Vern Poythress has probably brought Van Til’s thought to its widest and most creative application in the field of hermeneutics. He does this in at least four main ways. First, he acknowledges the value of Van Til’s general presuppositional approach for hermeneutics. In particular, Poythress has highlighted the insights of Thomas Kuhn in the history and philosophy of science196 which has helpfully drawn attention to the role of presuppositions and lack of neutrality, paralleling Van Til’s own insights in apologetics.197 Kuhn claimed that progress and change in knowledge comes not through mere piecemeal addition, but primarily through the use of frameworks, composed of basic assumptions, standards, and values.198 These insights, if biblically defined, are of particular relevance in evaluating hermeneutical methodologies, such as the historical-critical method,199 forms of literary criticism,200 and Speech Act theory.201 However, he also points out that the primary subject matter is different between science (creation) and biblical interpretation (Creator). In the case of biblical interpretation, due to God’s infinity and the nature of his relation to creation, no one analogy, theory, or model could ever define or capture him.202 This idea of capturing God in a theoretical framework involves reducing God to the limits of creation, thereby confusing the Creator-creature distinction.
In discussing different types of biblical theology and its relationship to exegesis and systematic theology, he argues that, rather than hindering, all three disciplines enrich one another. He mentions that Van Til and recent philosophical hermeneutics have recognized that “‘circularities’ are inevitable for finite human beings.” For example, exegesis necessarily involves making assumptions about the nature of reality and the presence or absence of God in the Bible. If presuppositions are inevitable, the question becomes, where are they taken from, from systematic theology or secular philosophy? Here, Poythress expresses a distinctly Van Tillian concept of antithesis. The only alternative to systematic theology influencing exegesis is the “corrupting influence of hermeneutical assumptions rooted in human rebellion against God and desire for human autonomy.”203
Besides presuppositions, other related Van Tillian ideas appear in various interpretive contexts. Poythress brings up his idea of brute facts to argue that no event or reality as a whole exists prior to and independent from any perspective, knowledge, or interpretation of it. All reality and events are ultimately meaningful to God prior to creation and hence, our knowledge is dependent on this backdrop of divine knowledge.204 Interestingly, this comes up in the context of a hermeneutical discussion of the fourfold Gospel account of the person and work of Christ. In another related context, the idea that there could be such a thing as mere events of history “without God’s word commanding them and interpreting them” is a counterfeit illusion, imposing our meaning upon that which is assumed to have no previous meaning.205 Historical investigation cannot avoid prior commitments about the nature of reality and meaning.206 The question becomes, which god or metanarrative is assumed?
Discussing God’s relationship to language, he mentions that unbelievers actually depend on God in order to rebel against him.207 He sees Van Til’s ideas of antithesis and common grace as helpful in making sense of the effects of sin on language and communication. The former refers to allegiances between believers and unbelievers, which manifests itself in ultimately different worldviews. The latter refers primarily to the fact that unbelievers are not as bad as they could be—holding onto fragments of truth, though inconsistently so (at least according to their unbelieving assumptions).208 Both ideas are used by Satan to endorse counterfeits of truth, having formal similarity yet meaning something very different. These counterfeits are rooted in and aided by a faulty view of the Creator-creature distinction, expressed in terms of a false transcendence (God is unknowable), false immanence (God identified with creation), or an unstable combination of the two. Modernism tends toward a false immanence, whereas postmodernism tends toward a false transcendence, though both feed off one another and display an unstable mixture of both.209
In addressing key tenets of postmodern deconstructionism, he cites Van Til in opposition to Derrida, who infamously asserted that, concerning meaning, “There is nothing outside the text.”210 Though not absolutely denying the existence of things outside a text in principle, deconstructionists emphasize that all we have are processed and assimilated human constructions. All we have access to with regard to God are such constructions. However, from a biblical worldview, meaning is not ultimately generated by man, but by God. God, as Creator, defines reality and there is no meaning that doesn’t come from God—“no existence that does not depend on his signifying word . . . we never get outside God’s meanings.”211 Here, Poythress explicitly employs Van Til’s emphasis on all facts and meanings of those facts being derived from being in relation to God and his all-encompassing plan. Indeed, there are no brute facts, but only that which exists in the “text” of God’s plan.212 Ironically, deconstructionism does have some affinity with Van Til’s transcendental apologetic. Both are interested in critically examining assumptions. However, deconstructionism seeks to undermine a text through exposing assumptions made concerning background issues of language and thought. These background assumptions, it is argued, are of an unfathomable, universal nature, of which man cannot have comprehensive knowledge.213 Hence, these assumptions undermine explicit assertions made in the text. Van Til, to the contrary, would argue that the grounding of all so-called unfathomable knowledge