The Art of Occupation. Thomas J. Kehoe

and resources, and the influx of refugees and DPs.⁴²

      A black market was virtually inevitable in such conditions as people struggled to survive. Most MGOs viewed even this low-level crime as damaging to the social order because it exposed MG’s inability to meet people’s food and resource needs. MGOs frequently responded by imposing stricter rations, which drove resource hoarding, which MGOs in turn criminalized. In Munich, Kurtz made “Violation of Consumption Orders” a breach of Section 43. Similar actions were taken in Bremen and in major urban areas of the British Zone such as Cologne, creating a repressive cycle of desperation and criminalization of survival actions.⁴³

      All crime and social unrest emphasized the importance of policing, which along with nearly all questions of governance fell to district detachments. They had to rely on German police. The instructions were clear, as the Public Safety Manual emphasized: “German police … will be responsible for maintaining law and order.”⁴⁴ But this requirement placed detachments in an unenviable position between the occupation’s transformative aims and the requirements of local law enforcement. Reluctant to remove the German police who were vital to maintaining order, MGOs often forwent denazification in favor of ensuring the peace. CIC agents then took care of the matter for them, checking German police for Nazi histories along with other government officials and dismissing many of them.⁴⁵ These sweeps were often more far reaching than MGOs were comfortable with, leaving district police forces understaffed and amplifying concerns about local security, which led to persistent conflict in the districts between MG and zone-level agents of denazification.⁴⁶ When Andrews in rural district Nuremberg noted “some increase in crime” in early July 1945, he reversed denazification and ordered “all persons dismissed … for political background … back to work immediately.” He also granted the German police greater authority to resolve civil disputes in order to relieve pressure on his detachment.⁴⁷ One month later, Andrews reported that a CIC-led denazification sweep had once again “hit some departments of the city very hard.” Faced with few options for hiring new officers, some MGOs simply reemployed dismissed police when CIC agents left. Andrews, for instance, pursued an “intensive campaign for new employees” this second time, which included once again reassessing—to his benefit—the political status of dismissed Germans.⁴⁸