3.1.5 A multi-dimensional model
3.2 Sanctions variables: Economic costs and democratic goal
3.2.1 Economic costs of sanctions to the target
3.2.2 Democratic goal of sanctions
3.3 Regime variables: Personalism and legitimacy
3.3.1 Personalist regime
3.3.2 Regime legitimacy
3.4 Economic variables: Vulnerability and development
3.4.1 Vulnerability
3.4.2 Development
3.5 Control variables: Natural resources and war
3.5.1 Natural resources
3.5.2 Civil war
3.6 Summary
Part II Designing
4 The market of political survival
4.1 Players: Horizontal and vertical threats
4.2 Tools: Repression, economic transfers, political power
4.2.1 Repression
4.2.2 Economic transfers
4.2.3 Political power
4.2.3.1 Vertical: Co-optation
4.2.3.2 Horizontal: Enfranchisement
4.3 Integrating the variables
4.3.1 Economic costs of sanctions
4.3.2 Democratic goal of sanctions
4.3.3 Personalist regime
4.3.4 Regime legitimacy
4.3.5 Economic vulnerability
4.3.6 Development
4.3.7 Natural resources
4.3.8 Civil war
4.4 Overview process
5 Methodology
5.1 Unit of analysis
5.1.1 Time
5.1.2 Excluded cases
5.1.3 Case coding
5.1.4 Sources
5.2 Operationalizing the dependent variable
5.3 Operationalizing the independent variables
5.3.1 Economic costs of sanctions
5.3.2 Democratic goal
5.3.3 Personalist regime
5.3.4 Regime legitimacy
5.3.5 Economic vulnerability
5.3.6 Development
5.4 Operationalizing the control variables
5.4.1 Natural resources
5.4.2 Civil war
5.5 Limitations
5.6 Econometric model
Part III Evaluating
6 Findings
6.1 Main model
6.2 Robustness checks
6.2.1 Multicollinearity
6.2.2 Resource-rich states and civil war states
6.2.3 Time
6.2.4 Autocracies and global trend
6.3 Interpretation
6.3.1 Variable 1: Economic costs of sanctions
6.3.2 Variable 2: Democratic goal of sanctions
6.3.3 Variable 3: Personalist regime
6.3.4 Variable 4: Regime legitimacy
6.3.5 Variable 5: Economic vulnerability
6.3.6 Variable 6: Development
6.3.7 Sanction design
6.3.8 Re-conceptualizing
7 So what? Implications and recommendations
7.1 Metatheoretical implications
7.1.1 Ontology of success
7.1.2 Epistemological issues
7.1.3 Methodological bias and manipulation
7.2 Research recommendations
7.2.1 Sanctions-related research recommendations
7.2.2 Regime-related research recommendations
7.3 Policy recommendations
7.4 A Kantian use of economic statecraft
7.5 Lessons learned
Appendix
A. Cases of economic sanctions
B. Types and goals of sanctions
C. Results
List of figures
Bibliography
| AU | African Union |
| BAFA | Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control) |
| CV | control variable |
| DPRK | Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) |
| DV | dependent variable |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| EU | European Union |
| EUR | Euro (€) |
| FDI | foreign direct investment |
| FRY | Federal Republic of Yugoslavia |
| FH | Freedom in the World Index; Freedom House 2018 |
| GCC | Gulf Cooperation Council |
| GDP | gross domestic product |
| GIGA | GIGA sanctions dataset; Portela & Soest 2012 |
| GNP | gross national product |
|
GWF
|