I propose to insist that sperm banking practices cannot be detached from the reproductive complexes within which routinization is unfolding. Sperm banking and AID are medical technologies that, like others, are constantly in the making, and as such we must, as scholars, relentlessly attend to the productive and often unintended effects of their making. Through my assemblage ethnography I have set out to identify the contours of the configurations that allow for sperm banking in China today (chapters 1, 2, and 3), to track the “daily grind” practices that constitute it (chapters 4 and 5), and to examine how sperm banking comes to be used in the treatment of infertility (chapter 6). This requires attendance to the styles of knowing and rationalities of governing that shape and are shaped by regimes of reproductive practice on the ground, in the clinics and laboratories currently developing and scaling up individual techniques, from IVF to AID. Hence, akin to the analytical work that has been done around the emergence of particular “styles of thought” in biomedical science (Fleck, 1979), my central argument in this book is that—as the cryopreservation and insemination of third-party sperm have come to be translated into routinized medical practice over the last thirty years—a certain style of sperm banking has emerged in China that is unique because of the ways in which it has been shaped by the particular cultural, juridical, economic, and social configurations that make up China’s restrictive reproductive complex.
In making this argument, I want to mobilize Ludwik Fleck’s insights into how thought collectives can form in biomedical research settings. However, the sciences of sperm cryopreservation and artificial insemination have long since been translated into the medical technology of sperm banking–AID in China and elsewhere. Sperm banking is a routinized medical technology and as such the primary task of the sperm bank is to deliver quality-assured donor sperm to fertility clinics that provide regular AID treatment to couples living with male-factor infertility. And so rather than a thought collective, I will show how the sperm bank in Changsha (and in other cities) is better conceived of as a practice collective within which we find routinized and protocolled daily procedures as well as socialities of lab workers, nurses, recruiters, doctors, donors, and administrators. Fleck argued that “like any style, the thought style also consists of a certain mood and of the performance by which it is realised” (1979, p. 99), and indeed in what follows we will gain insights into the mood and performance within the practice collectives that make up sperm banking in China today.10 For, while each sperm bank in China can be analyzed as a practice collective in its own right, I will show that there are commonalities linking each of these practice collectives in China together to the extent that it makes sense to talk about a specific cyclic and high throughput style of sperm banking. This style of sperm banking manifests itself in the ways in which daily routines are organized around tasks of recruitment, screening, semen analysis, record-keeping, cryopreservation, and distribution, which, in turn, shape the ways in which donor sperm is made available to and accessed by certain bureaucratically circumscribed infertile couples who can afford AID cycles in China.
In carrying out the research for this book, I have been guided by two overarching analytical and methodological objectives. Firstly, I have wanted to broaden the empirical scope of social studies of sperm banking beyond America and Europe. Research from this part of the world has often pointed to and been critical of an ongoing commodification of the body and its substances. In a global reproductive bioeconomy, gamete procurement, fertilization, implantation, gestation, termination, and birth have each become specialized fields of laboratory-clinic practice. Rene Almeling and others have shown how “the practice of clinically transferring eggs and sperm from body to body is now part of a multi-billion-dollar market” in countries like the United States and Denmark (Almeling, 2011, p. 2; see also Adrian, 2010; Kroløkke, 2009; Mamo, 2005; Martin, 2017; Mohr, 2016; Moore, 2008; Tober, 2001; Waldby et al., 2013), a market that is but one subfield within ever expanding exchanges of human biological material—from organs to blood, bone, and cadavers—across the globe (Hoeyer, 2013; Scheper-Hughes, 2000). Sperm banks, egg agencies, and commercial fertility clinics recruit and screen donors, pay for their eggs and sperm, and market extended profiles of “super donors” to infertile couples, single women, as well as gay and lesbian couples who can “click-a-donor” as they shop around. What we have yet to see, however, are social studies focusing on the development and routinization of sperm banking outside of a Western setting.
In the following chapters, I will argue that while ARTs in general and sperm banking in particular are certainly being commercialized in China today (they are seriously big business); alongside health care in general, the analytical traction that commodification provides in accounting for the daily routines of sperm banking in China is limited (cf. Hoeyer, 2007). First of all, Ministry of Health guidelines in China specify that “it is prohibited to market sperm [which] shall not be treated as a commodity in market transaction” (MoH, 2003b, p. F3), even if a case can be made that it to some extent is, not least in the form of a shadow black market for sperm. Moreover, in accordance with family planning regulations, only married couples in China with “qualification of pregnancy” certificates can access donor sperm. Single women and lesbian couples (the only real “growth segment” in America and Europe these days, I was told by one sperm bank director from Europe) are barred from using sperm banks, even as sperm banks have their work cut out for them just to meet demand from infertile couples. Chinese regulations prohibit the import and export of sperm, thus restricting the operation of sperm banks. On their part, infertile couples in China have little choice when it comes to sperm donors in the face of chronic shortages. There are no websites that would allow them to click through extended donor profiles. Instead, couples most often wait two to three years before donor sperm becomes available and are then advised by doctors when looking at a list of perhaps four to six different anonymous donors on an Excel sheet with fifteen columns of basic information. And finally, restricting the number of women’s pregnancies per donor to five, as I have pointed out, has resulted in an arduous and costly high throughput style of sperm banking, which bank administrators see as “constraining” for their operations, however much they might agree with the reasons for it. Costs per donor are much higher in China because one qualified donor can be used by only five couples, compared to as many as 30 to 100 offspring from a single donor in Europe or America.
My second overarching objective has been to shift analytical attention away from globalization, exportation, importation, and technology transfer, toward routinization and making when studying reproductive technologies in non-Western parts of the world. Lisa Handwerker (1995), Marcia Inhorn (2003), Aditya Bharadwaj (2003; 2016), Viola Hörbst (2012), and Elizabeth Roberts (2012) have been among the first ethnog-raphers to study the burgeoning use of ARTs outside Europe and America—in China, Egypt, India, Mali, and Ecuador respectively. Com-mon to their studies has been an analytical