Rise of the Conservative Party
The IRA had spent much of the 1970s waging a violent campaign against unstable Labour governments. Few within the leadership of the Labour Party dared to grapple with the Irish crisis and Tony Benn, one of the most outspoken figureheads, created some disquiet in early 1979 when he privately raised the prospect of a ‘fundamental review’ of British strategy in a letter to the Prime Minister. Callaghan’s advisors suggested
that a public debate of a ‘Troops Out option’ was highly dangerous in an election year and might invite an escalation of IRA attacks in England.208 The discussion demonstrated the continuing concern in British government circles regarding local aspects of the conflict in Ireland. In this instance, the lexicon of debate was that formulated by British-based allies of Irish republicans.
James Callaghan’s government fell on a vote of no confidence on 28 March 1979, heralding a General Election which Labour had little chance of winning. While the tide of support was inexorably running out for the Labour administration, the trigger for its dramatic fall was centred on the maltreatment of Irish prisoners. The appearance of the Bennett Report in March 1979 discomforted the generally amenable Gerry Fitt MP who cited its findings on the systematic brutalization of suspected republicans by the RUC as the reason for his abstaining during the crucial vote.209 Frank Maguire also abstained on 28 March, as he had long threatened, in order to protest the manner in which IRA prisoners were being treated by the British authorities in England and Ireland.210 The net result was that the Labour Government collapsed in 1979 on its handing of Irish political prisoners less than two years after an Irish Labour/ Fine Gael Coalition had been rejected by the Twenty-Six County electorate due to similar grounds.211 Although only one of several factors in play, the formerly automatic pro-Labour votes of the Irish MPs for all intents and purposes equated to the balance of power.212 Election events organised by the British Labour Party were disrupted across England by the RCG, for which they were lambasted by former TD Conor Cruise O’Brien in The Observer. In Croydon, Seamus O Mathuna received a cold reception from Merlyn Rees upon raising the subject of the H-Block crisis.213
The political landscape changed on 4 May 1979 with the resounding victory of the Conservative Party, which brought Margaret Thatcher to power as Prime Minister. The prospects of republicans making significant political headway with the most right wing British government in decades appeared remote. Thatcher’s ascent had shortly followed a major personal setback when Irish socialist republicans blew up Airey Neave on 30 March 1979. Neave was not only her closest mentor during her ousting of previous party leader Edward Heath, but was intended to become Secretary for State for Northern Ireland. The sense of outrage within the establishment was sharpened by the fact that Neave had been killed by the INLA within the precincts of the House of Commons. Soviet - manufactured plastic explosives were detonated by a sophisticated mercury tilt switch which activated as Neave’s car ascended the exit ramp of Westminster’s underground carpark.214 The INLA had originally targeted the incumbent Northern Secretary Roy Mason in his Yorkshire Labour constituency but switched their focus to his equally virulent Conservative counterpart during the election the which Tories appeared poised to win.215 The organization had been in existence under various flags of convenience from 8 December 1974, but was only proscribed in Britain on 3 July 1979 under Section 1 (3) of the PTA (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976.216 Neave was one of the most vocal Conservatives to publicly oppose British military withdrawal from Ireland and evidently believed that the IRA could be defeated.217 Thatcher recalled his sudden loss in 1983, having survived an IRA attempt on her own life when in Downing Street: ‘For some reason the death of a friend or family member by violence leaves an even deeper scar’.218 In hindsight, moderate Tory John Wells told Thatcherite MP Alan Clark that ‘the historic consequences of Airey’s assassination could never be fully assessed’ and had resulted in ‘errors of judgment’ in appointments to her first Cabinet in 1979.219
The killing shocked outgoing Prime Minister Jim Callaghan, who, on 2 April 1979 addressed his National Executive Council to warn that arising from ‘the political assassinations that have taken place, particularly Airey Neave’s, there is a risk to NEC members’. Yet Mason, openly despised by dangerous enemies in Ireland, had been spared by the INLA and no Labour Party politician was ever shot or bombed to death by the IRA. Callaghan’s spiel digressed into the ‘issue of Northern Ireland and terrorism’, resulting in an extraordinary late office - declaration that opened blue water between the stated views of a man facing enforced retirement and the numerous courageous initiatives taken by his predecessor Harold Wilson: ‘We should have as little difference as possible between ourselves and the Tories. I think there should be talks with both parties to discuss’. Tony Benn MP, a genial and perceptive diarist, was perturbed by this improbable conflation of incident and arguably pusillanimous bipartisanship on a matter of principle and practicality.220
Extensive use was made of the PTA to question, often harshly in respect to Paddington Green, IRSP members living in England. Deirdre O’Shea, a left wing political activist with IRSP connections, lost several teeth when assaulted in the London police base. In December 1984 she was deeply engaged in efforts to protect her veteran activist mother, Dr. Maire ‘Betty’ O’Shea, from prosecution in an INLA - linked operation in England.221 Nick Mullen, student radical and a significant figure in IRA logistics in England in the late 1980s, was also detained for two days in Paddington Green in 1979 arising from the Neave assassination. Mullen was then involved with the IRSP, in which he encountered leading socialist republican personalities Naomi Brennan and Gerry Roche.222 Personal connections heightened the sense of grievance for IRA prisoners in England. Billy Armstrong knew and respected the IRSP/ INLA leader Ronnie Bunting, who was killed by a pro-British death squad on 15 October 1980.223 Bunting was one of a number of prominent IRSP and H-Block campaigners shot in 1979–1981, not least Noel Lyttle, Miriam Daly, John Turnly and Bernadette McAliskey. The involvement of British military personnel in collusion with embedded Loyalist auxiliaries was widely suspected, particularly when the integral involvement of UDA commander John McMichael was revealed.224 Another leading UDA member and British agent, Robert McConnell, claimed SAS assistance in the assassination of Turnly.225
Suspicions of such illicit co-operation were raised by Billy Armstrong and others in England regarding the fatal shooting of National H-Block Committee member and QUB lecturer Miriam Daly on 26 June 1980.226 Daly had cogently presented both academic and personal analyses of the Irish