Dark Seas. JE Harrold

‘jumpy’, uncertain and inaccurate.”

      The sea was smooth and visibility good (15 miles). The enemy concentrated on the Gloucester, which zig-zagged to avoid being hit. At 0829 the range had decreased to 23,500 yards and the Gloucester fired three salvoes which, though falling short, caused the Italian cruisers to alter course away and draw outside the British gun range; there resuming a parallel course the Italian cruisers continued firing, though their salvoes were all falling short. Both forces continued speeding to the south-east when at 0854 the aspect of affairs was abruptly changed by a report of enemy battleships. This originated from British aircraft 5F which had seen at 0805 what appeared to be a force of three enemy battleships in a position 34° N., 24° 16’ E., steering to the south-west (210°) at 20 knots. As Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell at 0805 had been only seven miles from that identical position and must have sighted them himself had they been there, he considered the position was “manifestly incorrect”,19 but there remained the possibility of enemy battleships being somewhere in the vicinity. At 0855 the enemy cruisers ceased fire, and turning to port went off to the north westward on an approximate course of 300°, having been ordered by the Italian C.-in-C. to break off the engagement, as he considered that his cruisers were being drawn too far into waters under control of our aviation. The VALF reported the enemy’s alteration of course and decided to follow and try to maintain touch. At 0936 he reported the enemy still in sight bearing 320°, 16 miles, course 320° speed 28 knots. During this phase of the action the Vendetta developed engine trouble, and was detached to Alexandria.

      Fig 2

      The C.-in-C.’s Movements, 28 March

      Meanwhile the C.-in-C.,20 after receiving at 0827 the Vice-Admiral’s sighting report of 0802, had increased speed to 22 knots (0832) and altered course to 310°. The situation did not for the moment appear “unduly alarming”, but twenty minutes later he ordered the Valiant (0851) to proceed at her utmost speed to join VALF, detaching the Nubian and Mohawk to accompany her. The Warspite (with slight condenser trouble)21 and the Barham remained in company with the Formidable (Plan 1), which had been ordered at 0833 to range a torpedo striking force, while the aircraft at Maleme were also ordered at 084922 to attack the enemy cruisers (See Attack by Maleme Striking Force on the 3rd Division). Aircraft reports were then coming in indicating another enemy force to the northward, though their presence was by no means certain. Aircraft 5F’s report (at 0805) of battleships might be correct, or on the other hand she might be mistaking cruisers for battleships, a not uncommon error at the time arising from the similar silhouettes of the Cavour class battleships and the cruiser Garibaldi class, two of which were with Force Z. At 0847 the C.-in-C. received a report from aircraft 5F that touch was lost with the enemy cruisers and destroyers (probably enemy Force X), which she had reported at 0839 well to the southward of the 0722 position given by aircraft 5B.

      By 0918, the C.-in-C. knew that the enemy cruisers: (Force X) had broken off action and were retiring to the north-west, being reported by VALF and aircraft 5H as steering 320° or 300° respectively, speed 28 knots. At about this time the Gloucester’s aircraft, which had been catapulted for spotting duty at 0831, reported another enemy force23 to the northward of Force X. This report was not received in any other ship as the aircraft did not use the correct frequency nor was it passed on by the Gloucester. The receipt of this signal in the flagship would have helped to dispel the uncertainty created by indefinite and confusing reports received from the reconnaissance aircraft, which were not using “Duty letters” and in some cases were omitting their position.

      At 0922, the C.-in-C. decided to hold back the Formidable’s striking force until the situation cleared and a signal was accordingly sent (0925) to R.A.F. 201 Group to send his flying boats to locate and shadow the enemy fleet in the Crete-Africa area between 25° and 23° E.

      Plan 3, detail Battle of Matapan, action off Gavdo

      Plan 4

      HMS Formidable’s First Striking Force Takes Off

      In order to relieve the pressure on our cruisers, at 0939 the C.-in-C. ordered the Formidable to fly off a torpedo striking force to attack cruisers in sight of VALF or other squadron of enemy cruisers if sighted. This order was carried out at 0956 by 5 Albacores (826 Sqdn.) and 1 Albacore (829 Sqdn.) with an escort of two Fulmars (803 Sqdn.). A Swordfish (826 Sqdn.) also took off for “Action Observation, Duty J”. The striking force was armed with Mark 12 torpedoes with duplex pistols, set to 400 yards safety range, 40 knots speed and a depth setting of 34 ft. This setting the observers in three planes succeeding in altering to 28 feet when it was known that cruisers were the target of attack.

      Meanwhile the Orion and cruisers of Force B were following hard (course 310°) in the wake of the enemy cruisers (Force X) which were barely in sight 16 miles away. A number of aircraft were sighted and Force B between 1045 and 1100 fired on several, including some of our own.

      About 1045 the enemy was again visible from the Orion’s director, but nothing more had been heard of the three battleships reported by aircraft, ‘5F’ to the northward and the VALF came to the conclusion that they were in reality his own cruisers.

      Plan 5

      Action with the Italian Battleship

      The enemy’s motive in breaking off action and retiring to the north-west was revealed in dramatic fashion at 1058 when the Orion sighted an enemy battleship (later known to be the Vittorio Veneto), bearing 002° (Force Y in Plan 3). Her appearance “put a very different complexion on affairs”. The enemy was fast and the Gloucester’s maximum safe speed was expected to be 24 knots. It looked as if the British cruisers might be “sandwiched” between the Vittorio Veneto to the north and the Italian cruisers (Force X) to the north-west (see Fig. 1). The battleship quickly opened fire and the VALF at once altered course together to the southward in order to disengage, increasing speed to 30 knots, a speed which fortunately the Gloucester successfully achieved. It was then 1059. For ten minutes the enemy concentrated on the Orion which suffered only minor damage from a near miss. The enemy’s shooting at 32,000 yards was remarkably accurate; the Veneto fired 94 rounds in 29 salvoes out of which there were 11 mis-fires. Force B was ordered to make smoke, the wind at the time being about E.N.E., Force 2 and the smoke soon became effective, though the Gloucester, the only ship remaining visible to the enemy, was repeatedly straddled until the Hasty was able to reach a position where it was possible to cover her with smoke. The Italian battleship on the port quarter of our cruisers possessed an equal turn of speed, and at 1100 the 3rd Division of 8-in. cruisers reversed course to engage from the starboard quarter, a situation that might have become serious if the Formidable’s striking force had not at this critical moment opportunely intervened.

      The First Attack on the Vittorio Veneto

      Flying at 9,000 ft. the aircraft sighted the Vittorio Veneto at 1058 steering in a south-easterly direction24 and shortly afterwards observed her salvoes straddling our cruisers. The planes proceeded to manoeuvre to reach a position off her starboard bow on the opposite side of the destroyer escort.