ט’ זקני יש’ היו מקדימין ברגליהם להר המשחה ובית טבילה היה
שם ומטמין היו את הכהן השורף את הפרה מפני הצדוקים שלא יהוא או’
במעורבי שמש היתה נעשית י’ סמכו ידיהן עליו ואומ’ לו אישי כהן
גדול טבול אחת וירד וטבל ועלה ונסתפג
(3:7) … The elders of Israel9 used to walk to the Mount of Olives before the heifer arrived. And a place of immersion was there. And they would render the priest who burned the heifer impure. [They did this] on account of the Sadducees—so they would not say that the ritual was performed by one whose purification included waiting until sunset.10 (3:8) They placed their hands on him and said to him: “Sir high priest, immerse yourself once!” He went down and immersed himself and came up and dried off.
It is unclear why this text uses the biblical expression “elders of Israel,” a phrase not appearing in the biblical red-heifer narrative of Numbers 19. Yet the strong parallel with the Day of Atonement narrative, together with other mishnaic uses of the term “elders”—in one instance, “elders of Israel”—to refer to the Great Court suggests that these are the same elders of the Court as in the Day of Atonement narrative.11 And as in the Day of Atonement narrative, these elders play a role in the preparation for the ritual, rather than in the ritual itself. In this case, before the cow is led to the Mount of Olives (הר המשחה), court members come to the site and perform the ritual actions of rendering the priest impure and saying a ritual utterance. Though the actions seem strange, they are a form of preparation that again ensures that the ritual is performed correctly—in this case, according to the non-Sadducean view that the priest need not wait until sunset after being purified before performing the ritual.
The Court’s role in these two rituals is different from its role in the judicial narratives. There are no witnesses and there is no courtroom, adjudication, or verdict. Here, the Court members play a role in Temple-centered ritual. Though their involvement is ultimately peripheral to the larger ritual performance, their limited role establishes and demonstrates that they have authority over the entire ritual. According to both narratives, the Court is empowered to ensure that the procedure is done correctly or according to the correct view; indeed, in both cases the narrative presumes that the priests are forced to follow the dictates of the Court. Even in the ritual actions taken, the Court’s authority is in evidence. By formulaically ordering the priest, addressing him as “Sir high priest” and ordering him, “Immerse yourself once!” (Parah 3:8) or “read with your own mouth!” (Yoma 1:3), or addressing him in a similar manner and adjuring him to perform the ritual according to what they have told him (Yoma 1:5), Court members establish their authority ritually, as the ones who determine which actions are taken and who can command the priest.12
In addition to their appearance in these two narratives, the Court and its members are found in as many as seven additional Temple-centered narratives. Their role in these additional narratives can be similar to that in Yoma and Parah, with the Court involved in a fully ritual matter, as is the case in the barley ‘ōmer offering narrative in Menaḥot 10:3–5, the sōṭah (accused adulteress) ordeal narrative in Soṭah 1:3–3:4, and perhaps the ritual palm branch narrative in Sukkah 4:4. Or they may have a more hybrid judicial-Temple ritual role, as in the ‘eglāh ‘ărufāh (broken-neck calf) narrative in Soṭah 9:1–9, in which the Court is involved in a ritual associated with priests and the Temple, which still has to do with the absence of justice for the abandoned body found, and in the priest-disqualification trial narrative in Middot 5:4, in which the Court adjudicates about the validity of individual priests in the Temple.13 In Rosh Hashanah 2:5–7 and perhaps Ta‘anit 2:1–5, the court plays a central role in rituals that are at least partially centered on the Temple—the determination and proclamation of the new moon and the fast-day prayers when there is no rain—though the Temple is somewhat peripheral to these rituals, which continue to be performed even after the destruction.14 These narratives vary in the degree of Court authority they depict; but in sum, they repeatedly portray the Court as involved in and with authority over the performance of ritual associated with the Temple in Temple times.15
Sectarian Resistance and Court Authority
A second way in which the Mishnah’s ritual narratives give the Court authority over Temple ritual is by depicting the Court exercising authority against sectarian resistance. As we have seen in the red-heifer narrative, Court members are involved in the preparation for the ritual “because of the Sadducees,” which seems to mean that they ensure that the procedure does not follow the Sadducean view. According to the narrative, members of the Court would intentionally render the priest impure and then ritually order him to immerse himself for purification. With this unusual procedure, it was guaranteed that he did not wait until sunset to become pure before performing the ritual (indeed, he did not wait at all). And because the sectarian-Sadducean view required him to wait until sunset, the procedure ensured that the performance of the ritual did not follow the sectarian view. By describing sectarian resistance and the Court’s role in quashing this resistance, the narrative puts the Court and no one else in the position of authority over the ritual.
This particular conflict about the nature of purification for the red-heifer ritual is evidenced in an earlier text, one of the Dead Sea Scrolls known as 4QMMT. This ancient scroll from the time of the Second Temple recounts the same divergence of opinion; but here, it is told from the point of view of the Mishnah’s tsadduḳin (Sadducees or perhaps Zadokites). According to 4QMMT, the priests involved in the ritual (in contrast to the Mishnah’s single priest) must wait until sunset to become pure in order to perform their tasks.16 For those living during the time of the Temple who produced 4QMMT, this and related conflicts over Temple practice helped define their group identity; but such was not the case for the rabbis of the Mishnah. As Shaye Cohen has argued, there is little evidence of such sectarian struggle during the post-destruction era in which the rabbis lived.17 In the red-heifer narrative, the rabbis recall such conflict not because it continued in their own day but because the memory of past sectarian disputes both created and demonstrated the authority of the Temple-era Court. As Catherine Bell has suggested, rephrasing Foucault, resistance itself helps create the power relationship.18 This is especially true in a literary account. The Mishnah’s inclusion of the Sadducean resistance provided the opportunity for its imagined Court to express its power to suppress this resistance.
Elsewhere in the genre, sectarians—called tsadduḳin, bēitĕsin,19 minim (heretics), and perhaps, in one instance, kutim (Samaritans)—are described as resisting in a similar manner on as many as four additional occasions.20 One of these possible occasions is the Day of Atonement narrative. The Mishnah itself never mentions any sectarian conflict about how the Day of Atonement procedure is to be performed, yet the Tosefta and both Talmuds understand that the (potentially) sectarian high priest is forced to follow the dictates of the Court and not his own sectarian views. In each of these instances, sectarian conflict is the platform upon which Court authority over the details of the ritual rests.
The extent to which the Mishnah emphasizes the absolute authority of the Court against sectarian resistance can be seen in the contrast between the Mishnah and Tosefta in the way they imagine sectarians resisting. Three times, the Tosefta imagines a sectarian priest successfully following the sectarian version of Temple practice. On singular occasions, a Boethusian (bēitĕsi) or Sadducean tsadduḳi) manages to thwart the “correct practice” of the Day of Atonement ritual (Kippurim [= Yoma]