Senegal, by virtue of its presidency of the OAU, was assured of a voice at the table. Both France and Rwanda seemed to see Uganda as an essential part of the peace process, as witnessed by the border-assessment mission France had already deployed and the upcoming visit of Ugandan foreign minister Ssemogerere to Paris. The parties were ambiguous about potential African mediators. Neither side was particularly friendly with the Tanzanians. Both the internal opposition and RPF mistrusted Zaire. But both were determined that the ceasefire negotiations should move back to an African locale. Eventually, Arusha won out over Kinshasa, although the parties insisted on keeping Mobutu as mediator and the N’sele Accord as the founding document for the revived negotiation process.70
AN AMERICAN GAMBIT
Since the US policy review in March, the United States had been visibly active in the Central African region. An internal summation of the US position concluded that “with Hank Cohen’s high visibility as the promoter of dialogue and without a vested interest in the area, the USG is seen as the most objective party.”71 Cohen’s personal diplomacy had brought together the Rwandan government and the Front in Kampala. He had encouraged Museveni’s positive participation in the peace process and had secured an invitation to the United States to be present at the Paris talks in May. Now the French had invited the assistant secretary to be in Paris during the visit of Ugandan foreign minister Ssemogerere on June 20. The ostensible purpose of the foreign minister’s meeting was to be briefed on the French border survey. But Paris wanted Cohen’s help in pressuring the Ugandans to stop assistance to the Rwandese Patriotic Front.
At the meeting, the assistant secretary found the foreign minister surrounded by Ugandan security officers and plaintively denying Ugandan engagement with the RPF. Cohen finally got Ssemogerere to the side and told him that the United States knew that Uganda was supplying the RPF. This war was destabilizing the region and costing the international community large outlays for humanitarian relief. The war must stop. If a ceasefire was not in place by October 1, Cohen warned, the United States would deduct from its aid to Uganda the amount of its costs for relief for displaced persons within Rwanda.72 The foreign minister said that he personally welcomed this demarche and wished that President Museveni would have a chance to hear it directly.
Consequently, Cohen had Ambassador Carson deliver to President Museveni a letter in which Cohen noted that the fighting in the Rwandan conflict had intensified despite Museveni’s commitment to help end the conflict, that the fighting was not necessary since the democratization process in Rwanda allowed the RPF the best chance to gain satisfaction of its legitimate grievances, that the fighting was draining international relief coffers, and that Museveni’s government “bears a direct responsibility in the continuation of the fighting.” The letter then reiterated the US position that if a peaceful settlement or firm ceasefire “is not in place by October 1, 1992, we will have no choice, given the burden the conflict places on U.S. resources, but to deduct what is needed for relief for Rwanda’s displaced from the economic assistance we provide to Uganda.”73
On Assistant Secretary Cohen’s return to Washington, the staff sent up a decision memorandum proposing technical assistance to the ceasefire negotiations. The memorandum was based on the belief that the Rwandan conflict had reached a critical turning point where “the situation may deteriorate due to inertia and inexperience on the part of the GOR and the RPF,” if the United States did not exert pressure to influence the outcome of ceasefire negotiations. The proposal would have legal expert John Byerly and military specialist Lt. Col. Charles Snyder meet with the government of Rwanda and the Patriotic Front, respectively, to discuss preliminary ceasefire proposals and conflict resolution techniques.74
If those talks were constructive, the experts would proceed to the negotiations as backup technical support to the US ambassador to Tanzania, Edmund DeJarnette, the official US Observer for the ceasefire talks. The memorandum also recommended that “we brief the French and the Belgians on what we propose to do” and that the United States raise the level of regular contact with the Patriotic Front to the ambassadorial level in Kampala, thus “increasing symmetry in our relations with the GOR and the RPF.” Cohen agreed to the proposals under specific condition that the French and the Belgians not object to this modest US initiative. The French and Belgian embassies in Washington were called in for a briefing, and demarches were made in each capital.75
Snyder and Byerly had helped construct the Namibian peace agreement and brokered a truce in the Angolan civil war, and they were at that time deeply involved in peace negotiations in Mozambique. With Byerly’s knowledge of texts and approaches and Snyder’s understanding of military requirements, they constituted a formidable reservoir of information on strategies for conflict resolution. Snyder spent long hours with RPA leader Kagame and his cohort when they visited Washington, and Byerly went to Kigali to huddle with the Rwandan government negotiators. The Byerly-Snyder team forwarded texts from ceasefire agreements in Zimbabwe, Angola, El Salvador, and Nicaragua to both parties.76
The experts found two very different planning environments. Colonel Snyder met with Paul Kagame, a military leader who had demonstrated military prowess in the field but had yet to raise significant political support within Rwanda. Convincing Kagame and the RPF that they could attain their minimum goals through compromise within a political process was Snyder’s goal. He found the RPF to be quick learners who assessed negotiating scenarios and expanded their options and analyses in preparation for the July 10 encounter. On the other hand, Byerly met with a Rwandan government discouraged about the war, divided on core principles, and competing with the president for power. Byerly had to rally the divided and dispirited members of the Rwandan government, convincing them to develop a common position and confidently to engage the RPF in negotiations.77
Finally, a Ceasefire
Despite the apparent success of the Paris talks, the success of the July ceasefire negotiations was by no means assured. Until late June, it was not known where the talks would take place, other than that they would be held in Africa, in keeping with OAU principles. Though the parties were loyal to Mobutu as mediator and to the N’sele and Gbadolite Accords as the foundation for future discussions, Zaire, preoccupied with its own internal problems, was not in a position to host the negotiation.
With customary caution, the Tanzanian government indicated its willingness to take on such a role, should both parties request it officially.78 On June 26, Rwandan minister of interior Munyazesa asked the government of Tanzania to “arrange for direct GOR-RPF talks to take place in Arusha, July 10–12.” But it was not yet confirmed what the Tanzanian role would be in those talks.79
As the ceasefire talks opened in Arusha, July 10, Ambassador DeJarnette noted the style of Foreign Minister Ngulinzira as conciliatory and flexible but that of RPF commissioner Bizimungu as rhetorical and demanding. Ngulinzira presided over a large delegation representing contentious political parties, the foreign ministry, and the defense ministry. Bizimungu spoke for a small team of experienced negotiators and one field commander.80
The sessions were beset by “confusion over tabled texts, a tendency by both delegations to score negotiating points rather than focus on substance.” According to DeJarnette, “mutual suspicion and a tendency to lose sight of final objectives” characterized the Rwandan delegations. Long-winded interventions by Foreign Minister Diria and other African Observers “missed the mark more often than they hit it.” The US delegation concluded that “it is at best an even proposition that they will succeed in reaching any agreement in Arusha and even less that the agreement will be workable.” Although the United States had been engaged in the negotiating process with technical advice from the Byerly-Snyder team and networking by Ambassador DeJarnette, the delegation felt that the United States should not associate