On November 10, 2011, President Obama announced that he was delaying a decision for twelve to eighteen months, pending further State Department review. Pressure from environmental groups had clearly paid off. As McKibben described the development in his email announcing the victory, “Six months ago, almost no one outside the pipeline route even knew about Keystone XL. One month ago, a secret poll of ‘energy insiders’ by the National Journal found that ‘virtually all’ expected easy approval of the pipeline by year’s end. As late as last week the CBC [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation] reported that TransCanada was moving huge quantities of pipe across the border and seizing land by eminent domain, certain that its permit would be granted. A done deal has come spectacularly undone.” Sierra Club executive director Michael Brune attributed Obama’s decision to “people power,” noting that “the earth moved in Washington, D.C., today” and that “without such a strong, organized, and righteous movement, we never would have prevailed.”20
McKibben, Brune, and other environmental leaders recognized that Obama might simply delay Keystone’s final approval until after the election. He could use the temporary denial to secure environmentalist support for his reelection campaign, then uphold the pipeline during his new administration. But they also believed that a State Department review would almost certainly find the pipeline impact report deficient, making the project as proposed unlikely to ever be built.
GOP Plan Backfires
But there would be yet another twist to the story. As part of a December 2011 deal on extending popular payroll tax cuts, Republican pipeline supporters demanded that Obama make a decision on Keystone within two months of the budget agreement. Although initially opposed to such a rider to a debt ceiling measure, Obama angered environmentalists by reversing course and agreeing to the two-month deadline. Sierra Club president Michael Brune described the inclusion of Keystone in the tax deal as “bullshit.” McKibben made sure that anger over the reversal targeted Obama: “People literally put their bodies on the lines and they thanked the president when they took him seriously. And the president said he was acting on principle and that it was important and if that resolve lasts five weeks and that’s it, if all it takes is Newt Gingrich getting up and expostulating San Francisco and environmental extremists for him to turn around, that’s really sad.” Betsy Taylor, a philanthropic adviser to climate donors and foundations, helped organize more than eighty-five donors and volunteers for the 2008 campaign to send a letter to Obama urging him to reject Keystone. Taylor echoed McKibben’s theme: “If the president waffles on this or fails to act decisively, it will send a huge chill through the community. Will people vote for him? Yes. Will they work for him, raise money for him and activate their networks for him? Not likely.”21
To maintain pressure, 350.org scheduled a mass rally at the White House on January 24, 2012, only days before Obama’s expected decision on the permit. But on January 18 the president preempted this event by denying the permit. “The rushed and arbitrary deadline insisted on by Congressional Republicans,” Obama announced, “prevented a full assessment of the pipeline’s impact, especially the health and safety of the American people, as well as our environment.” McKibben, astutely using the positive side of the fear-and-loathing strategy, responded to Obama’s denial by saying, “The knock on Barack Obama from many quarters has been that he’s too conciliatory. But here, in the face of a naked political threat from Big Oil to exact ‘huge political consequences,’ he’s stood up strong.” Obama’s decision allowed TransCanada to make another application for the pipeline, but McKibben noted that even a “re-route will do nothing to address the climate impacts of burning tar sands, the economic downside of continuing our addiction to oil, the risks the pipeline poses to other states along the route, or the political influence Big Oil continues to use to override the interests of the American people. If this pipeline comes back, so will we.”22
The Keystone XL campaign illustrates how far the environmental movement’s strategic savvy has come since Bill Clinton’s first term. Environmental groups that did not want to burn bridges with the Clinton-Gore administration over the East Liverpool incinerator chose a different course here. Part of this shift was due to the framing of Keystone as a national and even international climate change issue that demanded an all-out fight. But equally important was that environmental groups had learned that giving politicians a pass on breaking environmental commitments to one constituency leads to further betrayals. As a result of environmentalists adopting a clear fear-and-loathing approach, a “done deal” for Big Oil unraveled and green political clout grew.
On February 17, 2013, an estimated 50,000 anti-Keystone activists convened at the Washington Monument and marched past the White House in the largest climate change rally in U.S. history. Primarily organized by the Sierra Club, 350.org, and the Hip Hop Caucus, the event urged President Obama to move “ForwardOnClimate,” cleverly using the president’s 2012 campaign theme of “Forward” to hold him accountable on climate change. Four days earlier, on the day after Obama vowed to combat climate change in his 2013 State of the Union address, the Sierra Club engaged in civil disobedience for the first time in its 120-year history when its executive director, Michael Brune, was among dozens of activists arrested at a White House anti-Keystone protest. Keystone had become the key environmental litmus test for the president, and a case study for how green activists should hold politicians accountable.
NO SE PUEDE ON IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
Like environmentalists, immigrant rights activists began the Obama presidency with high hopes. Their chief goal was comprehensive immigration reform that would create a path to citizenship for 8 to 12 million primarily Latino undocumented immigrants. Momentum appeared to be on the activists’ side. The movement had brought millions into the streets in support of comprehensive reform in the spring of 2006. In 2008, a higher Latino voter turnout helped Obama win four states that had gone Republican four years earlier (Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, and Florida). Many believed that the Republican Party could not afford to sacrifice Latino votes in future elections by opposing immigration reform, and President Obama was publicly committed to its enactment. Immigrant rights advocates regarded Obama as an ally; his administration would provide the movement its first real test of its ability to hold a Democratic president accountable.
Unfortunately, as too often happens after a long-disenfranchised constituency gains additional power and helps elect a political ally, immigrant rights leaders failed to confront Obama with the fear-and-loathing approach necessary for success. Like San Francisco tenant leaders after helping elect Art Agnos as mayor, immigrant rights activists continued to trust Obama well after it became clear that he would not honor his commitments. The president had close relations with many of the key immigrant rights movement stakeholders, including the president of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Andy Stern, who often talked about his many invitations to the White House. These relationships and other factors allowed Obama to entirely ignore comprehensive immigration reform during his critical first year in office, and, even worse, to set new records for deportations.
Danger signs about Obama’s commitment to enacting comprehensive immigration reform emerged even before he took office when he selected Arizona governor Janet Napolitano to be secretary of homeland security. Napolitano had maintained popularity by allowing antiimmigrant attitudes to fester in her state, which was becoming notorious for the racist outrages of Maricopa County sheriff Joe Arpaio. Obama’s appointment of Napolitano reflected a defensive strategy that sought to reduce opposition to comprehensive reform by addressing opponents’ demands for strengthened border control and increased deportations. Napolitano’s replacement as Arizona governor was a Republican, so Obama’s appointment of her also increased the power of the state’s anti-Latino forces.
Immigrant rights activists understood that getting an economic stimulus bill through Congress was President Obama’s first priority. They also recognized that his next priority was health care, but were told that this would not sidetrack work on immigration reform. Here’s where activists made their first mistake. As the above examples from San Francisco and the Clinton administration show, politicians use their first months in office to