As the field of German history in the United States expanded, West German historians of all age cohorts came into contact with the American historical profession. Accordingly, the third chapter analyzes how exactly these encounters unfolded. Established scholars sometimes reactivated their prewar contacts with American colleagues or sometimes ventured into unknown territory. A number of scholars, such as Fritz Fischer, participated in faculty exchange programs, sponsored by those American organizations that explicitly or implicitly wanted to familiarize German academics with “Western” approaches. This chapter explores whether and how these older scholars were influenced by their contacts with American academia and the United States more generally. Individuals such as Gerhard Ritter and Karl Dietrich Erdmann did not always show the openness so characteristic of the younger generation and sometimes went to the United States in order to promote certain views on German history. Apart from the established scholars, a number of young German historians, including Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Volker R. Berghahn, and Jürgen Kocka, encountered the American historical profession, as well as related fields, as students in the 1950s and 1960s. They have since, without exception, emphasized how formative these experiences were, and have maintained close relationships with American colleagues throughout their careers. The analysis therefore explores the degree to which the Germans were influenced methodologically and interpretively by their early contacts with American academia.
The fourth chapter returns to the Federal Republic to examine the historiographical developments of the 1960s and early 1970s from a transatlantic perspective. Many German historians perceived this period as one of acute crisis, because the social sciences seemed to threaten Clio’s position as an academic discipline with a significant role in public debates. Even worse, the importance of history as a high school subject came into question as educational reformers attempted to integrate it into a more comprehensive social studies course. However, the sense of decline was also a result of dramatic changes within the field. Some historians strongly objected to the methodological reforms that younger scholars in particular proposed. Focusing on the rise of the Bielefeld school and its project of historical social science, the chapter explores the extent to which these reforms took place in a transatlantic context, and argues that American historians of modern Germany were attentive observers rather than active participants or sources of inspiration. The analysis proceeds along three dimensions: interpretively, the fierce debates revolved around the question of whether Germany had followed a “special path” (Sonderweg), marked by economic modernity and political backwardness, in comparison with Great Britain and France. Methodologically, proponents of historical social science argued, against more traditional political and diplomatic historians, for a greater interdisciplinary orientation of the profession, which should ultimately lead to the integration of political history into an all-encompassing social history or history of society. The political dimension concerns the realm of academic politics of that period. The analysis reveals how the protagonists of historical social science successfully established themselves within the profession, and how German “traditionalist” historians responded to the iconoclasts’ challenge. Yet it also takes a broader perspective and examines both sides’ ideas about the historian’s role in society. This debate revolved around the question of whether scholars should provide their readers with “affirmative” or rather “critical” histories and touches upon the issue of the historian as a public intellectual.64
The fifth and final chapter again approaches the West German historical profession from a transatlantic perspective. By the mid- to late 1970s, the Bielefeld school had asserted itself institutionally and interpretively within the field. Now part of the academic establishment, the Bielefelders in turn came under attack from new, oppositional historiographical groups such as British neo-Marxists, West German historians of everyday life (Alltagshistoriker), and West German women’s historians, who emphasized historical social science’s blind spots and challenged the Bielefelders’ claim to represent the most progressive historiographical movement. In addition, American historians now questioned some of the Bielefelders’ interpretations. While the notorious “Historians’ debate” (about the singularity of National Socialism and the Holocaust) of the 1980s appeared to restore a transatlantic progressive historiographical alliance, this episode constituted only part of a bigger, more variegated picture.
Ultimately, the decades under review in this book witnessed the establishment and consolidation of a large and diverse German-American scholarly community in which the national background of the participants became less important. The creation of a continuous transatlantic conversation, which developed more and more into a transnational conversation, unquestionably constitutes an impressive achievement. My study traces the twists and turns of this dialogue during the existence of West Germany and emphasizes the benefits for both American and German historians—even as they have also maintained their own institutional and professional affiliations within their own national cultures.
Chapter 1
German History in the Federal Republic
On October 8, 1951, Martin Göhring, founding director of the recently established Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz, wrote to Guy Stanton Ford, secretary general of the American Historical Association (AHA). Motivated “by the question of organizing close contacts between American, English, French and German historians for the purpose of intensifying historical research, particularly in the field of modern history,” Göhring stated that it was “our intention … to achieve a revision of history’s interpretation by means of international cooperation, one of the most urgent tasks of our day.”1 On a more practical level, Göhring expressed his hope to secure American financial support to establish a library at the institute.
It certainly made sense for Göhring to appeal to the AHA. While the Mainz institute had been founded as the result of a French occupation initiative, it had early on received support from the United States High Commissioner as well.2 In light of a German historical profession with a traditionally Prussian-Protestant bent, the institute was supposed to contribute to the “de-Prussification” (Entpreussung was the commonly used term) of modern German history. Instead, scholars involved in the planning for the institute suggested a supranational and supraconfessional cooperation of historians in a European spirit. While few American historians believed in a straight line from Luther or Frederick the Great to Hitler, most were indeed convinced that their German colleagues had to reconsider the course of modern German history. In addition, quite a few thought that a broader European instead of a strictly national perspective was now the order of the day. By the late 1950s the Institut fu¨r Europa¨ische Geschichte had become an institution where American scholars saw these needs fulfilled.3
American historians of modern Germany played an important role in the reconstitution of the German historical profession during the immediate postwar years, either as active participants or as attentive observers. In some cases, Americans had come into contact with Germany through their military service; in other instances émigré historians took a lively interest in the postwar development of West Germany as well as of the German historical profession.4 In addition, some German scholars approached their American colleagues, either reestablishing older ties or reorienting themselves under drastically altered circumstances.
These postwar tendencies illustrate that German history no longer “belonged” to German historians alone. German scholars began to realize that they could not ignore American—as well as other foreign—views on their past. By no means did these academics immediately shed their defensive and nationalist attitudes. Accordingly, well into the early 1960s some maintained that a foreign historian was unable to properly interpret German history. But even the most conservative West Germans realized that their American colleagues were not a quantité negligeable anymore, and that it was preferable to engage in a dialogue with them.
This chapter first explores the West German historical profession’s institutional and personal development between 1945 and the early 1960s. It then traces the ways in which German historians tackled topics related to the rise of National Socialism and how their American colleagues perceived and responded to these efforts. Yet before one can assess the consequences