Next morning, Saturday 6 April, Koht gave an account to the Parliament of the political situation. There was a great public interest for the meeting and the public galleries were crowded. For over an hour the foreign minister elaborated the international situation, concluding that the Norwegian will to remain neutral had not faltered and, surprisingly, added that ‘None of the belligerents had attempted to drive Norway away from this policy.’ He ended his speech by stating that ‘Employing all available resources to defend Norway’s national independence is a duty to our country and to the future.’ Nobody in the Parliament disagreed and the customary debate was not prompted. Koht mentioned neither the warnings from Berlin nor the Allied note nor any of the other threats received during the week. Later he wrote that he had believed it would be ‘inappropriate’ to reveal ‘what had been given to him in confidence’ as he did not wish to ‘frighten the public’. Unknown to Koht, several European papers reported the contents of the Allied note that morning and the news was in the Norwegian newspapers by lunchtime.15
After the orientation, Koht at last informed the government of the note he had received the night before, but made it clear that he would handle this alone, as usual, and there was no need for the others to worry. Minister of Finance Oscar Torp did worry and insisted the Neutrality Watch should be strengthened around the Oslofjord immediately. Nygaardsvold asked him to discuss the matter with Ljungberg to see what could be done. Eventually nothing was. Unbelievably, neither Koht nor Ljungberg brought up the reports from Berlin and Copenhagen and when Carl Hambro, the president of the Parliament and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, called Koht in the afternoon to ask what was going on and why he had not been informed of the Allied notes, he was curtly assured that everything was under control and the Foreign Office would handle matters.16 Nobody in the government or the Parliament had the slightest notion that Operations Weserübung and Wilfred were both already under way.
At Tirpitzufer in Berlin, the SKL officer on duty over the weekend entered in the war diary that Koht had stated in the Norwegian Parliament that the goal of his policy was ‘sustained Norwegian neutrality’.
[There is] heightened tension in most countries over the development of the Norway issue . . . [but] there is no evidence that the Allies have recognised Germany’s strategic intentions. At least, they do not grasp the dimensions of the operation. The measures of the enemy indicate . . . that he himself is very close to initiating his own actions in Norwegian waters. As he is undoubtedly aware of German preparations of some kind and will anticipate immediate German reactions, we must expect him to be well prepared to defend his own forces. How far in its preparations the enemy is, or if this operation has already been initiated, is not known. The SKL is, however, of the opinion that the launch of Weserübung is now highly urgent. 9 April appears to be the last possible date for the operation.17
How right he was – and how wrong. Operation Wilfred was indeed underway. Commander King-Hartman had taken the minelayer Teviot Bank to sea from Scapa Flow in the morning of 5 April, before the warning note was delivered in Oslo. Escorted by the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla led by Captain (D)3 Percy Todd onboard Inglefield with Isis, Imogen and Ilex in company, Force WS was heading for Stadtlandet to lay the southernmost of the two real Wilfred minefields.
Later that same day, Vice Admiral Commanding Battlecruiser Squadron William ‘Jock’ Whitworth took to sea from Scapa Flow onboard Renown (Captain CEB Simeon), screened by the destroyers Greyhound, Glowworm, Hero and Hyperion. The intention was to meet up with Birmingham, Fearless and Hostile, who were hunting German fishing vessels, off Lofoten on the evening of the 7th. British intelligence believed all four Norwegian panserships were at Narvik and it was hoped the presence of a deterrent force might prevent a confrontation with the minelayers. In the morning of the 6th, Captain J Bickford of the 20th Destroyer Flotilla fell in with his four mine-laying destroyers Esk, Ivanhoe, Icarus and Impulsive (Force WV), carrying sixty mines each for the Vestfjorden minefield, escorted by Hardy, Hunter, Havock and Hotspur of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla under the command of Captain (D)2 Bernard Warburton-Lee.18
In view of the potential situation that might arise from swift German reaction to the mine-laying, it is difficult to understand why the Admiralty did not order at least parts of the Home Fleet to sea. From a central position north of the Bergen–Shetland Narrows, both mine-laying operations could have been covered against German reactions without exposing the ships to the Luftwaffe.
In the early morning of 6 April, Lieutenant Commander Gerard Broadmead Roope of Glowworm reported losing a man overboard, asking for permission to search for him in spite of the worsening weather.19 Permission was given and Glowworm turned back, rapidly losing sight of the rest of the force, which shortly after changed course further to the north. After several hours searching, Roope decided there was no hope of finding the sailor and attempted to rejoin Renown. Being under strict radio silence, this turned out to be an impossible task. Eventually, Roope realised he was on his own and set course back towards Scapa Flow to receive new orders.
HMS Glowworm. 1,350 BRT, overall length 323 feet (98.5 metres) and a normal complement of 145 men. Her maximum speed was thirty-six knots. Armament was four single 4.7-inch guns and two quadruple 0.5-inch A/A guns. She was in addition fitted with two experimental five-tube torpedo mountings. (Wright and Logan)
Hyperion and Hero were both low on oil and were sent back to Sullom Voe for refuelling when the minelayers had joined up. Admiral Whitworth expected Glowworm to catch up and counted on his screen to have been enhanced by Birmingham and consorts by the time the mine-laying force would be detached. Hyperion and Hero were instructed to look for Glowworm and give her an update on Renown’s last position and course, should they come upon her. On midday of the 5th, Birmingham received instructions for a rendezvous with Renown off Vestfjorden in the evening of the 7th. Delay in the transfer of prize crews to several captured trawlers and a heavy head-sea, however, prevented Captain Madden from complying.20
Meanwhile, Glowworm was close enough to Scapa Flow for Roope to break radio silence and ask for orders. At 11:43, a signal was received from C-in-C Home Fleet with Renown’s estimated position and orders to turn back and look for her. During the evening, a supplementary signal was received from Renown with her anticipated position next morning.21
Departures
Having a long way to go, the German transport ships destined for Narvik, Rauenfels, Bärenfels and Alster, departed Brunsbüttel at 02:00 on 3 April. In the afternoon, the tanker Kattegat followed. Over the next several days, the freighters Main, Sao Paulo, Levante and the tanker Skagerrak departed for Trondheim, followed by Roda for Stavanger. Some fifteen other vessels departed Lübeck and Stettin, heading for the southern Weserübung ports, packed with soldiers of the 69th and 163rd IDs and a large amount of provisions and heavy military equipment. Officially these ships brought supplies to east Prussia, which had been isolated by floods, but once out of sight from land they turned west for the Danish Belts. At the German supply base Basis Nord near Murmansk, the 12,000-ton tanker Jan Wellem received orders to leave during the evening of 6 April and relocate to Narvik where further orders from the German consul would be received.22