In this way, identity is constructed in relation to the discourse controlled by the private governor. This allows the less powerful actor to enforce rules that may not suit the interests of those to whom the rules are being applied. Furthermore, this process works both ways. Where the traditional literature remains focused on dyadic relations between the private governor and those to whom rules are being directly applied, this approach broadens the scope of actors that are part of the private authority process. Private authority is much more than a two-way relationship. It encompasses a broad range of relationships within the context of networks.
It is important to note before moving forward that such a broad conceptualization of private authority holds the risk of being misinterpreted as a conflation between private authority and influence. Yet this broad approach can stay true to the definition of private authority—as rules being enforced upon the governed—because it identifies the social rules that are spoken or enshrined as part of practice by the governors. I reference here the implicit rules that are part of the FSC/MSC sustainable management code—namely, that ENGOs follow certain implicit rules that include no boycotts or protests against industrial actors that were members of each of the organizations. Such instances will be identified in the case studies and rules will be clearly identified as part of the discourse throughout the project.
Conclusion
In order to explain private authority, then, there are a couple of tasks that need to be completed. First, there must be a clear understanding of the discourses that define acceptable behavior within certain networks. These are the nodal points around which actors’ identities and interests converge. Chapter 3 will examine and outline the competing discourses that defined the overall environmental sector in order to provide a general frame from where the research proposed by this book can be conducted. Second, in order to understand the emergence of actors into subject positions from where they can wield private authority it is critical to first identify the demarcating lines between networks. This book executes that task by separating the networks based on the discourses they speak. By using a map of the discursive terrain, the empirical chapters will examine “how” private actors came to fill subject positions from where they could even be considered as private governors. Then, it will look to explain “why,” once in these positions, some actors are able to proliferate more rapidly than others. Before moving to an explanation of the development and manifestation of the distinct discourses, I find it important to provide a brief overview of the analytical framework/methodological approach guiding this book. As there are multiple components, and a number of competing variables to this project, a brief of overview of the framework used to treat these elements will help to place the rest of the book in the appropriate context.
NOTES
1. Haas, P.M. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.” International Organization 46, no. 01 (1992): 1–35.
2. Strange, S. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
3. Keck, M. E. and Sikkink, K. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998.
4. Barnett, M. N. and Finnemore, M. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004.
5. Bernstein, S. and Cashore, B. “Non-state Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?” in Kirton, J. and Trebilcock, M., eds., Hard Choices, Soft Law: Combining Trade, Environment and Social Cohesion in Global Governance. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004: 33–63.
6. Lake, D. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.
7. Green, J. F. Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013: 26.
8. Several authors have made the more expansive argument for these changes. I am not trying to expand upon these but rather borrow a frame that presents a more accurate context for the social processes that explain private authority. Therefore, I will not expend space recounting these arguments here. For a number of examples discussing this, see: Castells 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2006; Hajer and Hendrik, 2003; Barney, 2004; Bovaird, 2005; Castells and Cardoso, 2006; Benkler, 2006; Knoke, 2012; Van Dijk, 2012; Krieger and Belliger, 2014.
9. For such examples see: Friedman, 1990; Haas 1992; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004; Pattberg, 2005; Avant, Finnemore and Sell, 2010; Risse, 2012; Auld, 2014; Green, 2014; Moog, Spicer and Böhm, 2014.
10. For an illustrative example see: Burt, R. S. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Harvard University Press, 2009; Kahler, M. Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009; Carpenter, C. and Drezner, D. W. “International Relations 2.0: The Implications of New Media for an Old Profession1.” International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 3 (2010): 255–272; Wong, W. H. Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights. Cornell University Press, 2012; Lupu, Y. and Voeten, E. “Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by the European Court of Human Rights.” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 02 (2012): 413–439; Oatley, T., Winecoff, W. K., Pennock, A., and Danzman, S. B. “The Political Economy of Global Finance: A Network Model.” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 01 (2013): 133–153.
11. Kahler. Networked Politics, 4–7.
12. Ibid., 4–7.
13. Kahler. Networked Politics, 4–7.
14. Knoke, D. and J.H. Kuklinski. Network Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982.
15. Emirbayer, M. and J. Goodwin. “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency.” American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 6 (1994): 1141–1154.
16. Gargiulo, M. and M. Benassi. “Trapped in Your Own Net? Network Cohesion, Structural Holes, and the Adaptation of Social Capital.” Organization Science 11, no. 2 (2000): 183–196.
17. Burt. Structural Holes.
18. Goddard, S. E. “Brokering Change: Networks and Entrepreneurs in International Politics.” International Theory 1, no. 2 (2009): 249–281.
19. Particularly in the work of Burt. Structural Holes; Goddard, “Brokering Change.”
20. Particularly in the work of Burt. Structural Holes; Goddard, “Brokering Change.”
21. As Barney discusses Weber’s (1958) expectations as a social scientist—Barney, D. The Network Society. Vol. 2. Polity, 2004: 1–2.
22. Barney. The Network Society, 2.
23. Castells, M. The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol. I. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1996: 469.
24. Barney. The Network Society, 26–32.
25. Castells, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2006.
26. Hajer, M. A. and Hendrick, W. Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
27. Barney. The Network Society.
28. Bovaird, T. “Public Governance: Balancing Stakeholder Power in a Network Society.” International Review of Administrative Sciences 71, no. 2 (2005): 217–228.
29. Knoke, D. Economic Networks. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.
30.