The early success of the boycott exceeded the expectations of Chavez and the leadership of the union. During the first two years, growers watched the “free on board” (FOB) price of a lug (box) of their grapes plummet from a high of over $6 in 1966 to approximately $5.50 in 1968, on its way down to $4.89 in 1969.10 In addition to Drake, who served as the information director for Chavez, LeRoy Chatfield and a Bay Area ally, Mike Miller, communicated with boycott organizers located in key cities around the country. Indicative of the supplemental role the boycott played in this period, some of the communication came from Delano, where Chatfield and Drake spent much of their time, and some of the communication emanated from a San Francisco office convenient to Miller’s location.11 The union lacked so much in the way of infrastructure that Chavez had to rely on staff located throughout the state to carry out multiple tasks. Those involved in the boycott celebrated the moral victory of swaying the consumers in a given city or at a specific market but had little time to devise a system for charting their success. Tantamount to building a plane while flying it, Chavez and a small group of leaders constructed the union by stringing together public relations victories that gathered endorsements from a diverse set of supporters.
Securing well-positioned allies had been one of the early keys to Chavez’s success. For example, when the AFL-CIO convened its annual meeting in San Francisco in 1965, the grape strike and boycott had piqued the interest of fellow unionists, but no one in organized labor formally endorsed the farm workers until UAW president, Walter Reuther, stepped out in support of the union. In the spring of 1967, Senator Robert F. Kennedy drew media attention to the struggle in a series of hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor. Although the subcommittee chair, Senator George Murphy (R-California), staunchly supported agribusiness and hoped to sway public opinion against the farm workers, Kennedy’s aggressive questioning of the Kern County sheriff, LeRoy Gallyen, on charges of false arrests of picketers exposed law enforcement officials’ abuse of activists’ civil rights and ignorance of the law. After the last hearing, Kennedy paid an unexpected visit to Filipino Hall, where he declared his support for the grape strike. Kennedy later joined a UFW picket line at DiGiorgio’s ranch and was a close ally of the movement for the remainder of his life.12
The success of the boycott and the political events surrounding the Delano-to-Sacramento march placed Schenley and DiGiorgio on the wrong side of public opinion. Although grape growers dug their collective heels in against the union, Schenley’s chief executive officer, Lewis Rosensteil, recognized the UFW campaign as a liability to the many products marketed by his company. Blackey Levitt’s ability to deliver support from the bartenders union and the cooperation of the Teamsters in San Francisco not to load Schenley products worried the company brass, as Schenley’s vice president James Woolsey later testified to the California Senate Subcommittee on Agriculture: “These reprisals and the publicity presented a threat of serious damage to our business on a nationwide scale. Our sales department felt that even more damaging than any decline in our sales was the adverse publicity that accompanied the boycott and the NFWA organizing activities.”13 Schenley was one of the four largest liquor distributors in the country, and its primary ownership of Central Valley grape vineyards had to do with wine production, not table grapes. Moreover, whereas the table grape growers had a tradition of not negotiating with unions, Schenley settled a strike by Galarza’s National Farm Labor Union in 1952 by increasing wages, establishing a grievance procedure, and rehiring workers who had been locked out during the initial conflict. For a shrewd businessman like Rosensteil, anything that sullied the national reputation of his products had to be eliminated.14
Rosensteil broke ranks with other owners and called on attorney Sidney Korchak to broker a deal with Chavez. A mercurial man with assumed connections to the Chicago mob and a reputation for “fixing” labor problems in the liquor and film industry, Korchak summoned Chavez, Levitt, Teamster representatives, and AFL-CIO representative, Bill Kircher, to his Beverly Hills mansion on April 3, 1966. The meeting preceded the merger of the NFWA and AWOC in August; however, Kircher’s presence provided representation for AWOC. According to Marshall Ganz, everyone at the meeting had an agenda, but Korchak recognized that “it was the NFWA that controlled the boycott.” As a consequence, Korchak recognized the NFWA as the union to represent Schenley workers and agreed to an immediate 35 cents per hour increase in wages to $1.75, the creation of a union-run hiring hall, and the option for workers to join the NFWA credit union upon their affiliation. He also promised full contract negotiations to replace the temporary agreement in exchange for an end to the boycott against Schenley.15
News of the breakthrough reached the marchers in Lodi, California, on April 6, just four days prior to Easter Sunday and the culmination of the perigrinación in Sacramento. The next day DiGiorgio, the other corporate giant in the fields, announced its willingness to recognize a union, but without fully endorsing the NFWA. Rather, it expressed its support for a secret ballot election, with the NFWA, AWOC, and a company union, Tulare-Kern Independent Farm Workers, as options. When the press exposed the company’s ties to TKIFW, DiGiorgio shifted tactics and appealed to the Teamsters to organize farm workers. Initially, DiGiorgio attempted to run an election at its Borrego Springs Ranch in San Diego County without agreeing to terms with either the NFWA or AWOC. When the NFWA appealed to workers to boycott the election and AWOC agreed, nearly half the 732 workers refused to participate, invalidating the results.16
To DiGiorgio’s surprise, its attempt to divide the NFWA and AWOC had the reverse effect, driving the two unions closer and making it possible for Kircher to engineer their merger into the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee.17 Fred Ross, who came to Delano to help with the DiGiorgio campaign, recalled, “Cesar learned as he went along; he knew he had to have money, and he had to have more strength.” According to Ross, “He had to do it,” but the decision to merge with AWOC did not sit well with many of the organizers who had hoped to maintain their independence. Chavez sympathized with these concerns, explaining, “I was worried that it would curb our style.” Among his chief concerns, AWOC’s tacit recognition of the government’s restriction against “secondary boycotts” compelled him to push for terms that would allow for a continuation of its use. “I told them I didn’t mind joining,” Chavez told the reporter Ron Taylor, “as long as we got a good deal, but we had to have the right to boycott.”18 Ultimately, the two sides got what they were looking for: AWOC wanted a union supported by the Mexican workers who constituted the majority of the NFWA’s rank and file, and the NFWA wanted the approval from the AFL-CIO that had been backing AWOC.
The formation of the UFW did not please everyone, and some from each organization defected to the Teamsters or left labor organizing completely. For most, however, Chavez adroitly navigated around conflict by honoring many of the Filipino organizers who initiated the 1965 AWOC grape strike. Larry Itliong became second in command of UFW, and Andy Imutan and Phillip Vera Cruz were named vice presidents. Veterans of the NFWA Dolores Huerta, Gilbert Padilla, and Tony Orendain also became vice presidents, while LeRoy Chatfield continued as an important manager of the new union’s affairs from its base in Delano. Meanwhile, Chris Hartmire and Jim Drake continued to steer urban support and dollars toward the movement through Migrant Ministry.19
DiGiorgio attempted to protect the reputation of its national products, S & W Fine Foods and Treesweet fruit juices, just as Schenley had, by separating itself from the San Joaquin Valley growers’ clique and pursuing peace with the union. Another company, Perelli-Minetti, a producer of quality wines and vermouth, pursued a similar solution when the newly formed