This book is aimed at examining and explaining the process by which global political spaces are being regulated by private actors wielding private authority. This emergent phenomenon is becoming increasingly important in the conduct of global governance, and thus broadening our understanding of it will serve the field of international relations. Private actors can govern by what has come to be known as private authority, a process wherein these actors create, implement, and enforce rules that are aimed at managing global problems. Up to this point, private authority has been primarily explained in the literature through materialist, structuralist, and/or rationalist means—all tending to describe private authority as being a derivative feature of an instrumental exchange relationship, or, in other words, as only being able to exist under conditions in which broader material or structural forces create a sufficient incentive structure for more powerful actors to see it in their interest(s) to accept private authority.1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 In the real world, an example would be a large, multinational, logging corporation—rich in capital and well-connected to governments—adapting its internal, corporate regulatory standards to meet Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification requirements only because doing so would increase the price that could be charged to customers and/or because the gain of reputational or efficiency benefits would serve the corporation’s narrow self-interests. Such approaches, while meaningful, ignore the more interesting story taking place at the constitutive level—at the level of identity. This critical part to the story of private authority needs to be explained in order to broaden our understanding.
I argue in this book that while the previously discussed traditional approaches are illuminating, greater consideration needs to be given to the social processes underlying private authority. Private actors are not simply outgrowths of incentive structures or certain material conditions; rather, they are purposive actors that can shape social structures through their actions. Going back to the FSC example, is the FSC capable of purposively shaping the behavior of a more materially powerful corporation in the absence of a clear incentive structure that serves that corporation’s narrow self-interests? Or does the FSC perhaps have a social toolkit that can be leveraged to grant them the requisite authority to shape behavior—even in the absence a clear incentive structure? Such questions will be explored in this book, with the focus being on expanding on current explanations of private authority by examining the constitutive elements that underlie this social phenomenon.
Before moving forward, it is important to note that the novel approach to explaining private authority adopted by this book focuses primarily on a newly emergent actor identified as a network connector—argued to be the most successful private governor in the international system. In an increasingly networked world, power and authority are becoming more decentralized.12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 Under such conditions, actors that can bridge two networks are playing increasingly critical roles. By focusing the project on these specific actors—through two case studies—these newly emergent actors can be introduced and explained, and the examination of their role in between networks will shed light on the social processes driving private authority.
Much has been said about private authority under the general banner of global governance, including discussions on (a) the emergence of private actors; (b) the ways they shape contemporary global politics; and (c) the emergent phenomenon that is private authority.20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30 Previous literature has demonstrated many of the forms by which non-state actors moved into the political terrain that was once dominated by states and by which they established themselves in this territory in select positions of authority. What these explanations do not fully explain are the socially constitutive variables that lead to private authority and support it once it is established. The issue identified in this book is that structural, materialist, and rationalist approaches treat actors as “bounded groups in hierarchical structures,” where actors operate within neat and hierarchically organized sectors.31 Within these sectors, private actors seeking to govern are able to do so by wielding what are considered ideal-type forms of authority (legal-rational, expertise, moral, etc.).32,33,34,35,36,37,38