Iranian Blues: The Politics of Grief
When you are among Iranians, don’t smile too much; they don’t. (Lewis 2000: 333)
Iranians frequently complain that the Iranian culture is “a culture of sadness” (farhang-e gham), “a culture of mourning” (farhang-e azadari). Contrary to Western conceptualizations of it, in the Iranian culture sadness in its various shapes of grief and despair is not an indication of anomaly or a destructive feeling, but rather is normal and even valued.20 The medical anthropologist asserts that dysphoria is central to the Iranian ethos (Good et al. 1985: 384). Such feelings are usually seen as symbols of inner purity (safa-ye baten). Once, while attending a concert, Dara and I saw Davod sitting close to us. Davod is a young man from Shahrak-e Gharb. An activist in the Local Association (anjoman-e mahali), he is accused by many other youths of being a political opportunist and having a “businessman style” (bazari maslak). Dara and his friends in Shahrak-e Gharb rarely missed a chance to criticize and belittle him. During the concert, Dara told me to look at Davod who, impressed by an old sorrowful melody, was shedding tears. Apparently surprised by Davod’s tears, Dara said after the concert: “Did you see? He cried. He is sincere. Despite his deceitfulness, his heart is clean.” Sadness and grief (qam o qosseh) are marks of social sophistication and personal “depth” (‘oumgh) and decency. Cheerful persons who express their joy frankly, laugh loudly, and joke with others risk being stamped as “happy-go-lucky” (alaki khosh), “unconcerned” (bi-khiyal), or bidard. In rural Iran it is still usual for people after long laughs to say “forgive me, God” (astaqforella), as if laughing is in itself a sin.
The centrality of tragedy to collective consciousness in Iran is reflected in popular culture and mythology. The Iranian national epic Shahnameh (Book of Kings) consists of tragedies. The best known of them are the tragedy of Rostam and Sohrab and the story of Siavash (I will return to these myths later). From the pre-Islamic mythologies in Shahnameh to the drama of Karbala, tragedy is related to the most conspicuous form of self-abasement and martyrdom. However, the Iranians’ vision of tragedy is first and foremost rooted in Shiite history and principally in the drama of Karbala.
The Tragedy of Karbala
The Karbala massacre took place in the month of Moharram 61 A.H. (ca. October 680 A.D.), on the plain of Karbala, located in today’s Iraq. Imam Hossein, son of Imam Ali and grandson of the Prophet, was martyred on the tenth day of Moharram, known as Ashura.21 The detailed history of Ashura is a story of loneliness, thirst, loss, torture, and bereavement. The anguish and regret of the Shiites are expressed and performed in a commemorative ritual of Ashura.22
The annual ritual of Ashura has since then been celebrated everywhere in Iran for ten days (1st to 10th Moharram). The ritual is a complex arrangement of collective, ritualized mourning through public recitation and the chanting of elegies (rowzeh-khani); ta‘ziyeh (a theatrical representation of the tragedy); and the Moharram procession (dasteh).
It is no exaggeration to say that the whole Iranian population, more than 90 percent of them Shiite Muslims, go through the ritual every year. Even the lives of nonbelievers and religious minorities are affected by the ritual. Moharram is the first month of the Arabic/Islamic lunar year. It is often called mah-e azadari, the month of mourning or “the time of sin.” Public morale forbids weddings and marriage preparations during the month of Moharram. No joyful ceremonies take place; TV and radio programs are cheerless, “weighty” (sangin), and “serious” (jeddi). During the ten days of Moharram, the whole society is driven into a state of depression. TV and radio broadcast programs about the Karbala tragedy and the rituals. Thus, even non-Muslims are involved, albeit indirectly.23
The Karbala tragedy has also affected Iranian art and literature. Ta‘ziyeh has been praised and developed as a particularly Iranian style of drama. There is a painting style related to the Karbala tragedy, known as pardeh or “coffeehouse painting,” that visually narrates the battle. A new generation of artists have developed “coffeehouse painting” into a modern art genre known as the “Saqakhaneh School” (see Chelkowski and Dabashi 1999). The main purpose of the Ashura rituals is to maximize lamentation. Shiite tradition encourages and promotes weeping as a way to salvation. Weeping for Hossein, called the “Lord of Martyrs” (Sayyed-ul Shohada), not only brings divine forgiveness, but also contributes to the triumph of the Shiite (see Enayat 1982: 182). A recurrent expression in official speeches is that “Islam needs tears.” Tears would even help Imam Hossein: “A learned man saw in a dream that the Imam [Hossein] had recovered from all the wounds [inflicted on him at Karbala]. He asked the Imam how his wounds had healed so miraculously. ‘With the tears of my mourners,’ replied the Imam.”24
As Motahari formulates it, the Karbala tragedy is a “school” (maktab) and a “culture” (farhang) (see Motahari 1379/2000). Another Islamist, Emalduldin Baghi, in his book Jamm‘e Shenashi Qiyam-e Emam Hossein (Sociology of Imam Hossein’s Movement), agrees that the rituals of Ashura fulfill various social functions. They protect the society from cultural impurity and alienation and revive ethical values, such as “faith,” “martyrdom,” “sacrifice,” “dignity.” The cult of Ashura guarantees social cohesion and represents an “ideal lifestyle.” It imposes a norm and is a means for social control and guidance of the young people (1379/2000: 76–82). Thus, the Karbala tragedy is more than a historical event. As Michael Fischer puts it, it provides a paradigm, because it is
(a) a story expandable to be all-inclusive of history, cosmology, and life’s problems; (b) a background contrast against which the story is given heightened perceptual value: in this case, primarily Sunni conception, but other religions at times serve the same function; and (c) ritual or physical drama to embody the story and maintain high levels of emotional investment. (Fischer 1980: 27)
Good et al. (1985) and Good and Good (1988) also believe that the Moharram ritual organizes a “prototypical” view of the social order and the self in Iran. The central concept of the Karbala paradigm is “self-abasement.” Mourning and self-flagellation represent the feelings of guilt of all Shiite Muslims who were not there to help Imam Hossein. They represent the Kufan people repenting their abandonment of Hossein. How a “sense of guilt” and “valued dysphoria” has been manipulated and utilized in the political mobilization before and after the Revolution will be examined below. A recurring slogan since the Revolution has been “We are not like Kufans to abandon the Imam alone” (Ma ahl-e Kufe nistim Emam tanha bemanad).
Before discussing the role of the Karbala tragedy in the emergence of the current social order in Iran, I want to comment that, despite the fact that the shadows of the overwhelming ritual of Moharram reach out into all parts of the nation, there are subtle variations in the interpretation of the Karbala tragedy. For instance, in rural areas the Moharram ritual is only an excuse for teenage boys to have fun. Being together in long nights spent at the hosseinye, they make jokes or play cards (Fischer and Abedi 1990: chap. 1).
One way to avoid a fatalistic and static representation of Iran—as entirely subject to the ubiquitous sadness (e.g., in Good et al. 1985; Good and Good 1988)—is by “historicizing” the process whereby the Karbala tragedy has been transformed from a central symbol of folk religion into the focus of a state ideology.
The Politicization of Karbala
For Ayatollah Khomeini, the Karbala events had transformed not only the history of Islam, but the whole of human history. Imam Hossein’s heroic movement was depicted as an archetype representing the eternal struggle of Goodness against Evil, injustice, and tyranny. This new interpretation of the Karbala tragedy became popular among young people, despite the disapproval then shown by orthodox clerics.