Engineering Revolution. Marlene Spoerri

aid could have a real future in the country. After all, if ancient hatreds had not stood in the way of democracy’s development throughout the nation-states of Western Europe, there was little reason to assume they would in Eastern Europe.

      Equally unsound was the notion that the aid community could not afford to support Serbian parties amid the burgeoning landscape of needy recipients in postcommunist Europe. Though attention may well have lain elsewhere, it is difficult to argue that a modest aid effort could not have been forthcoming, in which party aid may have played a small role. Certainly, it could not have been for lack of funds. Indeed, though it is true that the fall of Communism was met by an increase in demand for democracy assistance, it is also true that such demand was met by an increase in supply. In 1989, the United States established the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) program, which devoted approximately $300 million a year to U.S. efforts aimed at furthering democracy in postcommunist Europe. Carothers (1999: 41) estimates that the United States spent close to $1 billion on democracy-related projects in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union throughout this same period. That year also marked the emergence of a host of new European democracy foundations, with cumulative expenditures roughly mirroring those of their American counterparts. Given such sizeable funds, it is hard to imagine that even modest resources could not have been reserved for Serbia’s parties.

      Nor is it likely that Serbia’s opposition would have spurned foreign efforts to provide democracy assistance. In a 1996 letter to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana noted that anti-Milošević groups had repeatedly come forward, urging American policy makers to provide them with aid. Indeed, in their early forays to Serbia, aid providers found Serbian parties to be very willing to receive foreign support. According to one NDI senior program officer, though they lacked “a well thought through idea of what they needed,” parties offered “fairly positive reactions” when discussing the prospect of assistance.⁵⁰ NED program officers who traveled to the region reached a similar conclusion.⁵¹ Although Serbian politicians were more reticent to walk into a relationship than were individuals in the other Yugoslav republics, they were clearly willing to engage in substantive discussions regarding the forms of assistance that might be provided.

      Certainly, this is the sentiment offered by most Serbian party leaders. Drašković, for example, says he “demanded support from Western states and from right-wing oriented parties.”⁵² He insists he was not afraid of the regime’s attempts to discredit him as a foreign-funded lackey and repeatedly sought out foreign assistance. Evidence lends credence to Drašković’s claims. In a public statement made on a trip to London in 1993, Drašković could not have been clearer, stating, “I want concrete support.” His party, he said, was “the biggest opposition group in Serbia, and the only property we have is one car. If we could under such circumstances get—as we got in the last election—1.2 million votes, only 100,000 less than Milošević’s party who have faxes and control the television, then we must be the eighth wonder of the world.”⁵³ The same was true for presidential candidate Milan Panić. When in late 1992 Panić requested that foreign policy makers support the opposition’s efforts to create an open media, he was left “bitterly disappointed.”⁵⁴ Kesić (2005: 99) writes that “the complete absence of support from the United States and the relative indifference shown by the international community crushed the spirit of Serbia’s opposition movement.” The notion that Serbia’s opposition would have rebuffed foreign efforts to provide aid is thus untenable.

      Also untenable is the notion of Milošević’s presumed indispensability for Yugoslav peace. Foreign policy makers’ decision to sidestep Serbia’s opposition and to communicate solely with Milošević did little to raise the profile of the Serbian opposition in the eyes of the Serbian public. Ironically, it may have helped garner domestic support for Milošević within Serbia, given that it bolstered his international prestige. According to Mihailo Markovic of the SPO, foreign policy makers simply “never understood that the man who set Yugoslavia on fire will never put the fire out, that the lifeblood of the Serbian government is war” (as quoted in Thomas 1999: 159). Daniel Serwer of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) agrees. He believes that the mastermind of U.S. policy toward Serbia at the time—Richard Holbrooke—“never understood the degree to which his meetings with Milošević helped to give Milošević legitimacy” within Serbia.⁵⁵ Such opinions are shared by many in Serbia. As Pešić laments, “The U.S. was more on the strong side.”⁵⁶

      Also problematic were concerns regarding the nationalism and ineptitude of Serbia’s opposition. Though many parties may have espoused greater nationalism than their postcommunist colleagues in Central and Eastern Europe, several explicitly denounced nationalist rhetoric and made pro-peace policies the centerpieces of their platforms.⁵⁷ None of these parties, however, received assistance from the democracy aid community. And although it is true that anti-Milošević parties suffered numerous faults, their ills were largely reminiscent of those witnessed elsewhere in the postcommunist space. Parties with shallow membership, poor organizational development, weak partisan identities, and personality-based profiles were (and remain) the norm throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Unlike in Serbia, however, these qualms failed to deter aid providers. In fact, it was their very presence that justified aid’s onset throughout the region—after all, had such parties not suffered from flaws, they would not have required aid.