167. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 12–13.
168. Silva, “Has the Church?,” 70.
169. Silva, “Has the Church?,” 69–70.
170. Silva, “Has the Church?,” 70n20.
171. Van Til typically articulates this in terms of ultimacy. Either man is ultimate in his interpretation or God is ultimate (e.g., Theory of Knowledge, 22).
172. Silva, “God, Language,” 204.
173. Silva, “God, Language,” 204.
174. Silva, “God, Language,” 204n1; Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 36–37.
175. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 251–69.
176. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 254–55.
177. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 257.
178. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 259–60 (emphasis mine); Poythress, “Presuppositions and Harmonization,” 508–9; Vanhoozer, Is There?, 455.
179. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 261. Silva makes the perceptive point, contrary to the objection that such a method is indefensibly anachronistic, that the very use of modern English to explain the biblical text requires the use of subsequent formal expressions. Hence, contemporary theological explanation of the bible’s message demands contemporary theological categories (“Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 262).
180. Frame, Doctrine, 276.
181. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 261–63. Here, Silva again cites Van Til as one who, before Bultmann and Kuhn, emphasized the role of pre-understanding and questioned “neutrality” in scientific method, exposing the role of presuppositions.
182. E.g., Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 17–54; Defense of Faith, 27–44.
183. Van Til, Theistic-Ethics, 1–37.
184. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics.
185. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 42. He cites Van Til and Thiselton as particularly significant figures in these respective fields.
186. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 21–25, 43.
187 These correspond to the common hermeneutical categories of author, text, and reader.
188. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 43 (emphasis mine), 44, 47.
189. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 22.
190. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 46–50.
191. Goldsworthy, “Ontological,” 161–62; Hermeneutics, 258–72.
192. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 50–51.
193. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 59, 124, 197, 283, 367n51.
194. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 53; Van Til, Defense of Faith, 27.
195. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 68.
196. Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions.
197. Poythress, “Science and Hermeneutics,” 503–5, 528–9; Symphonic Theology, 84, 122.
198. Poythress, “Science and Hermeneutics,” 473, 478–79.
199. Poythress, “Science and Hermeneutics,” 438, 441–42, 465–68.
200. Poythress, “Philosophical Roots,” 165–71; “Structuralism,” 221–37; Conn, “Historical Prologue,” 22–23.
201. Poythress, “Canon and Speech,” 337–54.
202. Poythress, “Science and Hermeneutics,” 500; Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 145.
203. Poythress, “Kinds,” 134.
204. Poythress, Symphonic Theology, 49; Van Til, Theistic Evidences, 40–65.
205. Poythress, In the Beginning, 239.
206. In context, Poythress mentions postmodernism, modernism, and “critical realism.” Each, he argues, to one degree or another exhibits “autonomous criticism” of which there is no “autonomous escape.”
207. Poythress, In the Beginning, 79–80. This is an example of Van Til’s notion of “borrowed” or “stolen” capitol (Van Til, Systematic Theology, 152–53; Case for Calvinism, 147–48).
208. Poythress, In the Beginning, 114–15.