed in the west. Raeder did not agree, and Generaladmiral Albrecht, in overall charge of the naval operations