Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, and in particular his concept “language games,” offers a good starting point for thinking about and studying non-human animal and interspecies languages. Wittgenstein argues that the way in which language works and its interconnection to social practices means we can never give a universal definition of language as a whole, or fixed definitions of separate concepts. If we want to study language, we should instead investigate the meaning of different language games (chapter 2) by examining how and where they are used. This method of studying language is well suited to the study of non-human animal and interspecies language games for various reasons. A focus on existing practices and the social context in which language games gain meaning allows us to acknowledge and better understand non-human animal agency in language. Language games also consist of more than words: Wittgenstein emphasizes the importance of gestures and other non-linguistic expressions in creating meaning (PI§7). Gestures, movements, and other non-verbal expressions play an important role in the languages of other animals. Existing human concepts can offer guidelines for understanding the meaning of certain practices, and Wittgenstein’s ideas about how language games are related—by means of a family resemblance—can shed light on similarities and relations in human, non-human, and interspecies language games. Finally, Wittgenstein views language as essentially a public practice, arguing that meaning originates from the relation between language and world, which helps us to see why skepticism about the minds of other animals—human and non-human—is misguided (chapters 2 & 3).
My aim in this book is not, however, to present a full theory of non-human animal languages. Humans are only just beginning to learn about many non-human animal languages, and it would be empirically impossible to develop a final theory of animal language. Furthermore, rethinking what language is should not be a solely human endeavor, and it is not up to humans to define what constitutes meaningful communication for others. In order not to repeat anthropocentrism, we need to learn about language in interaction with other animals.
In further developing ideas about language and politics in an interspecies context, it is important to keep in mind that there is, of course, no such thing as the political animal voice or “the animal” (Derrida 2008). There are many different species, communities, and groups of non-human and human animals, and they all have their own languages and cultures. There are also many different relations and encounters between different groups of animals, including those of the human variety. In order to rethink language and politics with other animals, we need to take these differences into account. We also need to be careful not to use the human as a standard for measuring other animals, because this pre-excludes many of them, and makes it difficult to see them in their own right. This means we need to challenge human exceptionalism together with the view that there is a binary opposition between “the human” and “the animal.” We should pay attention to the variety of ways in which other animals speak and act politically, and search for ways to form new, better relations with them. This should not just be a human project, because other animals have their unique perspectives on their own lives and on their relations with humans, and their own ways of formulating these. Humans and other animals can, and already do, have relations in which species is not the determining factor in achieving understanding or intimacy, and in which humans aim not to oppress the other animals with whom they share households or land. These relations can offer us insights into how change is possible, and can function as starting points for thinking about new forms of coexistence.
Theorizing from the Ground Up: A Note on Method
Until now, the political turn in animal studies has primarily been advanced by philosophers and political theorists working in the tradition of Anglo-American analytical liberal political philosophy (i.e., Cochrane 2012; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Garner 2013; and O’Sullivan 2011). In this book, supported by empirical ethological studies, I bring their ideas into conversation with insights from other philosophical traditions, most notably phenomenology and post-structuralism. I do so because I do not simply defend the view that we need to take animal voices into account politically. This project is also an investigation of what concepts such as “language” and “politics” mean and could mean in relation to other animals, and how they have been constructed. We need to do both because non-human animals have been excluded not only from our political communities, institutions, and conversations, but also from the concepts we use to describe and think about them.
Language is a good example of how this works. Other animals have been excluded from this concept from very early on in Western traditions of thinking. As discussed above, Aristotle famously separated human language from non-human animal use of voice, thereby drawing boundaries around “language” and the political community in one movement. This is not a neutral or natural step: unequal power relations play a role in this process, and we could even say that our view of language has been constructed by excluding other animals. In order to develop a theory of non-human animal and interspecies languages, we cannot, therefore, simply draw on ethological research that investigates the linguistic capacities of other animals and say that other animals “have” language; we also need to investigate how this concept was constructed and how it is used and has been used in relation to other animals. This critical investigation can function as the basis for developing a new phenomenological understanding of language together with other animals. As I argue in more detail below, insights from different traditions can shed light on different aspects of this question.
Recognizing the role that power relations play in constituting the meaning of concepts also has consequences for the political philosophical standpoints adopted in this book. My phenomenological approach to political concepts can perhaps best be described as “from the ground up,” meaning I start with non-human animal agency and interspecies relations, as described in the case studies and other examples I use, as the basis for the development of my philosophical views. I do not, for example, start from the basic principles of liberal democratic theory and then argue for including non-human animal interests; rather, I evaluate the relevance of concepts such as citizenship, sovereignty, or deliberation through the lens of non-human animal agency and interspecies politics. Rights, and other liberal democratic institutions, practices, and processes, may play a large role in improving the lives of other animals, and a critical investigation of these can lay the foundation for new interspecies relations. However, as I discuss in more detail in the second part of the book, while rights and other human inventions can be important stepping stones towards better relations, they cannot be the final goal. It is not up to humans to come up with a full political theory into which other animals fit; to do so would be to repeat anthropocentrism (see also chapters 1 & 8). Just relations can only ultimately come into being through interaction with other animals.
Theorizing from the ground up also means that these explorations are rooted in a liberal democratic reality. This is relevant from a material point of view because existing institutions, rights, and practices can be changed to better incorporate animal voices, and this would make a significant difference for many non-human animals. Theoretically, it is also important to start with existing situations in order not to make universal or metaphysical claims about other animals; this would again be a matter of humans deciding what is best for other animals without consulting them. Just as with language, however, while rights and other liberal democratic institutions and practices carry a promise of justice and can make a difference for many non-human animals, one must remain critical of the system in which they are grounded, and bring to light the power relations that helped to create them. This is especially important in the case of non-human animals, who were not just excluded from rights by accident, but were seen as the “other” in relation to which “the human” was constructed (chapter 1, Derrida 2008). In order to move beyond that and conceptualize new futures, we must learn from other animals and from non-Western human cultures (Ko and Ko 2017).
In this book, I therefore discuss existing concepts from different theoretical angles, rooted in existing practices, and explore how we can use these as tools to begin thinking and acting differently. Because thinking and acting differently will need to happen in an interspecies context, and because we do not know how other animals will act once they no longer need to fear humans, the outcome of this is unclear. As Hannah Arendt shows ([1958]