Japan Restored. Clyde Prestowitz

continued assistance to the capacity-building of the Philippine coast guard.”

      Coming from the then junior security partner in the US-Japan alliance, these visits and statements were surprising to some. But Abe seemed to have understood that the continued presence of American power in the region could only be maintained on the basis of a stronger, more independent Japan. Many suspected Abe of dreaming of a revitalization of Japan’s prewar nationalism. But, as Kazuhiko Togo, an ambassador in the Japanese Foreign Ministry noted in the Nelson Report in September, 2014, no American president could indefinitely justify unilateral American defense of Japan to the American public when the interests of the two countries might diverge. Ironically, the nationalist Abe was trying to keep the Americans in the Pacific as part of his effort to keep the Chinese out, or at least at bay.

      Three issues were particularly indicative of the trend of the future of the Pax Americana: South Korea-Japan dissension; Chinese-Japanese confrontation over the Senkaku Islands; and a potential choice for America between the current Air-Sea Battle strategy of complete dominance over the East and South China Seas up to the shores of China, and the new, less confrontational Offshore Control strategy anchored on the second island chain rather than the first.

      SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN DON’T TALK TO EACH OTHER

      Like Japan, South Korea had a mutual security treaty with the United States that committed America to its unilateral defense. As allies of the United States, South Korea and Japan were indirectly allies of each other, and shared many of the same security concerns. Nevertheless, neither country shared even routine national security intelligence with the other. All exchanges took place through American intermediaries. Finally, in June, 2013, it appeared that an agreement on intelligence sharing had been reached. At the last minute, however, the deal was tabled because of an intense anti-Japanese reaction by the South Korean parliament.

      This was triggered by Tokyo’s release of a public opinion survey showing that two-thirds of Japanese thought the Takeshima Islands, then administered by South Korea as its own sovereign territory, were rightfully Japanese territory. South Korean politicians saw the release of this survey as insultingly provocative and reneged on the intelligence deal.

      To explain just how strange this situation was, some analysts noted that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces were committed to defending the Takeshima Islands as Japanese territory, while South Korea’s president emphasized that his country would defend them to the death, especially against Japan. The United States, as the most important ally of both countries, was bound by treaty to defend each. Did that mean that the US Navy would go to war with South Korea against Japan while the US Army went to war with Japan against South Korea? Obviously, this was kind of a joke question, but it carried an important hidden meaning. If South Korea and Japan didn’t care enough about their own and regional security to settle the issue of these tiny, insignificant islands in order to share national security intelligence, perhaps America should also think differently about how it fulfilled its security treaty commitments.

      THE SENKAKU ISLANDS

      The second issue that had ramifications for the future of the Pax Americana was China’s unilateral and unannounced establishment, on November 23, 2013, of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea that overlapped with Japan’s ADIZ in the same area, covering the Senkaku Islands. Beijing required aircraft of any type passing through this zone to file a flight plan with the Chinese authorities and to notify them when entering the space.

      Sovereignty disputes over the Senkakus between Japan and China were nothing new. In the wake of World War II, the islands had been kept under US Occupation authority and then turned over to Japan, along with Okinawa, when the islands reverted to Tokyo’s authority in 1972. According to accounts by former Japanese diplomat Hiroshi Hashimoto, during their 1972 talks on restoration of Japan-China diplomatic relations, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En Lai and Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka had agreed to leave resolution of the question of ultimate sovereignty over the islands to later generations. Quiet then prevailed until September of 2012, when the Japanese government bought three of the islands from their private owner. Ironically, Tokyo did this to forestall any private plans for economic development of the islands that might antagonize China. Tokyo’s intent to the contrary notwithstanding, Beijing was antagonized, claiming the purchase was a violation of the agreement between Zhou and Tanaka, and responded aggressively by sending fishing boats, patrol craft, and observation planes into the waters and skies around the islands. At one point, Chinese naval guns even locked their firing radar on Japanese Self-Defense Force planes. All of this seemed to be aimed at calling into question Japan’s ability to administer the islands and at forcing Japan to agree to negotiations over their eventual fate.

      Japan had no interest in negotiating as this might have constituted an admission of the possible validity of China’s claims. In the eyes of Tokyo, Japan’s ownership of the Senkakus could no more be disputed than China’s ownership of Taiwan.

      In this regard, however, a crucial question was what the United States thought. By treaty, it was obliged to come to Japan’s defense if Japanese territory were attacked. But did the Senkakus count as Japanese territory? On one hand, Washington recognized that Japan was administering the islands, and said in press statements in 2013 that it would defend against any effort to change that administration by force. On the other hand, it repeatedly responded to press questions by saying that it had no opinion on the question of which country’s historical claims were most valid. So the United States would not commit itself completely to support Japan’s position, and that gave a hint of danger to Tokyo.

      The imposition of the ADIZ by Beijing probed at this possible gap between Washington and Tokyo. The immediate US reaction was to announce that it would not recognize the zone. To prove the point, it immediately sent two B-52 bombers through the zone without prior notice or flight plans. While that was encouraging for Japan, Washington also directed all US airlines to act in accordance with the Chinese demands. This was less encouraging, as Japan had told its airlines to ignore the Chinese zone requirements. In early December, 2013, Vice President Joe Biden visited first Japan and then China. His mission was to reassure Japan of America’s strong commitment to its defense, while also not saying anything that might further disrupt US-China relations. In Beijing, he urged Chinese president Xi Jinping to administer the ADIZ passively, but did not suggest that China cancel the zone. To close observers, the message seemed clear. Washington was reluctant to risk offending China in defense of what Japan considered its right of sovereignty over the Senkakus. This became more worrying for Tokyo in May of 2013, when some Chinese generals stated that Japan also had no right of sovereignty over Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands.