An October 1982 letter to the editor of the Washington Post written by E. G. Windchy of Alexandria captured the initial gentle push for a memorial for Korean War veterans: “Where is the Korean War memorial? Somehow I never can find that.”27 The tone of this letter—wry, gentle humor, not entitled outrage—is interesting. In 1982, with the buildup to the dedication of the VVM underway, it expressed a sense that if the Vietnam veterans were getting a memorial, the Korean War veterans should get one too. A few years later, the lack of a memorial would become a source of righteous anger for many. By 1985, the gentle chiding was gone; when Virginia representative Stan Parris, a Korean War veteran, introduced a bill calling for the building of a memorial to honor Korean War veterans in Washington, the congressional record was full of indignation.
This new indignation is reflected in the headlines that followed passage of the Korean War Veteran Act of 1985. The Christian Science Monitor headline “Giving Korean War Vets Their Due” captures the mood. The refrain in newspapers—“They don’t have one . . . and they should”—was repeated again and again. In the fall of 1985, a New York Times article begins, “Almost as many (54,259) died in the Korean War as in the Vietnam War (58,022) but there is no Korean War memorial in the Washington area,”28 and a Los Angeles Times editorial begins, “At least two decades late, a bill is moving through Congress to erect a Korean War memorial.”29 Remembering the forgotten war in these conversations had remarkably little to do with the war to be remembered. And, between G. Holcomb in 1955 and E. G. Windchy in 1982, a significant shift in logic is evident. Holcomb turned to Lincoln at Gettysburg to justify his interest in a memorial about the particular details of the war, while Windchy assumed that a memorial should be built because it was appropriate and the Vietnam veterans had one.
Kim’s committee, which successfully initiated the push for the memorial, lobbied at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial dedication not only for a Korean War memorial but also for the particular shape it should take. The committee explicitly marked the emergent Korean War Memorial as a response to the VVM both in the need to remember the soldiers who served in these Cold War conflicts and also in the need to correct the anticelebratory, antiheroic design of the VVM.30 These terms were neither inevitable nor universally desired. They were, however, the terms that would triumph in the struggle over the memorial design. And it is important to note that these terms did not come from the veterans.
Before 1985 there was no active national organization of Korean War veterans. In 1984 Korean War veteran Bill Norris was dismayed by the poor turnout of Korean War veterans at a Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division Association reunion and set out to connect with his fellow veterans. He had trouble generating interest at first, but his persistence led to the formation of the Korean War Veterans Association. Their modest first meeting was a memorial service at Arlington National Cemetery in July 1985. On that day each veteran carried a single mum—a flower symbolizing both sorrow and the silence of the memory of the war.31 At this meeting they produced a statement of principles for their fledgling organization: “To support the ideals this Great Country was founded on; To maintain the dignity and pride of the Korean War veterans who served this country when asked to; To work towards the recognition of those who did not return from the Korean War; To maintain and foster the comradeship between the men and women who served during the Korean War; To perpetuate the memory and reason which required our service during the Korean War.”32
This statement is straightforward and moving, especially the final principle. They were not just asking to be remembered; they were seeking to “perpetuate the memory and reason” for their service. And although they were not writing about a war memorial and did not form the organization with a war memorial in mind, they became key advocates for the memorial, and their terms for remembering the war could have been useful as the process moved forward.
THE LEGISLATION AND THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE
This brave group has been leapfrogged by time and it is up to those of us serving in Congress to rectify the situation.
REP. STAN PARRIS
In October 1985, the Ninety-Ninth Congress passed the Korean War Veterans Act authorizing $1 million for the design, planning, and construction of a Korean War memorial. This was the third time the memorial had been proposed in Congress. In 1982, Representative John Hammerschmidt sponsored “a joint resolution to authorize the erection of a memorial on public grounds in the District of Columbia, or its environs, in honor and commemoration of members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served in the Korean War.”33 In 1983, Claude Pepper introduced a different bill. Adding “Allied Forces,” this one read, “A joint resolution to authorize the erection of a memorial on public grounds in the District of Columbia, or its environs, in honor and commemoration of members of the Armed Forces of the United States and the Allied Forces who served in the Korean War.”34 Both bills died in committee. A 1985 version, which was approved, dropped the allied forces; the logic behind this deletion is not made explicit in the congressional record, but the debate about the 1985 bill is revealing. The war to be remembered was an American war fought by American troops, and the role of the United Nations got precious little mention. Korea, communism, the millions of Koreans killed, and the Cold War also received hardly a passing mention.
The terms of the discussion in Congress echo the sentiments expressed in newspapers. Over and over again, the memorial is described as long overdue. The reason for building a memorial is universally assumed: to recognize the sacrifices of those who served. The war itself is described only in the most generic terms, as a quest for freedom, and the numbers of Americans who served and died are repeatedly emphasized. The service and sacrifice of the American soldiers are the central concerns. Representative Stan Parris was a sponsor of the bill; his language reflects the tenor of sentiments expressed in Congress.35 In May 1985 he stated, “A great disservice has been done to a very large segment of our population—a group of 5.7 million American Citizens who served during the Korean War.” He continued, “54,236 Americans made the ultimate sacrifice for their country and the ideals of freedom . . . ideals which form the foundation upon which this nation rests.” To him it was “incredible to note that there is not a memorial in the nation’s capital.” He concluded, “[T]his brave group has been leapfrogged by time and it is up to those of us serving in Congress to rectify the situation.”36
The final legislation is fairly straightforward. Public Law 99–572 was signed by Ronald Reagan on October 28, 1986, and calls for a memorial “in honor and commemoration of members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served in the Korean War.” It guarantees space on the Mall and puts the American Battle Monuments Commission in charge of overseeing the building of the memorial. It calls for the establishment of an all-veteran Korean War Memorial Advisory Board (KWMAB) to do two things. First, it was to select the design—subject, as is the case with all memorials built on federal lands in Washington, to the approval of American Battle Monuments Commission, the Commission of Fine Arts, and the National Capital Planning Commission. Second, it was to oversee fundraising for the memorial, or, in the language of the bill—“encourage private donations for the memorial.”37
The precedent had been set in this period for memorials on the National Mall to be built with private donations, when the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund rejected federal funds for their memorial for explicit political reasons.38 And though advocates for the Korean War Veterans Memorial did not seem to share this political position, they were required to raise the money to pay for their memorial from private sources. The Ninety-Ninth Congress also approved the building of a memorial for black Revolutionary War veterans