The falāsifah, influenced by Greek philosophy, were primarily intellectuals and not religious scholars.5 Since philosophy and science were closely related disciplines in those days, most of the philosophers were well-recognized authorities in sciences like mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, and medicine. They also performed experiments to the extent they could, in keeping with the practice of Muslim scholars in those days. They generally received government patronage and made substantial contributions to the development of these sciences. Moreover, since knowledge was not yet compartmentalized in those days, they were also quite well-versed in the religious sciences, and some, like Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198), were even considered authorities in these. While the extremists among them like Ibn al-Rāwandī (d. 250/864) and Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (Rhazes, d. 313/925) held views that conflicted with fundamental Islamic beliefs, most of them, including al-Kindī (d. 252/866), al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 428/1037), and Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), were relatively moderate. They did not find any incompatibility between reason and Revelation. In fact they tried to show the harmony between the two and rationally argued in favour of Revelation and Prophethood, life after death, and other Islamic beliefs and practices. They quoted profusely from the Qur’ān and the Sunnah to support their views.
This free and rational discussion of Islamic beliefs and practices raised a lively and extremely sophisticated intellectual debate on a number of epistemological issues, some of which were:
• What is the nature of God? Does He have a body with eyes, ears, hands and legs? If not, how does He see, hear, hold and move, and is it possible for human beings to see Him? What are His attributes (ṣifāt)? Are these attributes an integral part of His Being or separate from Him? Can reason help human beings know Him and His attributes, or are they totally dependent on Revelation for this purpose? Does He know everything that will happen in the future, even what human beings are going to do?
• If God is Eternal, is His creation also eternal? If not, was there a period when He was not a Creator? Is this conceivable?
• To what extent are human beings free or predestined? If their life is predestined, then would it be just for God to hold them accountable for their deeds and to reward or punish them?
• Is faith alone sufficient to be a believer or is it also necessary to reinforce it by deeds? Is a sinful Muslim a believer (mu’min), an unbeliever (kāfir), or something in between (fāsiq)?
• Will the resurrection of human beings in the Hereafter be only of the soul or also of the body? If there is bodily resurrection, will the body be the same as it is in this world or will it be different?
• If the Qur’ān is a part of God’s speech (kalām), then is it to be considered created and transitory like this world or uncreated and eternal like other Divine attributes?
• To what extent is it possible for human beings to know what is right from what is wrong by means of reason and to what extent is Revelation necessary for this purpose? Is it conceivable that a just God would hold human beings accountable for their deeds without creating in them an innate ability to recognize right from wrong?
It is evident that hardly any of these questions had anything to do with science. The answers were bound to be speculative and could not have been given with precision. It was, therefore, not possible to have a single answer. There were differing opinions and, therefore, neither the rationalists nor the conservatives constituted a homogenous whole.6 The real bone of contention was the extent to which reason and logic could effectively help answer the above epistemological questions. It seems, however, that the moderates among both the rationalists and the conservatives, who constituted the majority, appreciated the need for both reason and Revelation in different degrees. However, it was the extremists on both sides who succeeded in getting greater attention and who, therefore, set the tone of the debate.
The moderate rationalists, who stressed a greater reliance on reason, developed a set of five axioms (al-uṣūl al-khamsah) to help them argue their case more effectively. Two of the most important of these axioms were Tawḥīd (Unity) and ʿadl (justice) of God, which are accepted by all Muslims without exception.7 There would be no point in relying on axioms that did not command a consensus. Differences, nevertheless, arose in the deduction of their implications.
With respect to Tawḥīd which is the most fundamental of all Islamic beliefs and stands for the absolute Oneness and Uniqueness of God, the general Muslim understanding is that, because of their limited capabilities and perceptions, human beings cannot comprehend Him fully. The Qur’ān, itself, makes this crystal clear by saying that “there is nothing like Him” (al-Qur’ān, 42: 11), and that human “eyes cannot encompass Him” (al-Qur’ān, 6: 103).8 Therefore, in keeping with a Qur’ānic injunction (al-Qur’ān, 3: 7), the general Muslim attitude has been to accept on faith those unseen metaphysical realities which are beyond the reach of reason and sense perception and they do not try to probe into them too deeply. This would be a fruitless exercise because, while the existence of God can be established through observation and logical reasoning, His nature cannot be understood fully except through His attributes (ṣifāt) as revealed in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. Extreme rationalists, however, insisted that reason was by itself capable of enabling human beings to know His nature. Their effort to do so embroiled them in sterile and divisive controversies on a number of metaphysical questions like Divine attributes, Resurrection and Life after Death, angels, Revelation and Prophethood, the eternity of the world, the creation of the Qur’ān, Divine knowledge of particulars, and the ability of human beings to see God in the Hereafter. These extreme rationalists adopted hard line positions which were in clear conflict with the Qur’ān and the Sunnah and even the moderate rationalists had difficulty accepting their views.
With respect to the concept of ʿadl, the debate was more practical and relevant to the human condition even though it also raised a great deal of controversy. Some of the conclusions that the moderate rationalists derived were as follows:
• God subjects Himself to the same moral principles which He applies to human beings. He does only that which is just and morally right. It is inconceivable that He would do something that is unjust or morally wrong.
• Goodness or evil are innate in the nature of things themselves and not necessarily because God arbitrarily declares them to be so. It is, therefore, possible for human beings to recognize what is right or wrong through their own reasoning even though they need the help of Revelation to guide them and to confirm their conclusions.
• Since God is just, there is absolutely no room for the concept of predestination. Human beings are the authors of their own deeds, good or evil, and, therefore, rewarding or punishing them would be a reflection of God’s justice.
To a modern rationalist thinker there may be much appeal in a number of these views. Such appeal existed even in those days, and the initial objective, method and concepts of the moderate rationalists did not generate tension even among those members of the Muslim orthodoxy who did not accept the need for rational explanations for religious beliefs and practices. The differences of opinion that existed could have been resolved to a great extent over time in the light of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah and through rational debate. The question is, why did this not take place?
Reasons for the Downfall of the Rationalists
It was the extremists on both the conservative and rationalist sides who generated a great deal of heat and changed the texture of the whole debate, creating an atmosphere of confrontation. On the conservative side, extremists like the Hashwiyyahs insisted that faith is based entirely on the Qur’ān and