By giving legal meaning to the distinction between “faith” and “action,” the courts have also disadvantaged Native American and Caribbean faiths. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld governmental actions that restrict the religious use of peyote, a hallucinogen consumed as part of certain Native religious practices. In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith (1990), two men who “ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church” were denied unemployment benefits after losing their jobs for using “illegal drugs.” Upholding the denial of benefits, the court reasoned that when the government prohibits an activity—in this case, drug use while on unemployment—a person cannot avoid that rule by saying they were engaged in a religious obligation.27 Likewise, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah (1993), the United State Supreme Court upheld a ban on the Santeria religious practice of sacrificing small animals as a violation of public health standards.
The Court has also refused to recognize that reverence for and preservation of nature and land are part of spiritual belief for many. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988), the Supreme Court allowed the US Forest Service to build a paved road through six miles of wilderness that the government’s own study had found was “significant as an integral and indispensable part of [American] Indian religious conceptualization and practice.” The study concluded that constructing a road along any of the available routes “would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas that are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples,” because essential to the peoples’ religious use of the area were “certain qualities of the physical environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting.” Even as it acknowledged that the road would threaten “the efficacy of at least some religious practices” in a way that would be “extremely grave,” the Court refused to compel the government to protect citizens’ religious practices. Road construction through sacred land was deemed constitutionally permissible under the free exercise clause.
Across all of these cases, one can argue that the Court was upholding the outcome that appears to affect everyone equally: military uniformity, a ban on using illegal drugs, a non-recognition of religious traditions that would protect a particular geographic location or topographic feature. But if we are going to call these laws “facially neutral,” as courts often do, we must recognize Christianity as the “face” against which other traditions are being compared. If Christian practice included devotional head covering, Dr. Goldman and Sikh soldiers would not have had to fight those fights. If Christians used peyote in their religious practice, it would never have been declared an illegal drug in the first place. If Christianity recognized the notion of sacred lands and called for spiritually important natural spaces to be undisturbed, the logging operations in Lyng would never have commenced. Thus, Christians will never experience a “facially neutral” ban on their practices, and the burden of government regulation will continue to fall only on religious minorities.
Indeed, when Christians find themselves at odds with a “facially neutral” law, they tend to win rather than lose. In Yoder v. Wisconsin (1972), the Court allowed Amish28 residents to withdraw their children from public schooling after eighth grade despite a state law requiring all children to attend school until the age of sixteen. The Court went to great lengths to convey its respect for the Amish religious belief, and ultimately permitted the Amish to withdraw their children from school two years before the law allowed. The Amish succeeded, in part, by appealing to the justices’ nostalgia for a mythic American past—the simple Christian America of horses and buggies and life on the farm. This national past, however romanticized, was one most of the justices could readily understand: Of the seven justices who participated in Yoder, six were Protestant and one, William J. Brennan, was Catholic. So, whereas in 1986 the Supreme Court would call Goldman’s yarmulke a “personal preference” which the Air Force could “subordinat[e] … in favor of the overall group mission,” in 1971 the Yoder Court wrote: “the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction.”29 In the Court’s own words, the Amish were aided in their appeal “by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society.”30 If access to religious liberty is most available to groups who have been here a long time and are familiar to the justices, can we really expect “equal justice under law” for immigrant religious minorities?
Even more recently, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), the Supreme Court applied the Free Exercise clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) to protect corporations whose individual owners were Christians with “religious objections to abortion.” Hobby Lobby sought to avoid providing its employees with a health plan that included family planning coverage, despite the Affordable Care Act’s requirements that health plans include reproductive health care for women. The Court ruled that Christian-owned businesses can avoid complying with the Affordable Care Act’s coverage requirements based on “the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies’ owners.”
The Hobby Lobby ruling shows that Christians may be able to use Christianity’s normative social power to upend First Amendment jurisprudence. In cases brought by religious minorities, like Goldman and Lyng, the “free exercise” of religious observances outside the Christian norm were not protected by the Constitution. Rather, the Court concluded that a standard applicable to everyone is religiously neutral, even when it prevents everyone but Christians from practicing their faith. Based on that reasoning, the Court perpetuated legal discrimination against religious minorities. But in Hobby Lobby, the Court treated the Affordable Care Act—a health insurance mandate—as if it were not religiously neutral. According to the majority opinion, individual evangelical claims of free religious exercise can supersede a federal law about health insurance, so that a business could avoid providing the coverage the law requires. Clearly, the notion of “neutrality” is shaped by the deep effects of Christian normativity on the Christian-majority Court. The collective message of the Court’s free exercise cases is that a burden on Christian practice offends the Constitution, while a burden on non-Christian practice does not.
Because most Supreme Court justices are themselves born, raised, socialized, and educated within the symbols and structures of White American society, with its deep Christian normativity, they tend to reach decisions that reflect this influence. The power of social norms, particularly those shaped by centuries of Christian hegemony, shapes “the law of the land.”31 Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, an earlier generation of Supreme Court justices stripped a Sikh immigrant of his citizenship because “the common man knows perfectly well” that a Sikh is a “brown Hindu” and not a “white person” entitled to US citizenship.32
Litigation and debates over the Establishment Clause (“Congress shall make no law regarding the establishment of religion”) also show the strong influence of Protestant norms, and a bias in favor of behavior that is clearly Christian. In 2014, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that beginning a public meeting with prayer from a “volunteer chaplain” does not violate the Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs in Greece, New York, were not even trying to eliminate prayer from public meetings—only asking the Court to instruct the town that prayers should be “inclusive and ecumenical” and addressed “to a ‘generic God.’” Greece’s practice was to have chaplains offer only Christian sectarian prayers—“prayers steeped in only one faith,” to quote Justice Kagan’s dissent. The town had never invited non-Christian clergy to deliver the prayers. A lower court concluded that these practices affiliated the town with Christianity, excluded other faiths, and therefore violated the Establishment Clause.33 But the Supreme Court found no problems with how Greece conducted its public meetings. The majority opinion looked to jurisdictions across the country and throughout US history, including the First Congress of the United States in 1789, and concluded that employing clergy to open legislative meetings