17 See R. Kühner and B. Gerth, Aüsfurliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache (Hanover and Leipzig, 1898), II.l, pp. 438–40 (section 11). The example and its translation are from H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, revised by Gordon Messing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), para. 1517. The first dative (ἀπορίᾳ) expresses external cause.
18 But cf. Müri, “Politische Metonomasie,” pp. 67–68, who argues successfully against Gomme.
19 I believe that this type of ambiguous or polyvalent construction occurs in a number of places in Thucydides. Hornblower, following I. L. Pfeijffer, Three Aeginetan Odes of Pindar: A Commentary on Nemean V, Nemean III, and Pythian VIII (Leiden, 1999), uses the term polyinterpretability to describe this rhetorical device, in which the author seems to intend that the readers or hearers of the work may interpret some words in more than one way at the same time. See Thucydides and Pindar, pp. 80–81 and p. 367. This view of one of Thucydides’ apparent rhetorical devices would support the reading I have provided for 3.82.4 despite the persuasive points against it by June Allison in Word and Concept in Thucydides, p. 170n.17. See also the Hornblower’s discussion of this same rhetorical device in his review of the political judgment of Thucydides at 8.97.2: “then for the first time, at least in my lifetime, the Athenians seem to me to have had a good constitutional arrangement” (translation Hornblower at 8.97.2).
20 S. Simon Swain, “Thucydides 1.22.1 and 3.82.4,” Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 46, no. 1 (1993), p. 36 and p. 36n.8.
21 Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment, p. 110. Solmsen decides in favor of the traditional interpretation both here and in the article “Thucydides’ Treatment of Words and Concepts,” Hermes 99 (1971): 395. He describes Thucydides’ observation as the discovery of a “new type of synonym.” For Solmsen, the synonymy consists in, for instance, τόλμα ἀλόγιστος (reckless audacity) being called ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος (the courage of a loyal ally) during stasis and τόλμα ἀλόγιστος (reckless audacity) in normal times. But I think that Thucydides means that these different words were used at the same time and under the same conditions (stasis) to describe the same deed. Jaeger, Paideia, pp. 335–36, seems to have interpreted Thucydides along the lines later suggested by Solmsen’s question, although he does speak of “a change in the meaning of words.”
22 See Allison, Word and Concept in Thucydides, pp. 178–86, esp. p. 180.
23 See Gomme et al., Historical Commentary, 3.82.2n.
24 For Pericles’ view of the lack of intelligence, cf. 1.140.1; of intelligence, 2.40ff. For Thucydides’ own opinions, cf. 1.138.3 and 2.65.13.
25 See Price, Thucydides and Internal War, pp. 10, 42, 268, 309–10, and elsewhere. The last two pages (309–10) are important as there Price cites Thucydides’ general description of stasis in Athens (8.66.2–5) and notes the important themes such as the idea that speaking in opposition to proposals can be dangerous in revolutionary states, pretexts are available for “judicial murder,” people’s ability to think clearly deteriorates, violence shows that a partisan is reliable, revenge is rewarded, trust evaporates, and suspicion becomes one of the most dominant psychological states.
26 Cf. Strauss, The City and Man, p. 147n.8.
27 For a persuasive interpretation of οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει (“The leaders in the cities on both sides contested for the commonwealth, which they pretended to be serving, by employing specious slogans: the one side, constitutional government with the equal sharing of power by all people; and the other side, government by the best men, which is responsible by reason of preferment” [translation Graham and Forsythe]), see Graham and Forsythe, “A New Slogan for Oligarchy in Thucydides 3.82.8,” pp. 25–45. Graham and Forsythe argue that πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς (“on the one side with the cry of political equality of the people”) and ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος (“on the other [with the cry] of moderate aristocracy”) are parallel expressions, and that the τε . . . καὶ (“both . . . and”) clause is epexegetical to the first clause in the sentence (p. 31). προτιμήσει thus has a function parallel to πλήθους in terms of sense, and the translation of the passage as a whole is: “The leaders in the cities on both sides contested for the commonwealth, which they pretended to be serving, by employing specious slogans: the one side, constitutional government with the equal sharing of power by all people; and the other side, government by the best men, which is responsible by reason of preferment” (p. 45).
28 See LSJ, s.v., ἄτιμος III. ἀτίμως (the adverbial form), “dishonorably, ignominiously.” Allan Bloom’s translation of the Republic renders it “without honor.”
29 With Plato’s σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές (“calling moderation cowardliness,” translation Bloom) (560d) compare Thucydides’ τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα (“moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness,” translation Crawley, 3.82.4), noted by James Adam, The Republic of Plato, vol. 2 VIII.560d23 n.
30 Cf. Syme, The Roman Revolution, pp. 139–61, esp. pp. 153–56.
31 Adam, The Republic of Plato, vol. 2, VIII.560d27 n.
32 See, LSJ s. v. μοῖρα V. (“share,” “lot,” “fate”). In this example (τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη), “frantic violence became the attribute of manliness” (translation Crawley). See the full analysis by June Allison in Word and Concept in Thucydides, pp. 169–70, in particular. I suspect that the use of μοῖρα here suggests in addition the idea of Μοῖρα as the Goddess of Fate also so that Thucydides implies that frantic violence is added to the Fate of a man or of all the states including Athens that fall into stasis.
33 Allison, Word and Concept in Thucydides, p. 176.
34 Jacqueline de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, trans. Janet Lloyd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), translation of original 1988 publication in French, pp. 113–16.
35 Rosen, Plato’s Statesman, p. 125.
36 Rosen, Plato’s Statesman, pp. 119ff.
37 See, e.g., Madison, Federalist #10, “But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.” https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-10.
38 See the essay “From Limited War to Total War in America” by James M. McPherson, chapter 14, pp. 295–311, in On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871, ed. Stig Förster and Jorg Nagler, Publications of the German Historical Institute (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 ), for the argument that Sherman’s march approached the concept