Differences arose, however, over the purposes and parameters of public assistance. The most robust of the main contending visions was articulated by the CES Advisory Committee on Public Employment and Relief and key leaders within the FERA.11 The Advisory Committee lobbied for a dense and broad safety net that would provide both a larger public works program and income assistance for all those in need who could not participate in it. The committee urged a sober realism about the limits of employment to ensure adequate economic security and the resulting need for public assistance on a permanent basis, arguing that “the social hazards to which millions of persons and families are subjected, are too varied and too complicated to make it safe to assume that work would remove the need.”12 It also advised against a limited, categorical approach to determining who among the poor deserved assistance. The Advisory Committee argued instead for a unified program with appropriate federal authority, to address, in Josephine Brown’s words, the needs of “the ‘employables’ who would not fit into the practical work programs” and the “unemployables” who did not fit into designated categories.13 This vision of a broad program of federally supported general assistance to all poor Americans would surface repeatedly in subsequent decades.
The leading women activists at the federal Children’s Bureau, who were tasked with submitting recommendations for assisting children in poverty, held a different view of public assistance. The bureau had championed the development of state-level “mothers’ pensions” during the Progressive Era and saw New Deal public assistance as an opportunity to expand these programs. The aim would be to assist and enable eligible single mothers to provide proper care for their children in their homes without an undue burden of wage-earning. The bureau’s vision emphasized a casework approach that combined income assistance and counseling by trained social workers.14
The CES was charged with crafting the administration’s draft legislation, and many of its leaders—including executive director Edwin Witte and technical director Arthur Altmeyer—held a third position. Witte and Altmeyer were economists from Wisconsin who had helped create that state’s pioneering social insurance programs. Along with other prominent New Dealers, they wanted to make federal social insurance the centerpiece of the proposed legislation. They embraced the need for a more comprehensive, fair, and equitable system of public assistance for the poor, but they had a different assessment of its trajectory—one that would later be exploited by critics of public assistance. They were convinced that the need for public assistance would diminish as employment and social insurance grew. They therefore sought to keep the public assistance programs limited, in part to ensure that the new social insurance initiatives gained broad popular and congressional support.15
Despite their differences, these three positions shared significant common ground, and New Deal welfarism ultimately reflected elements of each.16 As the CES drew up recommendations, it adopted the more limited, categorical approach to federal public assistance (providing aid to those in the three categories of “unemployables”) rather than its Advisory Committee’s recommendation for a unified program of general assistance for the poor. The CES was persuaded, according to its report, that if all of its recommendations were adopted, this categorical approach would be adequate because the relief problem “will have diminished to a point where it will be possible to return primary responsibility for the care of people who cannot work to the State and local governments.”17 The CES plan did affirm the need for a more extensive and fairly administered system of aid for the poor—one with federal funding and oversight, however. In the case of poor families with children, the CES report stated bluntly that a “large group of children at present maintained by relief will not be aided by employment or unemployment compensation. There are the fatherless and other ‘young’ families without a breadwinner.” For these groups, “increased State appropriations and Federal grants-in-aid are essential.”18
The CES’s proposed ADC program would provide cash assistance to help eligible poor single mothers support their children at home. The programs, according to the CES report, “are designed to release from the wage-earning role” these single mothers.19 This principle was amplified in testimony before Congress by Grace Abbott, one of the authors of Title IV, who served on the CES Advisory Committee and had directed the Children’s Bureau. Because a “mother’s services are worth more in the home than they are in the outside labor market,” Abbott testified, she “should be enabled to stay home and take care of the children, and we expect she will have to do so until the children reach working age.”20
As the ADC provisions moved through Congress with the other public assistance proposals, they quickly became the victim of intraparty conflict, as historian Linda Gordon and other scholars have documented.21 Disagreements between the Northern liberal and Southern conservative wings of the Democratic Party emerged in both the House and Senate committees charged with producing the legislation, chaired by Representative Robert Doughton (D-N.C.) and Senator Pat Harrison (D-Miss.). Southern committee leaders ultimately rewrote the terms of assistance, including benefit and eligibility rules, in ways that radically curtailed the scope and reach of the program.22
The administration’s original legislation provided benefit levels that sought to ensure adequate (if minimal) support, defined as “a reasonable subsistence, compatible with decency and health, to dependent children.”23 Southern Democrats in Congress opposed this provision, however. According to Abbott, they “feared that northern standards might be forced on the South in providing for Negro and white tenant families,” and the clause was stripped from the bill.24 Instead, the final legislation stated only that ADC was to enable each state “to furnish financial assistance, as far as practicable under the conditions of the state.”25 A similar clause was eliminated from the program for the elderly poor, Old Age Assistance. But the committee leaders’ particular disregard for the ADC program was revealed when final benefit levels were determined: ADC benefits were the lowest of the three categories. Edwin Witte, executive director of the CES, later acknowledged that this may have been a mistake, but he “did not feel that it was wise to raise this point, lest we lose this aid altogether.”26
The original administration bill also contained a broad standard of eligibility for ADC. Following recommendations by the FERA, the administration initially defined dependent children as those for whom there was “no adult person, other than the one needed to care for the children, able to work and provide a reasonable subsistence.” This definition arguably would have laid the groundwork for federal assistance to virtually all poor children under working age, including those in two-parent families, and it would have exempted the caretaker parent—usually the mother—from waged work. Josephine Brown explained, “‘Aid to Dependent Children’ as conceived by the FERA meant general relief or assistance on a family basis to all families having children under sixteen.”27 However, Doughton’s House Ways and Means Committee removed the implicit work exemption for the adult caretaker. The Senate Finance Committee further circumscribed eligibility by asserting that the children must have been