Epistemically modest, the ideal of objectivity is metaphysically minimalist. It posits other minds with goals of their own, and the ontological bases of communication between the separate minds. In addition, the pragmatic context in which I place objectivity, posits a reality which has causal powers that render some sets of beliefs more effective than others. But nothing further is claimed about the nature of that reality in this conception of objectivity. Certainly, it does not imply there is some absolute description of reality, independent of its effects on subjects, which the objective perspective procures. There is nothing more in this objectivity than supposing a reality, which somehow shapes our subjective lives. All of them.
6. Objectively True Principles
Effective goal achievement justifies belief, and the objectivity of the justification derives from the breadth of goals the effectiveness is measured against. Objectivity is effectiveness in light of goal inclusivity.41 Just as information gleaned from every perspective makes description objective, the interests that emerge from every perspective makes action objective. A principle of action’s objectivity grows with the membership of the set of goals used to test it. A perfectly justified principle of action, which a rational person will acknowledge objectively true, would be a member of that set of beliefs that would best realize all goals, without regard to the goal’s origins.42
There may be different systems of belief that would be equally effective at achieving the most inclusive set of goals, so this conception of objectivity does not imply that there is a unique set of objectively justifiable beliefs.43 But the possibility of multiple truths must be distinguished from the idea that nothing is true, or the idea that everything is true. Although not provably monogamous, pragmatically justified belief is far from promiscuous. There are an infinite number of sets of belief less efficacious than the most effective set(s) of beliefs, so there is no end of objectively false beliefs. Any principle of action not found in the best set of beliefs, is unjustifiable, and cannot contribute to a sound justification of action. Acting on such a principle is irrational. The theoretical pluralism of pragmatic justifications gives no scope for a robust relativism of the “all principles are true, no actions are wrong,” variety.
Two additional considerations diminish the relativistic character of pragmatic justification. First, for neither individuals nor social groups are sets of goals static. Implicit in objectivity’s universalistic ambition, is its temporal impartiality—objectivity is not measured by a temporal cross-section of goals. An objectively true belief retains its effectiveness as future, evolving, and unforeseen goals come into being. The unpredictability as well as diversity of goals stabilizes the objectivity of belief, or rather, one criterion of the objectivity of belief is its stability across temporal perspectives. The best all-purpose tools may be inferior to tools tailor-made for specific tasks, but they are less liable to obsolescence. Lasting, wide-ranging, and adaptable effectiveness is the mark of truth. As we learn in eighth grade science, the longer a belief is tested and the more various the circumstances in which it is tested, the better its confirmation. Beliefs that pass unanticipated tests earn special credibility. Principles of action, like other sorts of belief, are justified by their enduring efficacy. As the universe of goals expands, once serviceable principles prove parochial and lose claim to objectivity.
Principles of action are winnowed from objective ranks even more ruthlessly than other kinds of beliefs, for it is their manifest function to adjudicate between conflicting goals. The belief that the cat is on the mat does not directly tie its justifiability to any goal, however, much its justification rests on its relation to the totality of goals, the goals of all who have goals. It presents itself as indifferent to goals. Its acceptance as a fact, its justification, ultimately depends on its contribution to goal achievement, but no specific goal is alluded to or implied by the claim that “the cat is on the mat.” However, the principle that implies one ought not to torture the cat, directly suggests that the acknowledged universe of goals is best served by belief in this principle. The callous child’s amusement, the sadist’s frustration, the cat-lovers anguish, and the cat’s agonized suffering are immediately revealed as the arbiters of the principle’s justifiability. The exclusion of any goal is simultaneously a step away from the principle’s objectivity and a specification of its purpose. Principles of action wear their degree of objectivity on their sleeve because they so clearly point at the goals their invokers would use to justify their truth. With principles of action, goal achievement is the last and first evidence adduced in their defense, and the goals explicitly entered into evidence declare the principle’s level of objectivity. Practical principles, which its denigrators view as morality’s flimsy subjective foundations, are instead its most overtly objective concrete pillars.
Hallvard Lillehammer suggests three characteristics of the objective: liability to error, dependence on reality for correctness, and, under ideal conditions, the tendency of objective judgments to converge.44 The “view from everywhere,” notion of objectivity, even when applied to practical principles, features all three. Any given practical principle might not appear in any justified belief set, so it is liable to error. If the principle is justified, it is because it appears in a justified set of beliefs, known to be true because reality enables it to maximally satisfy the totality of goals; so the principle’s justification depends on reality. Finally, under ideal conditions, wherein everyone recognized the maximal satisfaction of the same set of goals, namely the totality of goals, as the measure of justified principles, there is every reason to expect convergence of judgment. Groups that share goals tend to agree on principles of actions relative to those goals. Agreement on the ends will, along with instrumental experience, bring about agreement on the true means. If judgments converge more readily on factual beliefs than they do on beliefs of principle, it is attributable to the great overlap of proximate goals used to justify factual statements. The belief that the cat is on the mat serves the goal of locating the cat, a step on the way to feeding it, petting it, teasing it, admiring it, or protecting it. The enemies of cats and friends of cats alike share the goal of locating it. The same belief is useful to both, so both acknowledge its truth. All who share the goal of protecting cats will just as easily agree on the truth of the judgment that one ought not to torture cats as all who are interested in locating the cat will agree that it is on the mat.
Of course, a justification of the pragmatic approach to justifying principles of action as objectively true, cannot escape the ungroundedness that marks any ultimate justification of the truth of anything, when put under sufficient philosophical pressure. By what justified standard can one justify the pragmatic standard of truth? Any answer must beg the question.45 Nonetheless, we have the same kind of reasons to believe “you ought not to torture the cat,” is objectively true, if it is, as we have to believe “the cat is on the mat” is objectively true, if it is. Both will best serve the goals garnered from every perspective, even if their maximal satisfaction leaves some goals unachieved.
A pragmatic approach to justification is often taken as involving a “deflationary,” concept of truth, a pale version of the original idea. This is false. Pragmatic justifications justify truths that are as stubborn and enduring as we can coherently wish. It does not claim that we are justified in believing whatever some individual, group of individuals, or even the totality of individuals want to believe, for what we want to believe may not serve us well. Nor does it claim that we are justified in believing whatever some individual or group of individuals in fact believe, for what we in fact believe may not serve us well. Finally, it does not claim that we are justified in believing the set of beliefs that would be most useful to an individual or any group of individuals that is a proper subset of all individuals, whether that subset is defined geographically, temporally, cognitively, or politically. What serves some well, may not, all persons considered, best serve the whole. What pragmatic justification does claim is that we are justified in believing only those beliefs that will be included in the set of beliefs which best serves all of us. What best serves all of us may not, probably will not, include beliefs which are most useful to only some of us.