D—The Solutio Tantidem
In the fourth part of Crisp’s account of Dr. Edwards’ penal non-substitution model, he offers some explanation of the concept of the so-called “suitable equivalence” of Christ’s sacrifice. It is in this part where we can see what is perhaps the most significant difference between the Northampton Sage and his son. Suitable equivalence has to do with several tightly woven together concepts. Crisp fixes on two concepts in particular. First, whether the death of Christ is of a sufficient weight, as it were, to tip the scales on the penal demands of the moral law. Or put differently, whether Christ’s death can be treated “as if it were the moral equivalent to the sin of humanity.”52 Second, whether or not the problems of (and therefore the solutions to) the retributive and rectoral demands of divine justice can be individuated one from the other. Upon reviewing the several explicit comments about the suitable equivalence of Christ’s made by some of those later New England theologians, Crisp argues that on penal non-substitution, “Christ’s suffering on the cross was not a species of penal substitution.”53 This, as the comments clearly show, is because while Christ was thought to have suffered a penalty of some sort, he suffered it specifically to meet the demands of the moral law, not as a substitute for individual persons. Crisp is careful to note, against several recent accounts of penal non-substitution, that for Dr. Edwards, Christ’s work remained an objective, though not supererogatory act.
E—Suitable Equivalent and Acceptation
In a related point, Crisp thoughtfully goes on to show how Edwards Jr considers that Christ could in fact have suffered less than he actually did suffer and still have offset the penal demands for human transgressions against the moral law has some interesting links to the medieval doctrine of “acceptation.” Here, Crisp distinguishes between what he aptly refers to as a “thin” versus a “thick” doctrine of Christ’s equivalent suffering for sin. “Thin,” because the accumulated penal consequence(s) of human suffering may in fact not have required a corresponding infinite equivalent to offset their demands; something he says is likely not the case for Edwards Jr. “Thick” because, alternatively, it may be the case (and likely is for Edwards Jr) that because sins against a being of infinite value require an infinite punishment, that the only suitable equivalent for such offenses much be of corresponding infinite value, and thus offered up by an infinite person, namely Christ. Following his assignment of this latter account to Edwards Jr, Crisp further discriminates between what he calls a “thicker” and a “plain thick” version of the “thick” view of the equivalence of Christ’s suffering. According to “thicker” version, Crisp describes Edwards Jr’s assertion that “any amount of suffering endured by Christ is of a qualitatively different nature to any suffering that might be endured by someone who is merely human”; something he says of Edwards Jr is “counterintuitive.”54 The “plain thick” view, to the contrary, Crisp claims avoids the fallout that seems to be entailed by the “thicker” view, which says that Christ’s hitting his thumb with a hammer, as it were, is an infinite suffering like his death on the cross appears to be. Crisp shows that Edwards Jr’s consideration of supposed thickness of Christ’s equivalent suffering is not discordant with his earlier assertions regarding Edwards Jr’s thinking about the necessity of the atonement.
Crisp is altogether correct to claim that the son of the Northampton Sage contributed a great deal more to the development of the New England theological tradition than he is often credited with.55 The preceding should no doubt make this point clearly. His account of Edwards Jr’s doctrine of penal non-substitution is thoroughgoing and convincing. It is, however, not without its own vulnerability. For there is evidence that suggests that Crisp’s account of Edwards Jr’s thinking about atonement is itself “thicker” than we have been lead to believe. Upon this suggestion we transition to consider several important comments that Edwards Jr makes about the atonement that lend support to the idea that he had a place in his thinking for the penal substitution model after all. By considering these comments, we are not interested so much in how to reconcile this anomaly. It is enough for us, as we move on to Gelston, to point it out in hopes of provoking more systematic-theological research into this century-long debate. Let us turn now our attention to two important sources in Edwards Jr’s works.
II.3. A “Thicker” Reading of Edwards Jr on Atonement
Of the variety of theological writings that offer some additionally detailed insight into the development of his father’s legacy regarding the atonement, there are two works in particular that shed some help light on Edwards Jr’s thoughts about the work of Christ. It is here where we shall see that Crisp’s account of Dr. Edwards’ model of atonement is itself “thicker” than Crisp makes it out to be. The first work to shed more light on this matter is his Thoughts on the Atonement, echoes of which appear in a second piece by Edwards Jr, called “Remarks on the Improvements Made in Theology by His Father, President Edwards.” In both cases, the younger Edwards makes several curious statements that point in the direction of his ascent to something along the lines of a penal substitution model of atonement. Let us consider a few such statements from the good Doctor’s works, and then consider their significance to the larger account of his doctrine of atonement, after which we will turn out attention to Gelston. Dr. Edwards writes,
By atonement, I mean something done or suffered, which, to the purpose of supporting the honor and dignity of the divine law and government, shall be equivalent to the punishment of the sinner according to law. Therefore, the atonement made by Christ implies his substitution in the stead of the sinner, who is to be saved by him; or that he suffered that in the sinner’s stead, which as effectually tended to discourage, or prevent transgression, and excite to obedience, as the punishment of the transgressor himself, according to the letter of the law would have done.56
In another place he maintains,
The atonement is the substitute for the punishment threatened in the law; and was designed to answer the same ends of supporting the authority of the law, the dignity of the divine moral government, and the consistency of the divine conduct in legislation and execution. By the atonement it appears that God is determined that his law shall be supported; that it shall not be despised or transgressed with impunity; and that it is an evil and a bitter thing to sin against God. The very idea of an atonement or satisfaction for sin, is something which, to the purposes of supporting the authority of the divine law, the dignity and consistency of the divine government, is equivalent to the punishment of the sinner, according to the literal threatening of the law.57
From these statements, it is clear that the idea of substitution goes hand in hand with the legal/penal aspect of the atonement in the way Edwards Jr thinks about Christ’s work. The question for us is how Dr. Edwards can affirm both something that sounds quite like penal substitution and at the same time, the penal non-substitution model that Crisp labors (convincingly) to illumine. Part of the answer to this question has to do with the way that President Edwards and his son make sense of two aspects of the atonement. First, the nature of owing a debt versus owing a debt of punishment. Second, the direction of sins offense—whether it