151. Cicero states this despite the claims of Euhemerus, who, appealing to intellectual elites, had argued (early in the third century BCE) that most of those recognized as gods had originally been mortal human beings, who were then deified after their deaths. See the discussion in Seznec, Survival of the Pagan Gods, 11–13.
152. Topica is not the only work of Cicero in which he mentions divine testimony. In Part. or. 2.6, the following dialog between the elder Cicero and his son appears after the elder Cicero states that what brings conviction in a speech are “[A]rguments, which are derived from topics that are either contained in the facts of the case itself or are obtained from outside” (Part. or. 2.5):
“Son: How then do you distinguish between the two kinds of arguments you speak of?
Father: Arguments thought of without using a system I term arguments from outside, for instance the evidence of witnesses. . . .
[At this point there is a question and answer concerning internal arguments.]
Son: What kinds of evidence are there?
Father: Divine and human. Divine evidence is for instance oracles, auspices, prophecies, the answers of priests and augurs and diviners; human evidence is what is viewed in the light of authority and inclination and things said either freely or under compulsion—the evidence that includes written documents, pledges, promises, statements made on oath or under examination” (Part. or. 2.6).
153. Cf. the discussion above concerning Aristotle and the use of authority as an inartificial proof.
154. Quintilian then gives several examples of Cicero’s use of divine testimony in treatises and speeches, some of which will be examined below.
155. In his section on θέσις, Theon also references the topos of authority as a way of providing proofs for one’s thesis; he does not, however, mention the gods. He writes: “A more advanced student should include in each of the topics just mentioned the evidence of famous men, poets and statesmen and philosophers . . . and one should not make mention of these things randomly or by chance, but amplifying the examples, first from what has been done by an individual, private man, then by those in authority or a king” (Theon, Progymnasmata 122 [Kennedy]).
156. “And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight [ἀξιόχρεων]. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness . . . Well once [Chaerephon] went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; . . . he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser.” Note here that Plato connects the oracle itself with divine speech, a theme to which I will return.
157. Cicero also references this oracle in Amic. 2.7, 10; Sen. 21.78; and Acad. 1.4.16. See also Valerius Maximus, who also references this oracle in his Memorable Doings and Sayings (3.4.ext. 1). In this particular section, Valerius discusses those who despite lowly origins rose to positions of prominence. As a non-Roman example, Valerius names Socrates, using the oracle as proof of his intellectual and virtuous stature.
158. Cicero makes use of this oracle in a second argument for the immortality of the soul (Tusc. 1.22.52). Here, Cicero claims that a body is simply a container for the soul; one’s existence is therefore defined by the soul, not the physical body. The Delphic inscription, which he attributes to Apollo, is therefore the god’s command to know one’s soul, not one’s physical body. Cf. also Dio Chrysostom, 10.22; 67.3; Plato Charm. 164b-65b; [Alc. maj.] 1.124a-b. Aristides also references this oracle in his In Defense of Oratory 78–83; see the analysis of this passage below.
159. Specifically, Leocrates fled Athens and went to Megara when Philip won a victory over the Athenians at Chaeronea.
160. At this point, Dio Chrysostom quotes the oracle in full:
“Wait till the time shall come when a mule is monarch of Media:
Then, thou delicate Lydian, away to the pebbles of Hermus;
Haste thee and no longer stay, nor have awe of being a coward” (37.7).
161. “[Oratory] seems to me, Gorgias, not to be an artistic practice [εἶναι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὖ], but that of a soul taking aim, courageous, and naturally clever in associating with men. Its total effect I call flattery” (Aristides, In Defense of Oratory 22).
162. Aristides emphasizes his use of evidence in this section; he states, “Then my argument will be made not from lack of taste, but for proof [ἔπειτ’ οὐ τοῦ φορτικοῦ χάριν εἰρήσεται, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως], which we claim is lacking in these [i.e., Plato’s] arguments” (In Defense of Oratory 27–28).
163. “Men go to Delphi and inquire about constitutions. And then they legislate according to the voice which comes from the Pythian priestess, beginning with Lycurgus, who came after many others, but must be called first for the sake of argument” (In Defense of Oratory 38).
164. “[A]nd [Plato] says that then he must act, ‘if the Pythian priestess assents,’ but before that he does not dare” (In Defense of Oratory 41; cf. Plato, Resp. 540c).
165. Aristides summarizes this section with the statement, “So be it! Here is the evidence for our argument, from Delphi and Pythian Apollo [αὓτη μὲν ἐκ Δελφῶν ἡ μαρτυρία τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παρὰ Ἀπόλλωνος (τοῦ) Πυθίου]” (In Defense of Oratory 42).
166. This is basically an argument from the greater to the lesser, the greater being the “artless” testimony of the gods through oracles. Aristides summarizes: “Therefore, evidence and support has come . . . from all the gods [οὐκοῦν παρὰ . . . τῶν θεῶν μαρτυρία ψῆφος ἐπῆκται], that such an argument is worthless, which either seeks art or belittles whatever does not have it” (In Defense of Oratory 45).
167. Cicero will cite the gods as the source of madness as well; the context, however, is quite different. See comments below in connection with his speech against Clodius, De haruspicum responso.
168. Other