8th. Case 26. I am obliged to differ from Mr. Peirce in respect both of what he thinks unlikely, and of what he thinks likely. He thinks it unlikely that the percipient should have told his friends of his experience on one day, Friday, and have searched the local paper on the next day, Saturday. But he did both things on the earliest opportunity, the local paper not being published till Saturday. Mr. Peirce thinks it likely, on the other hand, that when he said “About 2 o’clock on the morning of October 21,” which was a Friday, he meant “the night of Friday at 2 A.M.,” i.e., 2 o’clock on the morning of Saturday. Now, had he made the statement which Mr. Peirce incorrectly attributes to him, “The vision occurred on Friday, at 2 A.M.,” there might be some ground for this view; for “Friday at 2 A.M.” is a phrase which one could imagine to be laxly used for 2 A.M. on the night of Friday-Saturday. But the use of the precise phrase “on the morning of,” which Mr. Peirce suppresses, and the giving of the day of the month, not of the week, surely makes a veiy distinct difference. On what ground can it be held that a person is likely to say “2 o’clock on the morning of October 21,” when he means “2 o’clock on the morning of October 22”?
Case 170. I agree that the degree of exactitude in the coincidence is here doubtful, and I would drop the case from the list in consequence.
Case 182. I do not think that there is much doubt here, as the date of the percipient’s experience was particularly remarked at the time, and might well be remembered for a month.
Case 197. I have myself pointed out that it is possible that the limit was exceeded by some hours. But two or three such cases may, I think, fairly be included in the estimate, considering what the object and upshot of the estimate is. The reader may of course be trusted to perceive that had the arbitrary limit been fixed at twenty-four hours instead of twelve, the overwhelming character of the odds against chance would remain. The precise figures would differ, according as a limit of six, twelve, eighteen, or twenty-four hours was selected; but considering that any selection, with the calculation based on it, would lead us to the same conclusion, I see nothing misleading in the inclusion of a case where the interval may have exceeded the actually selected lower limit, provided that it is equally likely not to have done so, and provided due warning is given. These remarks apply equally to Cases 201 and 231.
Case 195. It ought to have been stated that the percipient returned home almost immediately after—she and her mother think the very day after—the death, thereby missing a letter which was sent to her, and finding her grandmother dead. She would thus only have to carry her memory back a day or two to identify the date of her vision with that of the death.
Case 202. The percipient distinctly states that she saw the announcement of the death “two or three days” after her experience; to which, therefore, there is again a very high probability that she assigned the right date.
A similar remark applies to Case 237, where the percipient heard of the death “a day or so after” her experience. The interval certainly cannot have been much longer, as she saw her dead friend before the funeral.
In Case 214 we are told that the percipient “noted the day and the hour”; but the testimony to this effect is second-hand, and there was no written note, so that here there is reasonable ground for doubt as to the closeness of the coincidence. The case has been already dropped from the list for another reason; as also has Case 355, where, however, the coincidence, on the evidence, was extremely close.
Case 199. Mr. Peirce says that “the vision occurred, if at all, on a Saturday; the death on a Wednesday.” This seems unwarranted. The narrator thought that both the vision and the death had been on a Saturday, but he recollects and says nothing which independently marks the day of the week of the vision. Why is it to be assumed that his memory is right as to the quite uninteresting and little noticeable point of the day of the week, and wrong as to the extremely interesting and noticeable point that the day of the two events was the same? The fact remains, however, that he has made one definite mistake; and the probability that the closeness of the coincidence has been exaggerated in memory seems here sufficiently appreciable to condemn the case for the purpose of this particular list—even had not its retention been made impossible by its having occurred before 1874, as already stated.
Case 702. Mr. Peirce says, “The date given for the apparition differs from that of the death by one day.” This is contrary to the fact. The apparition is stated to have taken place on June 11, the day of the death; and as the death occurred in England at 5:20 A.M., and the apparition in Jamaica at a few minutes past 12 A.M., the coincidence of hour would be extraordinarily close if the coincidence of day is correctly remembered. Mr. Peirce’s next sentence conveys a totally false impression. In conversation with me, Mr. G. said that he fancied the date of the two events had been June 15, but that he could not be sure of this till he referred to the letter. What he was sure of was the identity of the two dates, which, according to his account, was noted both by his friend and himself with special care. Mr. Peirce’s way of putting it would imply that there was some independent reason—apart from Mr. G.’s idea that the 15th was the date of the coincidence—for believing that the 15th was the day of the apparition. But this is not the case; and surely it is obvious that correctness of memory as to a very striking coincidence does not necessarily involve infallibility as to the perfectly insignificant point on what particular day of the month the coincidence fell.
9th. Case 202. “The percipient, who is excessively near-sighted,”—this is Mr. Peirce’s version of the sentence, “She is short-sighted, but wears suitable glasses, and was wearing them on this occasion.” “This person’s head was turned away,”—this is his version of “I saw only the three-quarter face.” He has omitted to notice the improbability, specially pointed out in the account, that a lady of flesh and blood should be wearing a seal-skin jacket in August, and also the fact that the bonnet was recognized; nor does he seem to have remarked the importance of the recognition of the child, which tells strongly against the hypothesis of mistaken identity.
Case 249 (I presume that this is the case meant, though the number given is 201). Most readers of the whole case will, I think, agree with me that, if the facts are correctly stated, mistaken identity is a highly improbable explanation. And I cannot think that it is much helped by the hypothesis of the facetious and then conscience-stricken boy. If that hypothesis be adopted, however, I would venture to suggest the further feature of stilts, both as adding to the humor of the “Christmas joke,” and as probably necessary in order to enable the boy’s head (which he would naturally have practised before a mirror in the method of Mr. X’s “peculiar droop”) to be visible above the wall.
10th. Case 350. One of Mr. Peirce’s suppositions contradicts what is plainly stated in the account—that it was not known that the woman was dying, or in any way near death. She was a chronic invalid. I cannot guess how Mr. Peirce knows that she had cancer, which is nowhere mentioned. The hypothesis of the skull is quite inconsistent with M. J. F.’s and Mrs. R.’s evidence. I may add that “looking in and smiling at the girls” is rather a free version of “trying to look in,” which is the expression used in the account.
11th. Case 355 has been already excluded on the ground of the date; but Captain A. impressed our friend and helper, the Rev. J. A. Macdonald, as a reliable witness; and personal knowledge, though not an infallible guide in such matters, is, at any rate, a safer one than such a sweeping presumption as Mr. Peirce enunciates. As to Case 300, I can well imagine a difference of opinion. But, again, the witness appeared to be honest and truthful to a clear-headed cross-examiner, who had begun by disbelieving the story.
12th. By “any room to suspect” I suppose that Mr. Peirce means any appreciable grounds for suspecting. I should be interested to know what his own grounds are. As regards Case 29, would he supplement his assumption that all sea-captains are ignorant and superstitious by the still more robust hypothesis that all gardeners get drunk? The hypothesis, however, whether general or particular, would not at