Lütjens was seriously concerned that the encounter with Glowworm had compromised the operation. He was certain that the British destroyer had submitted a report before going down; the Admiralty would understand that German destroyers this far north could only mean an operation against northern Norway. The apparent unpreparedness of the British destroyer, indicated in a signal from Fregattenkapitän Gadow at 12:03, on the other hand, was strong evidence that the Royal Navy had not been put on a general alert. Group I gathered on the battleships during the morning, except Giese, which remained missing. At one stage, Lütjens considered staying with Group II and letting Group I carry on alone, but eventually decided to follow the plan. The announcement of the minefield in Vestfjorden, which he was made aware of through Group West during the morning, made it likely that British ships were in the vicinity. It was also known from Pruck’s report that the Norwegian panserships were at Narvik and might be encountered. The fuel situation of the Zerstörers meant that they could not return to Trondheim should they run into trouble. Hipper and her consorts, on the other hand, would be better off as they could withdraw northwards if necessary. Splitting the battleships with one in each group was not an option. During the morning, the wind turned from south-south-west to north-west, increasing further. At midday, Bodø Radio forecast a full north-westerly storm in the Lofoten area by nightfall. At 13:50 Lütjens ordered second-degree readiness (half of the positions manned) and a general speed of twenty-five knots. An hour later, a signal from Group West forwarded an observation from a long-distance reconnaissance aircraft, which had sighted ‘two battlecruisers, one heavy cruiser and six destroyers’ on a northerly course north-west of Ålesund.88
The chase was on.
Orzel and Rio de Janeiro
In the morning of 8 April the Polish submarine Orzel (Eagle) of the 2nd Submarine Flotilla was cruising at periscope depth in the Skagerrak off Lillesand when Lieutenant Commander Jan Grudzinski sighted an approaching merchantman. She carried no flag, but with the periscope at maximum magnification he could read the name Rio de Janeiro on her bows. Unknown to the Polish captain, Rio de Janeiro was one of the transports assigned to Group III, heading for Bergen. Originally a 5,261-ton liner carrying cargo and passengers between Europe and Latin America, she was now loaded with large amounts of military equipment including four 10.5-cm guns, six 20-mm A/A guns, seventy-three horses, seventy-one vehicles and 292 tons of provisions in her spacious hull. In addition there were 313 passengers, most of them wearing uniform.89
Rio de Janeiro in Stettin, just prior to departure. (Author’s collection)
In spite of orders to the contrary, Grudzinski brought Orzel to the surface and flashed a challenge: ‘Stop engines. The master with ship’s papers is to report on board immediately.’ Instead of stopping, Kapitän Voigt increased speed and turned shoreward. Orzel could do twenty knots on the surface and gave chase, firing bursts of warning shots from her Lewis gun. Rio de Janeiro halted and a boat was lowered, but stayed close to the liner in spite of a few sailors pretending to be rowing. Meanwhile, the radio operator of Orzel reported that the German was sending a coded radio signal and Grudzinski flashed by lamp to abandon ship as he was about to fire a torpedo. There was no reaction. While the torpedoes were prepared, the coaster Lindebø and the fishing vessel Jenny chanced to pass nearby. Grudzinski ordered fire at 11:45 and the torpedo struck amidships, after which he took his boat down. Steam and dense smoke poured from Rio de Janeiro and suddenly her deck came alive with men in field-grey uniforms, falling or jumping into the sea. Lifebelts and pieces of wood were thrown over the side as more men followed into the water. No one seemed to try to lower the lifeboats. Rio de Janeiro listed and turned slowly to starboard, but did not appear to be sinking. Lindebø and Jenny moved in to assist.
The Polish Orzel. On the surface, she could do over nineteen knots and, submerged, almost ten. Four torpedo tubes in the bow, four in the stern, four external amidships, one 105-mm gun and two 40-mms made her a welcome addition to the Allied submarine force. (Author’s collection)
At 11:15, Kristiansand SDS received a signal from Justøy coastguard station that they could see the tower of a submarine on a westerly course just outside the territorial limit and a merchant ship, which appeared to be idle next to it. The nationalities of both vessels were unknown. An MF11 reconnaissance aircraft was ordered up from the naval air base at Marvika and took off shortly after, arriving just as the torpedo struck. Kvartermester Almton took his aircraft low over the listing ship and Lieutenant Hansen in the observer’s seat could see chaotic conditions onboard with people running through flames and smoke, tumbling into the sea and trying to reach a few nearby floats. Several dead men were floating face down and horses were also in the water, adding to the horror. The submarine, which had dived as the aircraft arrived, was nowhere to be seen. A brief signal was sent to Marvika at 12:07 as Almton headed back towards Kristiansand to report.
Orzel, which had circled underwater, fired a second torpedo from periscope depth. It struck at 12:15 and the bow of the transport broke off and sank quickly. Lindebø had splinters flying over her deck from the explosion and several of the just rescued sailors were killed or wounded. The hull of Rio de Janeiro rolled over and sank minutes later, leaving hundreds of men to fight for their lives in the freezing sea.
The destroyer Odin, which had been sent to investigate, arrived at 12:45, joining the rescue work. Conditions were rough, though, and soon the surface was scattered with bodies. Eventually some 150 men were rescued by various Norwegian vessels while around 180 perished (19 crew and about 160 soldiers), plus all the horses.90 An accurate cross-plot of the position made from Justøy and Høvåg coastguard stations concluded that Rio de Janeiro had been just outside the Norwegian three-mile territorial limit when torpedoed. Lieutenant Commander Grudzinski took Orzel away from the carnage and eventually surfaced to send a report.91
Odin headed for Kristiansand with seventeen wounded and eighteen dead under a tarpaulin on the deck, flying her flag at half-mast. Most of the others ended up in Lillesand. The dead were taken to the chapel at the local cemetery. The less wounded were treated by three local doctors in the harbour area while the serious casualties were sent to the hospital in Arendal. The Germans were wet and miserable and obviously shaken by their ordeal. Chief of Police Nils Onsrud arrived to take charge of the operation. He became very concerned when he discovered that virtually all of the survivors wore uniform and that some even had guns. What was obviously an officer tried to maintain some order and shouted ‘Wehrmacht hier! Marine hier!’92 These men were no ordinary sailors! Onsrud started questioning them and some answered openly that they were soldiers heading for Bergen to assist the Norwegian Army against an Allied invasion – at the government’s request. The officer, presenting himself with a salute as Lieutenant Voss, held that Rio de Janeiro had been nothing but a merchantman loaded with general provisions. Onsrud was certain the man was lying and that he had stumbled onto something of great importance. He cordoned off the harbour area as best he could and organised dry clothes, food and cigarettes to keep the Germans busy, while he went looking for a telephone. His call to Kristiansand SDS came through at 14:30, but to Onsrud’s astonishment, the naval officer he spoke to at Marvika doubted his observations and saw no need to initiate any actions other than the ongoing rescue operation. To take care of the survivors and guard them, Onsrud was advised to contact the