During the 2000s the Lisbon agenda was repeatedly reinforced, including by “Guidelines for Growth and Jobs”, “National Reform Programmes” and “Recommendations” from the European Council. Particularly after the de Kok report (2004), policy toward labour markets has stressed the need for flexibility, contract standardisation, promotion of temporary and part-time work, and creation of (tax) incentives to encourage labour force participation.6 It is also true that improving the quality of employment was emphasised by the Council meetings of Nice (2000) and Barcelona (2002). In practice, however, the pressure of reform has led to a race to the bottom for workers’ pay and conditions. Several European legislative initiatives have met with strong resistance in recent years, for instance, reform of the internal market in services (Bolkenstein directive), or the new Working Time directive that would potentially increase the working week to sixty-five hours. Partly as a response, the European Commission has recently promoted a general agenda of reform focused on the Danish model of “flexicurity” – weak legal protection of labour relations compensated by strong state support for the unemployed.
Given that a single monetary policy has applied across the eurozone, and given also the tough constraints on fiscal policy (through the Stability and Growth Pact) labour market policy has been one of the few levers available to different countries to improve external competitiveness. Therefore, the effects of labour market policies have varied profoundly among different eurozone countries. Core countries have been historically characterised by high real wages and strong social policies, while peripheral countries have typically had low real wages and weak welfare states. Political and trade union organisation has also differed substantially among eurozone countries. All eurozone countries have joined the race to impose labour market flexibility and compress labour costs, but from very different starting points and with different mechanisms.
Of fundamental importance in this connection has been labour market policy in Germany. Put in a nutshell, Germany has been more successful than peripheral countries at squeezing workers’ pay and conditions. The German economy might have performed poorly, but Germany has led the way in imposing flexibility and restraining real wages. Characteristic of the trend have been the labour market reforms of 2003 introduced by the Social Democratic Party and known as Agenda 2010. New labour contracts have reduced social contributions and unemployment benefits. Since the early 1990s, furthermore, it has been possible for German capital to take full advantage of cheaper labour in Eastern Europe. The combined effect of these factors has been to put downward pressure on German wages, thus improving the competitiveness of the German economy.7
Peripheral countries with weak welfare states, lower real wages, and well-organised labour movements, such as Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain, have been unable to squeeze workers equally hard. Ireland, on the other hand, has been at the forefront of imposing more liberal conditions on its workers. Unfortunately for the Irish elite, this did not spare the country from the severe impact of the crisis of 2007–9.
The determinants of German competitive success
The difference in outlook between Germany and the peripheral countries can be demonstrated by considering the behaviour of nominal labour unit costs, that is, nominal labour remuneration divided by real output. Nominal unit costs can be disaggregated into nominal cost per hour of labour divided by labour productivity. This is a standard measure used to compare competitiveness internationally.8 The trajectory of nominal unit costs, therefore, gives insight into the variation of nominal cost of labour relative to labour productivity. This trajectory is shown in figure 10 for all the countries in the sample with 1995 as base year. Note that data on productivity is notoriously unreliable, thus the evidence should be used with considerable caution.
Fig. 10 Nominal Unit Labour Costs (1995 = 100)
Source: AMECO
Fig. 11 Real Compensation of Labour (1995 = 100)
Source: AMECO
The most striking aspect of this data is the flatness of nominal unit labour costs in Germany. It appears that the opening of Eastern Europe to German capital together with sustained pressure on pay and conditions has forced nominal labour costs to move at an almost identical pace to productivity. However, in peripheral countries things have been different. Unit labour costs have increased significantly as nominal labour costs have risen faster than productivity, with Greece in the lead. In short, peripheral countries have been losing competitiveness relative to Germany in the internal eurozone market.
The more rapid rise in nominal labour costs was accompanied by generally higher inflation in the periphery compared to Germany, as was previously shown in relation to figure 3. Nevertheless, nominal labour costs rose generally faster than inflation, thus leading to increasing real compensation of labour in the periphery, as is shown in figure 11 (definition in footnote 8). Extra care is required here as real compensation is not the same thing as real wages, and moreover it hides a broad range of payments to managers and others in the form of wages and bonuses. Furthermore, the aggregate conceals considerable inequality in real wages among different groups of workers. Still, figure 11 shows that the real compensation of labour has risen faster in peripheral countries compared to Germany, with the exception of Spain.
Real compensation and the share of labour in output
It is no wonder, therefore, that conservative commentators in the press have remarked that the sovereign debt crisis ultimately derives from peripheral country workers receiving higher increases in compensation than German workers, leading to a loss of competitiveness.9 This is true, but also misleading. The real problem has not been excessive compensation for peripheral workers but negligible increases for German workers, particularly after the introduction of the euro. Even in Greece, in which nominal and real compensation have increased the most, the rise in real compensation has been only of the order of 20 percent during the period of 2000–8, and that from a low base compared to Germany.
The modesty of labour remuneration in the periphery becomes clear when put in the context of productivity growth (fig. 12).
There has been weaker productivity growth in Germany compared to the rest during this period, with the exception of Spain which has been extremely weak. This is more evidence of the lack of dynamism of the German economy: Irish, Greek and Portuguese productivity rose faster, even if from a lower base (Irish productivity is probably exaggerated for reasons to do with multinational transfer pricing). Peripheral countries have generally improved productivity, and certainly done better than Germany, which has been a laggard. But the Lisbon Strategy has not succeeded in putting peripheral countries on a strongly rising path of productivity. There has been no true catching up with the more advanced economies of the eurozone, with the partial exception of Ireland. Productivity increases have been respectable compared to Germany, but that is because Germany has performed badly.
Fig. 12 Labour Productivity (1995 = 100)
Source: OECD
Nonetheless, productivity growth has still been faster than the rise in real remuneration of labour. Consequently, labour has lost share in output more or less across the sample, as is shown in figure 13 (definition in footnote 6). The only sustained increase after the introduction of the euro has been in Ireland, but even there workers barely made good the losses sustained in the 1990s. Workers have generally lost