The Admiralty in a Time of Radical Change
Alongside this series of dramatic changes in technology was an equally dramatic change in the way in which the Admiralty, which was ultimately responsible for the ships, operated. It took a much larger and more complex Admiralty to handle the new technology. The changing form of the Admiralty helps explain how decisions as to the shape of the fleet (including the size and nature of the cruiser force) and the shape of the ships themselves were reached at various times. There was no formal naval staff of the type created just before and during the First World War, hence no formal staff requirements for ships or weapons. This lack suggested to later writers that throughout the century ship development was determined primarily by the way in which technology evolved and thus by the views of technical experts such as DNCs. The reality was considerably more complex. There is certainly evidence of exactly the sort of strategic thinking later associated with naval staffs. It does not help historians that in a small Admiralty organization much of what happened was decided by face to face meetings which did not have to be written up.
The issue which most exercised naval officers was the balance between political control, exerted by the First Lord (who was responsible to the Cabinet) and professional naval thinking (represented by the Naval Lords, who were later called Sea Lords). A second issue, increasingly important as the pace of technological change accelerated, was the way in which the professional officers on the Board were connected to technological experts. The professionals on the Board set policy, but it had to be translated into ships.
The almost continuous wars ending in 1815 created an administration focussed on operations with a nearly independent Navy Board responsible for manning, supplies, and materiel. Once the war was over, operations receded. In 1832, at the outset of the steam revolution, the Navy board was abolished and the Admiralty was made responsible for both operations and resources. The new organization emphasized professional naval experience more than its predecessor. The new Board consisted of a First Lord superintending four Naval Lords (headed by a Senior Naval Lord, later First Sea Lord) and a Civil Lord (Fifth Lord), each of whom was responsible for a department through its separate chief. The First Lord was a political appointee responsible to Parliament (i.e., to the Cabinet). Although in practice he generally accepted the advice of the Naval Lords, the First Lord could issue commands without their advice or approval. Serving officers could sit in Parliament and experienced admirals were often chosen as First Lords.
The Senior Naval Lord (sometimes called First Sea Lord) was responsible for the distribution and composition of the fleet, for drawing up sailing orders, and for armament and complements of ships – as an advisor to the civilian First Lord. He performed much the same duties as his predecessor in the earlier all-operational Admiralty Board. However, he was also responsible for the Surveyor, who in turn was responsible for materiel, including ships.45 The Surveyor was envisaged as an instrument of the Board, designing (or ordering the design of) ships when asked to do so; the Board even reserved for itself decisions on the dimensions of masts and yards. In later terms the Surveyor was more DNC than anything else. In the official list of Directors of Naval Construction, Surveyors precede the first formally appointed DNC (his office was not yet called that), Sir Edward C Reed. The Surveyor had senior shipwrights (of the Royal Dockyards) under him; he had to approve the designs they submitted.
The Board did not provide the general policy guidelines envisaged. From about 1837 on the Surveyor gained autonomy. The Board as a whole seems to have been too busy with routine matters to spend time on policy and ship design issues.46 In 1837 a separate steam department, under a Comptroller of Steam Machinery, was set up to work alongside the Surveyor’s department.47
The two major Surveyors involved in this book were Captain Sir William Symonds (appointed 1832, retired 1847) and Rear Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker. Symonds was interested in curing what he considered the inferiority of British designs manifested in the Napoleonic Wars, favouring a combination of great beam and extraordinary sharpness, which made for much larger ships than their predecessors.48 He was not professionally trained, and he distrusted the new scientific naval architecture, preferring what he considered a more traditional or pragmatic approach. Symonds was unfortunate in holding office just as new technology, such as iron hulls and screw propellers, developed. From 1841 the Board of Admiralty lost confidence in him, subjecting his work to more and more scrutiny.
In contrast, Walker was a respected seaman who knew that he was no naval architect. He intended to supervise naval architects. He also had far more respect than Symonds had shown for technical expertise.49 Walker became Surveyor in February 1848. That June he made Isaac Watts his Assistant Surveyor and, in effect, his chief warship designer. In many cases, however, the chief shipwright at a yard prepared the design for a ship built there, in contrast to later (and earlier) policy in which basic design was centralized. That policy seems not to have solidified until the 1870s, under Barnaby.
With the new role of superintending the materiel of the fleet, in the spring of 1848 Lord Auckland the First Lord approved the existing practice under which the Surveyor prepared an annual program of ship construction and repair, taking into account the state of the fleet and reserves of timber in the yards. Auckland wanted the Surveyor’s projection to take account also of the number of ships currently at sea and of the numbers likely to be sent to sea during the year (Walker seems not to have gone that far). On this basis Walker was responsible for the program of steam battleship construction offered to the Board in response to French programs. Walker had been seconded to the Turkish navy in 1840 and was thus in an excellent (and appreciated) position to advise the Board when the crisis with Russia escalated in 1853, leading to the Crimean War (the Great Russian War). Walker also seems to have been co-author of plans for the Baltic amphibious assault, the threat of which may have been decisive in ending the war on Allied terms. In 1859-60 the Surveyor was finally formally authorized to submit monthly and annual programs to the Board, and he was also given the authority to issue direct orders to master shipwrights and engineers in the yards (Walker had actually issued such orders since the Crimean War, particularly when they were urgent).
In 1860 the Surveyor was formally redesignated Controller of the Navy.50 Walker was transferred out his job in 1861 to the post of commander of the Cape Station. His successor Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) Spencer Robinson found that he could not control shipbuilding and repair costs, so he sought to expand his powers. Cost control became more urgent because, from 1858 on, the Royal Navy was engaged in a building race with France, initially in wooden steam warships and then in ironclads. Both were far more expensive than their sailing predecessors.51 In the past, a much larger fraction of the budget had been operating costs (including repairs to existing ships), and the size and shape of the fleet had not been urgent issues. Now they were. Robinson found himself trading off the cost of repairing existing wooden ships against that of new construction. Because the building program was now so large a fraction of the overall naval budget, changes (up or down) in the budget were often concentrated on new construction.
Robinson revived an earlier idea, that the Controller should sit on the Board. That did not happen at once, but he was regularly invited to Board meetings, as he was in effect the Board’s expert on the new technology (particularly on guns and armour). He found himself disagreeing with his Senior Naval Lord, Admiral Sir Frederick Grey (in office 1861-66), who seems to have considered Robinson far too outspoken, and barred him from Board meetings. Even so, Robinson had a considerable impact on the Board in the form of comments on circulated papers. Moreover, Robinson made a very favourable impression on Civil Lord Hugh C E Childers (in office 1864-65), who shared his views on the need to centralize the Controller’s authority to enforce financial discipline.
As Controller, Robinson made his chief shipwright his deputy for ship design and construction. This deputy was initially designated Chief Constructor, and then Director of Naval Construction (DNC). The connection to Controller shows in the later formal title of Assistant Controller and Director of Naval Construction. DNC was formally the professional advisor to the Board on warship