Toward a Humean True Religion. Andre C. Willis

philosophy, like any science, rested on the general assumption of a rudimentary form of causal regularity. It affirmed both our belief in hidden powers in nature (a source for what we take to be the principles of human nature) and our instinctive perception that the universe is ordered and regular. I name this “basic theism” because, on Hume’s argument, to assume a constantly dynamic order is to invite the mind to the idea of an Orderer. Another way to say this—and this is accepted in Hume scholarship—is that the presupposition of order and regularity irresistibly orients the mind to the idea of an Author of Nature. For Hume, the source of this basic belief was neither a causal regress nor the ascription of intention in the universe based on observable effects; it was—more simply—common life’s suggestion and a propensity of the imagination to regard the universe as purposive.¹ Unlike the later Kantian approach, the Humean style was not preoccupied with establishing conditions for the possibility of its own observational science. For Hume, true philosophy unself-consciously accepted premises that could not be proven. The Humean approach was invested more in questions that spoke to everyday curiosities instead of philosophical quandaries. Thus, what we can say about this assumption—a dispositive propensity—is that it was sustained by habits of the mind and reflective customs of common life. While the disposition to order and regularity made the belief in “invisible, intelligent power” irresistible, this basic theism presupposed by Hume’s philosophy had little to do with conventional religion. Hume was adamant that belief in an all-knowing, omnipotent deity with a moral plan for the universe was unintelligible, historically divisive, and morally contentious. My reading basic theism in Hume’s philosophy calls the reader’s attention to what is presupposed by Hume’s philosophy—more than the sum of what was given in experience—and thereby set up his notion of genuine theism for our speculative Humean true religion.

      I am mindful that it may be confusing to name a presupposition of Hume’s philosophy, even provisionally, a basic theism and that some may disagree with this choice, though I have exercised caution by defining it as a disposition rooted in the simple assumptions of order and regularity. It is of use-value in this study because Hume used the terms “vulgar theism” and “genuine theism” as opposites. He explicitly and repeatedly remarked that the vulgar theism of popular religion was a distortion of mind. We can fairly presume that the genuine theism of true religion was an enlargement of mind. It follows that for each case we ask, what is being distorted or enlarged? I submit that it is the natural disposition to belief in an Author of Nature. This temperament, the willingness to tacitly cosign belief in an Author of Nature, is what I conditionally call “basic theism.” On Hume’s science of human nature, it is grounded in the assumption of a natural order, essential for any observational science and fundamental for the form of scientific rationality that undergirds Enlightenment thought. Does Hume’s philosophical project presuppose this basic theism or does the argument of the Treatise foreclose the intelligibility of basic theism? How can basic theism fund the genuine theism of our Humean true religion? I shall begin to pursue these questions through a brief assessment of Hume’s iconoclastic intervention in philosophy. After setting aside the deep skeptical reading of Hume by arguing that—on Donald Livingston’s phenomenology of common life—Hume was a mitigated skeptic who left room for true philosophy and true religion (with its genuine theism), I posit some sources for belief in basic theism in his philosophy. A Deleuzian reading of Hume’s theory of mind and an interpretation of his thoughts on natural belief as understood by Norman Kemp Smith furnish two methods of understanding how basic theism might be understood as both a presupposition for and a consequence of Hume’s philosophy of the imagination and common life.

      Though my moderate claim for the irresistibility of the belief in an Author of Nature is largely uncontroversial, some might challenge my assertion that theism exists in the Treatise on grounds that the work took little or no interest in religion.² My approach, however, acknowledges the significant religious interest underneath Hume’s intense philosophical focus. Hume’s philosophy was concerned with how we come to hold beliefs, particularly belief in deity; thus it was crucial for theism. In the well-cited section of the Treatise, “Of the Immateriality of the Soul,” Hume took a direct stand against both Spinozist and Cartesian positions on theism by claiming “anything may be the cause or the effect of anything” (1.4.5.32). Further, he stated—concerning the existence of God—that “existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it” (1.3.7, 2) and that our “idea of deity,” if it were to be intelligible on the standards of abstruse reason, should rely on an impression like our other ideas (1.3.14.10). These few examples (there are others) stand against the prevailing view that Hume’s religious writings are the only ones to be consulted for his views on deity. Paul Russell’s important work on Hume’s irreligion, whose conclusion—that Hume was against popular religion—I support, stands against the conventional reading. Russell argues that “the debate concerning our idea of God is implicated and involved in almost every aspect of Hume’s project throughout the Treatise,” and it is “a mistake to assume that Hume’s various discussions in the Treatise . . . are irrelevant to the question concerning our idea of God.” Russell concedes “the fact that Hume rarely mentions the term ‘God,’ and says little directly about the nature and origin of this idea.” He stresses that this “should not obscure the importance of all that he has to say as it relates to the divine attributes.” In short, Hume did not successfully “castrate” all the religious or “nobler” parts of his Treatise. His early philosophical work offered useful insights for and criticisms of theism and discourse on religion.³

      It is not surprising that the Treatise took up the topic of religion to expose the fragile sources of traditional arguments for God.⁴ Hume repeatedly stated that the vulgar theism of false religion was dangerous in part because it stood on unstable foundations. At the same time, he adamantly denied the charges of atheism and rejected the label of “deist.” Hume’s letters (especially the Letter to Mure, 1743), the first Enquiry (1748), Natural History of Religion (1757), and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) demonstrated the obvious: that Hume seriously and strategically considered both more and less useful forms of theism. Given his abiding interest in religion and the textual evidence for it, it is fair to presume that he began thinking about theism very early in his literary career. That Hume seriously considered theism does not mean he believed religion to be an automatic remedy for social ills (he did not) or that popular versions of theism were intelligible on his theory of mind (they were not). It is merely a Humean acknowledgment that what he called the “whimsical condition of mankind” (E, 12.2.7) was a state in which the mind seemed to naturally go beyond experience to “the assent of the understanding to the proposition that God exists” (LET, 1.50.21). This basic theism in Hume’s philosophy highlighted the mind’s assumption of a (hidden) source for what was given to us in experience, our natural presupposition of a (unseen) cause of perceptions, our sense that the principles of human nature had an (invisible) author, the feeling that there was an ultimate cause behind the (secret) powers of nature, and a disposition to teleology (the feeling that an unknowable purpose probably lightly guided nature).

      An interesting debate exists in the secondary scholarship as to whether Hume’s discussion of necessary connection and causation resulted in him holding the position that causal power was real.⁵ This debate bears heavily on discussions of theism in Hume. I try to circumvent its worries and take advantage of its insights by separating ontological concerns from epistemological ones. I restrict my interest in basic theism and my speculation that the proper office of religion might include a genuine theism to the realm of our thoughts and beliefs. I accept Hume’s fundamental caveat that “as long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties” (T, app., 35). I do not take this to mean that Hume sought to limit reality simply to our ideas. His nondogmatic skepticism left him open to the possibility of mind-independent reality. Still, I have no pretensions to chime in on this debate; I simply take the path of least resistance in describing basic, vulgar, and genuine theism by situating them entirely within the parameters of the mind and the bounds of the imagination. My interest is in the mind’s supposition of order and causal power