Farm invaders ceased to be paid daily allowances, as had been the case at the beginning of the invasions, because the government ran out of funds. The War Vets invented various strategies to secure new sources of income: extorting payment from frightened farmworkers for ZANU-PF cards that never materialized, selling “permits” to communal farmers and other hangers-on applying for plots of land, selling crops (an estimated 50 percent of the maize crop in 2001 was stolen or destroyed by squatters) and equipment impounded on the farms, and later, “managing” food aid. In so doing, their interests were competing with those of the ZANU-PF “big men” who intensified their land-grabbing after the presidential poll. On several occasions after March 2002 squatters were evicted by the riot police when they were told that the farm they had occupied was “earmarked” for a party official or a general. It became impossible to ignore the prospect of violent confrontations between government and embittered militias.
After two years of activity, ZANU-PF militias became accustomed to enjoying impunity when beating, looting, and robbing alleged MDC supporters, especially as the police pronounced them “untouchable.” The “green bombers” frequently complained quite openly that they had not been paid—being provided only with food and beer (and some say drugs)—and claiming that their crucial role in Mugabe’s election victory had not been adequately rewarded. Many had joined the National Youth Service because they were unemployed school graduates or had lost their jobs. The promised positions in the army, police, or civil service were not forthcoming (although some were hastily drafted into the police to enforce the August 2002 farmers’ evictions). They have been increasingly driven to use their special status for survival and behave like criminal gangs, especially in urban townships. For example, a militia group attempted in July 2002 to extort “security fees” from vendors at the Mbare Musika vegetable market in Harare.87 Violence is becoming a way of life for these young people88 in a process similar to the building up of militias in other war-torn African countries.
War veterans do not form a social class or even a cohesive group interacting as such with government and party leaders. Indeed, many genuine former combatants of the liberation war do not feel represented by the ZNLWVA criminal leaders89 and disapprove of the organization’s endorsement of ZANU-PF’s political agenda and the War Vets’ thuggish behavior. Some regrouped in May 2000 to form the Zimbabwe Liberators’ Platform (ZLP) with a view to challenging ZANU-PF’s monopolization of the liberation legacy. Their spokesman, Wilfred Mhanda (alias Dzinashe Machingura in the war), was a former ZANLA commander victimized by Mugabe.90 Mhanda claims that the bad publicity attracted by ZNLWVA’s violent actions, which put the war veterans in disrepute, prompted him with his colleagues to form the ZLP. At the outset, he said, most members of the organization, who “range from company directors, to magistrates, to high-ups in the army and the police …even within the intelligence services,” are now sympathetic to the MDC although not aligned with it. They hoped for its victory in the past elections and claimed to support a democratic constitution and the restoration of the rule of law. Some war veterans even joined the MDC, such as Sarodzi Chavakanaka (alias Zulu in the war), a former intelligence officer for ZANLA who retired from Mugabe’s presidential guard in 1997 and became an MDC organizer in Mashonaland Central in April 2000. So effective was he that Joyce Mujuru allegedly offered a reward for his assassination.91
Conflict Scenarios and the Army’s Role
The Mugabe clique’s war of attrition against the MDC increasingly tested the party’s commitment to a legalist and peaceful course of action. The number of violent incidents initiated by MDC people rose significantly during the parliamentary by-elections in 2001 and the presidential and Kadoma mayoral elections in 2002—though still far below violence coming from the other side—and there were more ZANU-PF/ZNLWVA members among the casualties. Cases of arson on ZANU-PF activists’ properties were also on the increase. MDC supporters were desperate after years of suffering and three stolen elections, and some MDC youths and a good number of party cadres wanted to fight back. As matter of fact, many MDC activists were defectors from ZANU-PF who carried with them the ruling party’s culture of intolerance and violence. This violent behavior was also manipulated by certain party leaders to settle scores in internal squabbles, and, as we will see, it played a role in the split of the MDC in 2006. However, the ruling party might also split along regional/tribal lines. Contending factions led by regional “big men” are likely to fight over shrinking economic resources and attempts to preempt Mugabe’s succession. Therefore, a civil war would not necessarily pit the MDC against ZANU-PF but rather various factions of disintegrating political parties.
The future attitude of the army will be crucial in this respect. Certain units like the presidential guard division have already participated in retributive violence in Harare high-density suburbs in late 2000. Elements from the air force were used to quell a strike in August 2001 and to occupy the local MDC MP farm in Chimanimani. Some soldiers were also seen beating up people in Masvingo in the run-up to the mayoral election. Others were seen manning roadblocks alongside the CIO and the police. However, it is difficult to establish the facts accurately because CIO operatives sometimes dress as uniformed police or military as a cover: it is in the regime’s interest to project the impression of a police and an army united behind ZANU-PF if only to preclude dissidence in these corps. The head of ZNA and now chief of staff general Constantine Chiwenga toured the barracks prior to the presidential elections to urge the military to vote for Mugabe. The commanders of the armed forces claimed before the 2002 and 2008 presidential elections that they would not salute Tsvangirai if he won. There has been a policy of politicizing the army ever since Independence, especially during the Matabeleland “disturbances” when ZANLA elements in the integrated national army illegally discharged ZIPRA ex-combatants, including superiors in rank, and were promoted according to their political loyalty.92 War Vets leaders had threatened to “declare a military government” if the MDC won the parliamentary and then the presidential elections and vowed to fight to defend ZANU-PF.93 Promotion in the military and the police force, and even the prison corps, favored former ZANLA guerrillas politically loyal to the president. The upper levels in the military establishment share with ZANU-PF politicians and high-ranking civil servants the same political culture and they have the same vested interest in perpetuating Mugabe’s regime.
There have been, however, some signs of sympathy for the opposition: some army rank and file waved in support to NCA/MDC demonstrations in 2000, and some army units intervened to stop ZANU-PF violence in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in Mashonaland Central. There was also sporadic unrest in the barracks after the intervention in the DRC, rumors of mutinies in late 1998, and protests over the high level of casualties. Only a minority of high-ranking or well-connected officers got rich from business deals in the DRC and the prevailing mood among the military was probably not at variance with public opinion: most soldiers suffer as much as the rest of the people from the inflation and the food shortages. In July 2001, according to the South African press, some unnamed junior brigadiers had offered to depose Mugabe if they received South Africa’s political and logistical support. Mbeki is said to have rejected this proposal as premature, too risky, and projecting a bad international image. Whether the story is genuine or not, the dissatisfaction of the military from junior brigadiers down to privates has increased along with the worsening economic and social situation. The ZLP offered to broker contacts between the MDC and the army chiefs like Perence Shiri or retired general Solomon Mujuru to have them switch sides, to no avail. Conversely, staging a coup is made more difficult by the army’s organizational structure:94 distribution of food rations, fuel, and ammunition is closely monitored on a short-term basis to control the units’ operational autonomy. Planning even limited troop movements would quickly attract suspicion from headquarters.
Besides, the military intelligence is fully at work to uproot any feeling of dissent or unrest in the defense forces, as was apparent in the unlawful detention and torture of the two Zimbabwe Standard journalists in 1999. In addition the government tries to keep the armed forces happy to be able to rely on them to nip in the bud any popular uprising. Provisions for defense in the state budget have always been