As the war began, German submarines initially had little success, but as we saw in the preceding chapter, things changed dramatically on 1 September 1914 with the sinking of HMS Pathfinder by a German submarine in the Forth. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, in command of the Grand Fleet, became very concerned about the threat of submarine attack and the consequent safety of the Grand Fleet in Scapa Flow. The same day that Pathfinder was sunk, he ordered the Grand Fleet to weigh anchor and move out of Scapa Flow to sea. Audacious was at this point in HM Dockyard, Devonport, being refitted – she would rejoin the Grand Fleet at the beginning of October 1914.
The Grand Fleet began to move around the west coast of Scotland and the northern coast of Ireland, marking time until Scapa Flow could be made safe enough to take the fleet there. Initially the fleet laid up in the alternative anchorage of Loch Ewe on Scotland’s north-west coast for 17 days, before returning to Scapa Flow.
A month later, on 17 October 1914, the fleet put to sea again from Scapa Flow, but this time Loch Ewe was regarded as unsafe because a submarine had been reported near there 10 days earlier. The Grand Fleet thus retreated even further from the enemy, to Lough Swilly in the north of Ireland, where the 2nd Battle Squadron, including the recently refitted Audacious, would be based for some months.
As we saw in the preceding chapter, the loss of Pathfinder was quickly followed by the sinking of the three armoured cruisers Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy, with great loss of life by a single submarine, U 9, on 22 September 1914. Then, on 15 October 1914, the same German submarine, U 9, sank the British protected cruiser HMS Hawke with the loss of some 500 men.
By now, every report of a submarine was causing grave consternation. In Scapa Flow, the Grand Fleet had been thought safe from attack – but lookouts, now on full alert, began to see German submarines all around, and constant alarms were being raised.
Now fully aware of the potential of the submarine threat, when the Admiralty examined the anti-submarine defences at Scapa Flow, naval commanders were staggered to find just how poor the defences were for the fleet. The astonishing success of the German submarine would subsequently cause the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, to change his view about utilising submarines in the Royal Navy.
On 2 November 1914, Churchill issued a list of decisions taken by the Admiralty. In amongst a raft of war preparations it was provided that extra numbers of destroyers and armed merchant cruisers, along with 48 armed trawlers and three yachts with guns, would be sent to Scapa Flow. Attempts were made to fortify and block all but a few of the main sea entrances into the Flow. In addition to sea defences, coastal defence gun emplacements were installed at strategic locations covering the sounds, and powerful searchlights were installed that could sweep across the water.
In the water, impenetrable anti-submarine netting made from thick interwoven sections of wire cable was suspended on floating wooden booms strung across parts of Scapa Flow and the larger channels into the Flow such as Hoxa Sound, which were not going to be completely closed off. Any fast-moving enemy torpedo boat or destroyer would suffer extensive damage if it hit the boom, allowing shore batteries to fire on it. Moving sections of the boom, much like gates, were incorporated so that they could be opened and closed to allow British vessels to pass.
Because of the tidal race in the smaller sounds, mining was not feasible and it wasn’t necessary to keep these channels open for navigation like the other larger channels. The water depths in the four sounds between the islands to the east of Scapa Flow and also in Burra Sound to the west, ranged up to maximum depths of about 15 metres at most – perfect to be blocked by intentionally scuttled sunken ships: Blockships.
These blockships were redundant, old or damaged vessels at the end of their lives that had no great commercial value – but which had great strategic value. They were stripped of anything valuable before being towed into position, their holds often filled with large boulders to make them sink quickly. Their hulls were then blasted open to the sea by explosives to finally sink them.
As the British Admiralty moved to make Scapa Flow safe and secure, German intelligence became aware of the deployment of the British 2nd Battle Squadron to Lough Swilly, and sent the converted liner Berlin to lay a 200-strong minefield in the shipping areas outside the lough. The North Channel of the Irish Sea lies between Northern Ireland and the west coast of Scotland, and was essentially a busy Atlantic highway for shipping moving through the Irish Sea to and from Liverpool for foreign ports. Whereas it would have been suicide for Berlin to actually sail through the North Channel into the Irish Sea, German Intelligence believed that a successful mining operation could be carried out in the open waters of the Atlantic to the west of the North Channel.
The first victim of the mines laid by Berlin was the freighter Manchester Commerce, sunk on 26 October 1914. The following day, 27 October 1914, the news of her loss had not yet reached the Admiralty – and no minefield was suspected so far west. The 2nd Battle Squadron super-dreadnoughts King George V, Ajax, Centurion, Monarch, Thunderer, Orion and Audacious left Lough Swilly with their escorts to conduct gunnery exercises at sea.
At 0840, in the middle of a turn, Audacious struck one of the Berlin’s mines off Tory Island. The mine exploded under the ship at the rear of the port engine room, which soon flooded, along with the machine room, X turret shell room and the compartments below. The ship rapidly took on a list of 10–15 degrees to port. Thinking that the battleship had been torpedoed, the captain hoisted the submarine warning signal flag.
Audacious lists to port as crew begin to abandon ship – other crew line the high starboard-side rail. (IWM)
With the Hogue, Aboukir and Cressy tragedy a month earlier still very much in his thoughts – and no doubt fearing a similar torpedo attack on the other ships of the squadron – Admiral Jellicoe ordered the 2nd Battle Squadron to leave the area. The light cruiser HMS Liverpool, four 2nd flotilla destroyers and a number of lighter vessels would remain on the scene to assist the damaged battleship.
By deliberate counter-flooding of compartments on the opposite starboard side of Audacious, her list was successfully reduced. The central and starboard side engine rooms were still operating and with the ship still able to make 9 knots she headed for land on her centre shafts.
Water continued to flood the ship, however, such that at 1000 the central engine room had to be abandoned. Shortly afterwards, the starboard engine also had to be closed down and the room secured. Audacious now had no propulsion whatsoever.
At 1030, the captain of the light cruiser HMS Liverpool spotted the White Star liner RMS Olympic on a return crossing from New York, and ordered her to assist in the evacuation of the 900-strong crew of the Audacious. By 1100, as the immobile Audacious rolled with the swell, her port side main deck had begun to dip under the water. Two hours later, all but 250 of the battleship’s crew had been taken off, and arrangements had been agreed to take the damaged battleship in tow to safety. The small and nimble destroyer HMS Fury set up a cable between Audacious and the larger and more powerful Olympic – and by 1400, the tow was secured and ready to begin.
Initially, progress was encouraging and the Olympic slowly began to make way, dragging the sluggish weight of Audacious westwards towards safety, flanked by other rescue vessels that were standing by. But when Olympic was required to alter course to south-south-east, to head towards Lough Swilly, things began to unravel. The seas were starting to rise and as the steering gear of Audacious was no longer operational, she became increasingly unmanageable. Eventually, she sheared off into the wind and the towline parted.
Another attempt at a tow was made at 1530, this time by HMS Liverpool. HMS Fury once again attached a cable, but after only 15 minutes, it became fouled in the cruiser’s propellers, and it too parted.
By 1600, Audacious was well settled down into the water, with only 4 feet clear