(Answer 174) The sufferings of Christ were not infinite in duration. Nor were they incident in quantity or degree, for it was his human nature, which suffered, and that was capable of only a finite degree of suffering. The infinite dignity of his person, however, gave value to his sufferings, which was fully equivalent to the endless torments of the sinner. Reason teaches us that the sufferings of a king’s son, especially if he possesses every amiable quality of a man, are of more value and importance than the sufferings of one of his lowest subjects. And in proportion, as the son is more elevated in station and character, his sufferings will be of proportionably more value in every respect, but especially to the support of the law and the dignity of the government.
We may be sure that the sufferings of Christ are equivalent to the endless torments of the sinner, from God’s actually accepting it as such. He would not accept of that which does not answer the demand of the law. This he fully intimates, when he says, “And ye brought that which was torn, and the lame, and the sick; though ye brought an offering: should I accept this of your hands? saith the Lord.” Malachi 1.13. That the sufferings of Christ were accepted as an equivalent is evident from what is abundantly asserted. “Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree.” 1 Peter 2.24. “As Christ also hath loved us, and hath given himself for us, and offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet smelling savour.” Ephesians 5.2. “For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin.” 2 Corinthians 5.21. Who gave himself a ransom for all.” 1 Timothy 2.6. “For by one offering he hath perfected forever them that are sanctified.” Hebrews 10.14.
Here Gelston again takes up and defends an aspect of suitable equivalence, this time by addressing the value of Christ’s sacrifice—a discussion that is often ignored or misconstrued by contemporary atonement theoreticians. That Christ’s sacrifice was suitably equivalent to the “eternal torments” is not the same thing as say that he endured the actual torments of hell for anyone. This seems to point away from Gelston’s subscription to a penal substitution theory. And at the same time, Gelston links humanities offense to both God and the moral law. It seems to us that despite the lack of clarity on these various comments of Gelston, that a fairly strong cumulative case can be made that he did not espouse a doctrine of penal substitution. So, what did he subscribe to in the end?
Finally, in question 175, Gelston asks, “Do the sufferings and obedience of Christ prove the divine law to be a just law?”
(Answer 175) It does not appear that the nature of the law is, in any instance, to be determined merely by its sanctions. The will or character of the lawgiver, the tendency of the law, and the nature of the trends rations against which its penalties are leveled, more properly give complexion to the law. Whenever, therefore, the justice of a law is questioned, the character of the lawgiver is equally questioned. And though he should execute the full extent of the threatening, this would not achieve the difficulty with respect to his law or character, for we know that an unjust and rigorous sovereign may commit the greatest injustice in this way, and be at proportionably greater distance from rectitude of heart. Something more than merely suffering the threatening of the law is necessary to vindicate its justice. Nor would mere obedience alone determine the law to be just. One of the contrary nature may be as punctually obeyed as if perfectly just, and it is injustice remain undiminished.
But if we take into consideration the true character of God and of Christ, we have the fullest assurance is law is holy, just and good. Without this, what ever be the sufferings in support of it, or however punctually obeyed, we would have no certainty of its justice.
In this final atonement-related question, Gelston further affirms his commitment to something other than penal substitution. The key phrase here is when Gelston says, “Something more than merely suffering the threatening of the law is necessary to vindicate its justice.” In this way, Gelston is saying that Christ must do more than merely suffer by absorbing the penal consequences. He must honor the law and its requirement, which in turn honor’s the Father. Notice again, as with his previous answer, the link between the moral law’s demands and the demands of God, the legislator. Although, these finer distinctions do not allow us to make a simple and easy categorization of what Gelston actually believed. The difficulty is parsing out his understanding of the specific mechanism at work in the atonement and how this relates to God and his moral law, particularly the specifics of meting out the requirements of the law beckons a serious scholarly return to the New England theological tradition, Gelston offering us one window into what remains a veritable trove of rich, under-researched theology. The complexity and depth of insight amongst New England theologians and the intricacy of doctrinal developments that have emerged from it are reflected here in the reading of Gelston.
Conclusion
To speak of New England dogmatics still remains something of a contradiction. Our introducing Gelston and his doctrine of atonement is but a modest contribution to this untapped and underdeveloped field of research. The doctrine of atonement reflects a wider and deeper conversation needing to occur with New England theology. So also is the relationship of Reformed dogmatics at large with their New England brethren.
Having been almost exclusively a matter of historical interest, and motivated primarily by questions about the nature of President Edwards’ doctrinal relationship to his intellectual progeny, contemporary systematic and constructive use of Edwards’ intellection tradition remains very much in its infancy. The atonement is but one example; one that still requires serious or sustained systematic theological inquiry. While penal substation theory was swirling around in New England discussions, it is apparent that it is not the dominant theory of the day—unlike what we find today in Reformed evangelical churches. How penal substitution assumed the dominant place in contemporary discussions depends on the social, cultural, and theological mores leading to its acceptance. During Gelston’s time and location, the moral government and Anselmian satisfaction are live, even popular, and robust options for New Englander’s. They, too, should be live options for contemporary theologians, as we have shown above. Through a process of retrieval, New England thought helps us raise new questions, in our social and historical context, about God’s relationship to his creation, the law, and Christ’s relationship to these doctrinal loci. Again, Gelston leads us to raise these questions.
Our brief investigation into Gelston provides one way in which the theologian might find it useful. What you have in your hands is a lens into the New England tradition and its influence on Reformed theological developments in America. Certainly other doctrines deserve our reflection. Gelston advances some interesting thoughts on the nature of revelation, natural knowledge of God, God’s Trinitarian nature, and the study of last things. These thoughts may or may not be novel insights from Gelston. Even still, they too reflect the New England tradition of theological development.
1. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People, 405.
2. The collected works of the most prominent New England theologians are housed in the thirty-seven-volume series, Kuklick, American Religious Thought of the 18th and 19th Centuries.
3. The most recent contribution to this literature are the essays contained in Crisp and Sweeney (eds.), After Edwards: The Courses of the New England Theology.
4. Crisp, “Penal Non-Substitution,” 140–68.
5. The biographical information for Maltby Gelston is gathered from the following sources: Harrison, A Discourse Delivered . . . at the Funeral of Rev. Maltby Gelston (1857); Dexter, Biographical Sketches of the Graduates of Yale with Annals of the College History, Vol. 4, July 1778–June 1792 (1907), 708–9; Ogden, An Address Delivered . . . Union Hall, Jamaica, Long Island (1842), 4; Franklin, History of Long Island (1839), 144–26, 397; Giddings, The Giddings Family (1882), 123; Verill (ed.), Maltby-Maltbie Family History (1916), 342–432.