After we arrived in the South, we were under a joint NVA-PLAF command.7 At first, we engaged mostly with the ARVN troops. When the rainy season began in June, our company received a new order from the joint headquarters: to destroy the enemy's “strategic hamlet villages” in the tristate region. In the spring of 1965, the “puppet” RVN government and its army continued their so-called pacification program design to bring security and local self-government to rural South Vietnamese people. During the dry season, they occupied many villages, purged the pro-Communist farmers, armed the villagers, and helped them to fortify their villages. The pacification protected the ARVN bases and lines of communication, and sought out the Viet Cong and the NVA in the surrounding areas. In the rain season, the ARVN troops pulled back to their bases and left the pro-government farmers on their own in their “strategic hamlet villages.”
We had a chance to retake these villages during the rain season. It was the first time we moved into enemy territory, but there wasn't much action. The armed farmers in their strategic villages rarely confronted the North Vietnamese regulars. When they saw us coming, they hid their weapons and acted as ordinary villagers. We usually gathered the villagers and tried to single out the government agents and hostile village leaders. Then we executed the bad guys and destroyed their defense works. As long as we didn't burn their houses and take away their food, the villagers didn't fight back.
That summer, our company participated in several ambush and small-scale defensive operations. In 1965, the NVA-PLAF command believed that the U.S. and ARVN troops in the South outnumbered NVA troops, and that the enemy had superior firepower and advanced air, naval, and armored forces. Thus, our troops avoided a frontal or formal battle with the U.S. troops, but engaged in traditional guerrilla warfare tactics, such as ambush, hit-and-run, night attacks, cutting transportation and communication lines, and attacking enemy weak points. We harassed the U.S. and ARVN troops, made the war as costly for the Americans as possible, and protected the civilian population as best we could.
In mid-July, the First Company was ordered to defend the village of An Theo. It was a strategic point in the area. After losing it to the NVA and PLAF in June, the ARVN now tried to take it back. The battalion command ordered our company to move into An Theo overnight. Then we spent a couple of days strengthening the defense works with the help of local Viet Cong and villagers.
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1963–1975
On July 18, the ARVN troops arrived. They attacked An Theo a couple of times in small groups, but our company defeated them. Then they stopped their attack, but did not withdraw. They were waiting for their reinforcement. Next day, more ARVN troops arrived with heavy artillery pieces and armored vehicles. On July 20, the ARVN launched a larger scale offensive against An Theo. They had at least three companies with seven armored vehicles. Their artillery pieces bombed the village with more than two hundred 105 mm shells and charged our defense positions several times. Their intensive artillery shelling destroyed most of our defense works. We had to move into underground tunnels to continue our defense. Having failed to take over the village, the ARVN troops stopped their attacks by the evening. They pulled out their troops and didn't come back the next day. We successfully defended An Theo. However, our company and local Viet Cong suffered heavy casualties during the three-day battle. We received our new recruits regularly from the North.
In the fall of 1965, the NVA developed a new strategy, the so-called formality strategy, or a formal warfare strategy. The new strategy included plans and tactics of frontal engagements, medium-scale offensive campaigns, attacks on the cities, and elimination of an entire enemy unit, like a company or even a battalion. Meanwhile, there were different opinions in the command. We heard about the strategic debates at the high command. Anyway, the new strategy lasted for almost three years until its peak, the Tet Offensive campaign of February 1968. Both NVA and PLAF suffered the heaviest casualties since the beginning of the war.8 Then the high command believed that the offensive strategy was too costly to continue. Thereafter, the NVA returned to its traditional guerrilla warfare.
Since the implementation of the new strategy, our company began to join other companies and engaged in large-scale operations at battalion level. One of the big battles we fought was the Central Highlands Offensive campaign. You called it the Battle of Ia Drang in America.9 At the end of October 1965, the PLAF and NVA launched a joint offensive campaign against Plei Me, an ARVN stronghold in the Central Highlands.10 By October 29, the PLAF had completely encircled the ARVN garrison. In early November, the NVA and PLAF launched our attack on the ARVN troops at Plei Me.
In order to eliminate all the ARVN garrison, the NVA set up roadblocks between Plei Me and Pleiku and between Plei Me and An Khe in order to stop possible ARVN and U.S. reinforcement or rescue efforts.11 Our Thirty-first Battalion was deployed at Hill 558 along Route 21 between Plei Me and Pleiku. One day in early November, our company moved into our positions at the bottom of the hill. We dug some foxholes along our defensive positions between Route 21 and Hill 558. And then we waited. Around noon, we were told that the ARVN reinforcements were coming from Pleiku on Route 21, including an infantry battalion and an armored battalion. We should ambush the ARVN troops at Hill 558 to stop the reinforcements and ensure a victory of the Plei Me attack. I was a little bit nervous since we had not yet engaged in such a large-scale battle in the past six months. I checked my ammo and medic-aid package again and again.
Before long, a couple of the ARVN helicopters flew over our positions. They didn't detect the concealed NVA troops around Hill 558. About 1400 hours, a long column of the enemy armored vehicles and trucks came along the road. We opened fire when they reached the hill. The enemy troops were in panic under the unexpected attack. They fled to where they came from and left many bodies behind along the road. We were so excited about our successful ambush. Captain Ngu, our company commander, ordered us to refill ammo and send wounded back. He shouted, “Hurry, they will be back.” He was right. About one hour later, the enemy troops attacked our positions with the help of the American helicopters. The American armed helicopters from Pleiku attacked our positions with a fierce bombing and shelling. We had to pull out of our roadside positions, and moved up to the hill for better coverage.
About 1600 hours, two more ARVN battalions arrived as new reinforcements. Then they charged the hill. Even though our battalion fought bravely, we were outnumbered and without any air and artillery support. When it was getting dark, our battalion commanders ordered a withdrawal from Hill 558. We heard next day that the American troops from An Khe also broke the NVA roadblock. On November 14, because of the failures of blockage, the PLAF stopped its offensive on Plei Me. On November 14, more American troops arrived in the Ia Drang Valley and began their counterattacks against the PLAF and NVA. Our command decided to concentrate the PLAF-NVA troops to deal with the American reinforcement.
From November 14 to 19, our company joined the other PLAF-NVA units and attacked American troops at the Ia Drang Valley. During the five-day battle, our company suffered heavy casualties, including thirty-one dead and forty-one wounded. We were replaced by our reserve troops. Our battalion also pulled out of the attack due to its heavy casualties. On November 19, the command decided to withdraw all the units from the Ia Drang Valley. Then we moved west, toward the South Vietnam-Cambodia border. That was a major withdrawal from the Central Highlands. On November 19, our company received new orders to escort a NVA field hospital moving west to the liberated area [the PLAF-controlled areas]. In the afternoon, the American helicopters discovered the field hospital and our battalion headquarters, which retreated with us. The helicopters’ firepower