Three causal stories emerged during Security Council deliberations, but they did not coincide neatly with the three phases of council action in Somalia. The inadvertent story described an internecine civil war in which all parties to the conflict were causing harm to civilians. The complex story identified multiple clans, characterized by fragmenting interclan rivalries, warlords, armed thugs, and criminal gangs, as responsible for inflicting terror on the civilian population. The intentional story characterized the violence as deliberate and planned—naming perpetrators including the Somali National Assembly (SNA), General Aideed, and the United Somali Congress who were deliberately inflicting violence on UN peacekeeping personnel and the civilian population of Mogadishu. Initially, Security Council members were split between those who articulated an inadvertent story about civil war in which all parties were called upon to cease hostilities and a complex story about fighting between multiple factions accompanied by vigilantism and armed banditry. Despite this division, the language of early Security Council resolutions articulated the inadvertent story. By December 1992, however, the complex story dominated the Security Council until June 1993 when the intentional story emerged to compete with it. The use of military force by UN troops qualitatively changed as the intentional story gained traction in the Security Council, evolving from the forcible but largely neutral protection of humanitarian aid to the highly punitive and aggressive use of military force against specific parties to the conflict. Regardless of the story, all the resolutions passed by the UNSC expressed concern with the unfolding humanitarian tragedy and characterized its own action (both military and nonmilitary) as a humanitarian response. Security Council members devoted significantly more time debating the appropriate humanitarian response to the crisis in Somalia than to understanding its underlying cause and character—its causal story.
Non-Military Enforcement Measures and Contestation Between Inadvertent and Complex Stories
In January 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 733, which urged “all parties” to the conflict to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire and imposed an arms embargo against Somalia. The resolution was passed in absence of formal deliberation but the text reflected an inadvertent story and the moral equivalence between parties that this implied. In March, only three members articulated the inadvertent story (Morocco, Nigeria, and the United States); they described the conflict as “fratricidal” and mutually destructive to the parties that were described as unwilling to create the conditions necessary for the delivery of humanitarian relief to their own peoples.17 In contrast, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and five members of the Security Council (Belgium, Japan, Hungary, India, and Zimbabwe) described the conflict as tragic and complex. The remaining council members declined to comment publicly on the cause and character of the conflict but joined the others in expressing concern about the plight of suffering civilians and linking the humanitarian crisis to international security. Security Council members pressed for an active UN presence in Somalia despite the failure of the Somali parties to abide by a cease-fire and in the absence of formal consent. The four reasons articulated in March 1992 were the magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy, the implications of continued fighting and famine for neighboring states, the unconventional nature of the conflict, and an appeal for equity in UN dealings with Africa in comparison to other regions.18
Unlike in Iraq, members of the Security Council were more concerned with the humanitarian tragedy unfolding within the borders of Somalia than its implications for neighboring states, and public comments emphasized the human suffering of the Somali people. For example, the United States described the situation as “a tragedy of heartbreaking magnitude” with Belgium, Zimbabwe, and Ecuador similarly noting its “tragic” character.19 Belgium described the increasing numbers of dead, injured, and displaced persons: “All the information emanating from Somalia coincides on one point: the humanitarian situation there is a tragic one. The number of dead, injured and displaced persons continues to increase, and famine is taking firm hold.”20 Its ambassador warned that the complex political and military situation was impeding the provision of humanitarian relief and that widespread famine was impending, necessitating an international response.21 Hungary noted its concern over “the magnitude of the human suffering brought about by the conflict” and asserted that “the continuation of this tragic and alarming situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”22 The Kenyan representative, speaking on behalf of the African group, called attention to “the vicious coexistence of war and famine in Somalia.”23 It is clear from statements like these that the humanitarian tragedy had captured the attention of council members. Yet members likewise were concerned with the potential regional impact of the conflict. Nigeria noted that refugees from Somalia have “consequential implications for neighboring states,” while France, Australia, India, and Zimbabwe argued that both the ongoing violence and its impact on civilians threatened peace and stability in the entire region.24 Despite this expressed concern about regional impact, however, Resolution 746 defined the continuation of the internal humanitarian crisis in Somalia as a threat to international peace and security, rather than its cross-border effects. “Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,” the resolution proclaimed.25 This same humanitarian language was repeated in Resolution 751, which established UNOSOM on 24 April 1992. The Security Council made no formal references to interstate dimensions of the conflict, transborder refugee flows, or the risk of regional spillover in either Resolution 746 or 751. Instead, nontraditional conceptions of security—that international security is affected by the violation of human rights—shaped initial UNSC reaction to the conflict. Only later did Resolutions 767 and 775, of July and August 1992 respectively, acknowledge that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia was important to council efforts to restore international peace and security in the region.
Security Council engagement in Somalia was also motivated by the unconventional nature of the conflict. Council members argued that the simultaneous tragedy of fighting and famine in the absence of legitimate government authority demanded “new and innovative methods” of response.26 Several members described the combined military and humanitarian tragedy as unconventional. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in both his report to the council and in a statement to the media, argued, “Somalia presented a special challenge, as an extraordinarily complex, tragic situation that had so far eluded conventional solutions.”27 It was the unique, nonstate character of Somalia that made the use of military force possible since the need for consent was eliminated and humanitarian intervention would not challenge state sovereignty.
Forcible Military Humanitarian Intervention and Shifting Causal Stories
The second phase of UN involvement in Somalia marked another historic shift in Security Council action with regard to intrastate conflicts. When the council passed Resolution 794 in December 1992 and Resolution 814 in March 1993 (Table 3.1), it authorized the use of “all necessary means” to create the conditions necessary to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and to foster political reconciliation. The authorization of the use of force under Chapter VII marked an important step in the emergence of the practice of humanitarian intervention. For the first time in its history, the UNSC authorized armed intervention for a strictly humanitarian cause.28 Unlike Resolution 688, which authorized UN protection for Iraqi Kurds and Shi’a because of the transborder impact of Iraq’s human-rights-violating behavior, Resolution 794 defined the internal humanitarian crisis itself as a threat to international peace and security.29 This Security Council innovation became possible due to a high degree of unity around a causal story and because the use of coercive force in this case posed little threat to established and highly internalized norms of state sovereignty.